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This thesis is endeavored to address the question whether and how 
catching up by backward countries depends more on technology 
diffusion or on indigenous innovation. We claim that the apparently obvious 
answer to this question involves a range of frequently controversial issues 
regarding the very definition of innovation and the role of government 
within the innovation system.
One of the key lessons the avid reader may derive from the discussion of 
the theory and empirical evidence throughout the different chapters of the 
book, is the need to rectify the theoretical structure from which relevant 
policy recommendations may be obtained regarding the promotion of 
innovation as a fundamental engine of economic growth. We hold that 
such recommendations are better informed by the evolutionary and 
innovation systems approaches than by the more extended reliance on 
the advantage of backwardness approach.
Summing up, we argue that a broad view of innovation, inclusive of both 
low-tech and high-tech innovations, is needed if we are going to gain a 
better understanding of the determinants of growth and catching up in 
backward countries. And among the many desirable characteristics of 
a good innovation system, we hold that there are three encompassing 
mechanisms that feature prominently in successful catching up 
economies regarding the role of government: leadership, sponsorship 
and coordination. Thus we conclude that, despite their importance, to be 
effective, innovation policy needs to go beyond the conventional focus 
on financial facilities and friendly regulations to foreign technology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The core objective of this thesis is to bridge two contesting intellectual tradi-
tions that currently shape the understanding about the best way less developed
countries can catch-up with countries at the frontier in terms of income per
capita.1 One of these traditions, the mainstream in our discussion, is associated
with the issues of convergence spurred by the Solow model which were followed
by numerous contributions of the endogenous growth literature and, currently,
is split into two versions, so-called the Semi-endogenous and the Product-variety
Schumpeterian models of growth.2 The other tradition relates to contributions
on issues of innovation, economic growth and catching-up that are underlined
by the theory of evolutionary economics and contributions of the literature on
1The issues of catching-up (and convergence) have been object of continuous controversy
and debate, including conceptual reviews, new theoretical avenues and empirical evaluations,
since the very beginning of the economics science—Pomeranz 2009 actually refers to it as a
process of “Great Divergence” that started with the industrial revolution. The present day
debates in this regard (e.g., Spence 2011, Stiglitz 2014, Lee and Malerba 2018.)—which are at
the core of our discussion throughout this thesis—are a continuation of concerns highlighted in
different contributions during the 1980s and 1990s (Lucas 1988, Romer 1986, 1993, Verspagen
1991, Fagerberg 1995, Pritchett 1997, among others) which, in turn, where influenced by
ideas formulated by Abramovitz and Baumol, in separate contributions published in 1986.
The latter authors (re)initiated a debate advanced earlier by Gerschenkron 1962, whose ideas
followed the line of thought in contributions made in previous decades by Schumpeter 1934,
1950, and propositions advanced, still earlier, by Veblen 1915. Veblen is credited to have
laid the foundations about the importance of technology and political institutions in the
development of industrialized economies. Yet, in their first stage, his ideas were pioneered
by the German Historical School which, during the 19th century showed a major concern
for such subjects as economic history, evolution, national policy and institutions, a focus
that arose as a reaction to the alleged universality of British economic thinking, based on
individual rationality, and the (misleading) implications of that approach for explaining the
industrialization process of the less developed Germany at the time (Shionoya 2002). The
intellectual genesis of these ideas, however, has been related back to the so-called Hume-
Tucker debate, which was spurred by David Hume in 1742—on the convergence side—and
Tucker 1776—on the divergence side (Semmel 1965, Elmslie 1995).
2Solow 1956, Arrow 1962, Shell 1966, Uzawa 1965, Phelps 1966, Romer 1986, 1993, Lucas
1988, Jones 1995, 2005, Ang and Madsen 2011, Aghion et al., 2013.
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National Innovation Systems–NIS.3 Throughout, the key distinctive feature be-
tween the mainstream and the evolutionary and NIS traditions is their distinct
emphases on the importance of technology diffusion and (local) innovation to
spur long run growth and development.
Consequently, our core research question is whether and how catching-up
strategies hinge on the diffusion of technological knowledge or on domestic in-
novation activities. As we shall see, the apparently obvious answers to this
question have involved a wide range of frequently controversial issues—between
the mainstream and the other schools in our discussion, namely, the evolution-
ary and NIS frameworks—regarding the conceptual definitions of technology
and innovation; and regarding also the proper role of innovation policy in a
market economy and, therefore, the justifications for government intervention
in the economy.
Certainly, on the theoretical front, most growth economists have come to
terms that technology is the key subject of interest in studying the perfor-
mance of the economy over the long run—even though the economic contri-
butions of technology and the way they work still are far from safely under-
stood. The distinction between the productivity impacts accrued to technology
diffusion/adoption and its (local) uses—and also the development of (local)
technology—has gained, on the other hand, increasing attention in the modern
analysis that explores the determinants of long-run growth and development.4
Throughout, we differentiate these two sources of a country’s technology by
referring to them simply as “adoption” (of foreign technologies), and (local)
“innovation.”
In the empirical front, the evidence for the importance of technology in
explaining differences in cross country development suggests that technology
accounts for up to between 60% and 90% of the differences in economic growth
across countries, and for more than 90% of the difference in levels of income
between poor and rich countries.5 Not surprisingly, this preeminence has in-
fluenced a widespread belief among mainstream economist that the eventual
convergence of growth rates and levels of income per capita is driven fundamen-
tally by a process of technological catch-up across countries.6
3Our discussion of evolutionary economics relates to recent debates spurred by the ideas
of Nelson and Winter 1982 and the numerous works that have followed from this publication
(see Nelson et al., 2018 for a recent appraisal of the literature). Yet, it is worth noting that
the literature on evolutionary economics has been traced back to classical economist, e.g.,
Malthus and Marshall (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi and Nelson 1994), and related also to
the foundations of the German Historical School which were followed by contributions by
Veblen and Schumpeter (Veblen 1898, Schumpeter 1934, 1950). Likewise, our discussion of
the NIS literature follows from the ideas presented by, among others, Freeman 1987, Nelson
1993 and Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007. But, again, it is worth noting that the NIS literature
has developed from a thread that goes back to the systemic approach to economic analysis
characteristic of Schumpeter (Fagerberg 2003) and even further back to propositions advanced
by Friedrich List 1841 (Soete, Verspagen and ter Weel 2010).
4For example, Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1995, Verspagen
1997, and Keller 2002, 2004.
5King and Levine 1994, Hall and Jones 1999, and Easterly and Levine 2001.
6For example, Barro 1991, Romer 1993, Mankiw, Phelps and Romer 1995, Pritchett 1997,
2
In this context, mainstream growth economics emphasizes on adoption of
foreign technology as the most expedite way for less developed countries that
want to make the transition to the frontier.7 Some evidence in support of this
hypothesis suggests that technology inflows account for more than 90% of pro-
ductivity growth in countries off the frontier.8 Thus, despite some debate and
controversy in the past over the question whether income and income growth dif-
ferences across countries are better explained by differences in the accumulation
of capital (physical and human) or by ideas gaps,9 the current understanding
within the mainstream is that, at least potentially, less developed countries
benefit overall from the adoption of the technology developed at the frontier.
Therefore, this approach holds, the most governments can do to take advan-
tage of the opportunities created by the free flow of ideas is to provide price
incentives (taxes, subsidies, low wages) and set the right market institutions,
including property rights and openness to trade.10
From the perspective of the evolutionary economics of innovation and tech-
nology change, which has developed as an alternative theoretical account in
this regard,11 the major shortcoming of the mainstream analysis above is the
presumption that the acquisition and mastery of foreign technology are “auto-
matic”. In contrast, as Nelson 2008 points out, what the experience of many
countries show is that significant improvements in the economic activity of less
developed countries have resulted overall from the assimilation rather than
the, however important, acquisition of new ideas and technology developed
elsewhere.12 From this account, assimilation and then (local) innovation—
understood in broad terms as the ability to develop new products and new
ways of doing things in a localized context—is the crucial challenge for coun-
tries aiming to catch-up.13 As we shall largely discuss in this thesis, the eco-
nomics of innovation is not alien to the mainstream.14 In fact, both mainstream
and evolutionary traditions retrieved their core ideas from earlier writings by
Schumpeter,15 but the scope of the analysis is sufficiently different to deserve
comparison.
As we pointed out at the outset, another strand of the literature on the role of
Lucas 2000, Rodrik 2011, and Spence 2011. As we shall see later in this thesis, the mainstream
analysis in these works—however based on similar contributions by Abramovitz 1986 and Ger-
schenkron 1962—differs substantially from the emphasis on historical analysis, institutional
factors and social capabilities highlighted by, among others, Fagerberg 1995.
7Romer 1993, 1994, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Jones 2005,
Snowdown and Vane 2005, Ch. 11.
8Keller 2002, 2004, though it is worth noting a sense of exaggeration in this figure. It refers
to the comparison of estimates upon the relative productivity elasticity to foreign/domestic
R&D in a small sample of nine rich countries. Counter-evidence is provided by Bernard and
Jones 1996a.
9Mankiw et al., 1995, Romer 1993.
10Baumol 2002, Parente and Prescott 2002, Rodrick 2005, Spence 2011.
11Verspagen and Werker 2003.
12Pack and Nelson 1999, Nelson 2008.
13Nelson 2008, Fagerberg, Srholec and Verspagen 2010.
14See, for instance, Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt 2003; and Aghion and Howitt 2006.
15Schumpeter 1934, 1950.
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technology in explaining income and income growth differences across countries
has been associated with the national innovation systems (NIS) framework.16
The NIS literature does not deny either the importance of technology diffusion.
But, it puts more emphasis on the institutional environment needed to cope
with all market and non-market interactions and interdependencies involved in
the design of a country’s science and technology strategy; and on the imple-
mentation of variegated policies toward the production and commercialization
of innovations including, for instance, knowledge transfers, firm networking,
public-private partnerships, the education system, the labor market, financial
institutions and so on.
Which is perhaps the most salient difference between the mainstream and
the NIS views on how innovation is realized is the market-failures view that char-
acterizes the former approach versus the system failures view that characterizes
the later.17 As pointed out in Soete et al. 2010 the market-failure-based policy
rationale is not useful or appropriate when it comes to understand the nature
of innovation and to formulate innovation policy as the interactive nature of
innovation, combined with the non-market-based nature of the institutions that
govern those interactions raise more concerns on the possibility of “systemic
failures”.18
Given this background, the goal of pulling together the above mentioned dif-
ferent strands of the literature—namely the mainstream, and the evolutionary
and NIS literatures—providing a unified framework of analysis seems warranted
in order to better the academic understanding of the relationship between tech-
nology diffusion, innovation and economic growth. Noticeably, even though
these are indeed different fields of the research, the evolutionary and NIS litera-
tures are frequently acknowledged to be closely related concerning the role and
conduct of innovation and innovation policy.19 It is when we examine the theo-
retical understandings and policy implications between mainstream economics
and these two other strands of research that we find fundamental disagreements
which blur our understanding; and thus our ability to derive sensible predictions
or formulate policy prescriptions on the connections between innovation policy
and economic growth whose consequences, in the end, only can be confirmed in
the distant future.
Our aim here may be seen as a first step in a larger scale research project
seeking to integrate different theoretical positions in a “new” stylized model
of economic growth intended to remedy some weaknesses, as suggested by its
critics, in the classical approach to the issues of technology, innovation and
long-run growth. Such an endeavor requires, of course, a focus on the gener-
alizable patterns that in each theoretical approach are deemed to govern the
long-run dynamics of technology and income across countries, rather than on
the exploitation of examples applying just to particular countries or periods of
16Nelson 1993, Freeman 1995, Nelson and Winter 2002, Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007
17Soete, Verspagen and Ter Weel 2010, Steinmuller 2010, Lee and Malerba 2018.
18Soete et. al., 2010.
19Nelson and Winter 2002, Fagerberg 2003, Nelson 2008, Dosi and Nelson 2010, Soete et
al., 2010, Lee and Malerba 2018.
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time.
To address this core objective, this thesis is split into six chapters, the first of
which is formed by this introduction. The second chapter presents an overview
of the problem. Its focus is on the historical dynamics exhibited by relative
levels of income per capita, long-run growth rates, and technology, across a
large number of countries in the world. A sample of 133 countries is classified
into those at the frontier and those that, over long periods of time show patterns
consistent with catching-up, remain stagnant, or have otherwise lagged further
behind. A simple extrapolation formula is proposed to calculate the years that
each country would need to catch-up given its income level and historical growth
performance.
While we investigate how consistent are the observed per capita income
differences with the technology differences observed across countries in the world
economy, we pay attention to a number of criticisms that have been raised
concerning the use of productivity as a proxy for technology. These are critics
on the assumption of constant factor shares,20 the need to account for differences
in terms of trade in the comparison of productivity across countries,21 and the
fact that most comparisons of productivity across countries do not account for
the fact that technology changes over time.22
Although we reach similar conclusions as in previous literature: that differ-
ences in levels of income and growth rates are highly correlated with differences
in productivity, we find that differences in the overall level of productivity have
less leverage than has been attributed in other research. In other words, we
find that differences in the overall level of productivity are insufficient to ex-
plain differences in income per capita across countries. This difference in our
conclusion arises from a simple twist in the assessment of the observable ev-
idence, namely the comparisons between successful and unsuccessful cases of
catching-up. Thus, we justify our approach to focusing on the assessment of the
economic contributions accrued to distinct sources of technology, particularly
the distinction between foreign and local sources of technology.
In Chapter 3, we delve into a review of the theory of technology and economic
growth. The aim of doing so is to provide a fair background about what the
economics profession think is the prominent role of technology in the analysis of
economic growth over the long-run. The chapter begins by clarifying the nature
and interlinkages of the diverse notions of technology that are usually at play
in the discussion of growth economics. Then, we focus on the concepts of tech-
nology and innovation, as well as the insights relating to the role of government
and the institutions/policies needed to promote them that are underlined by
the mainstream, the evolutionary economics and the NIS framework. Finally,
consistent with our research question, we elaborate on the distinction between
the economic impacts of adoption and innovation.
The conclusions reached in this chapter support our contention that when-
20Kongsamut et al., 2001, Gollin 2002, Caselli 2005
21Levine and Renelt 1991, De Long and Summers 1991, Eaton and Kortum 2001, Bosworth
and Collins 2003, Kohli 2004, Kehoe and Ruhl 2008
22Nuxoll 1994, Nordhaus 1997, and Bosworth and Collins 2003
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ever the theoretical underpinnings are taken into account, the academic under-
standing of the determinants of backwardness in the world economy, catching-up
prospects, and corresponding institutional/policy implications are largely am-
biguous. Notably, we argue that though the policy implications underlined by
the NIS framework have gained ample recognition in the policy context, they
remain to be incorporated in the formal modelling structures that have become
customary and shape the academic understanding of cross-country growth eco-
nomics.
Chapter 4 endeavors to construct a model of this kind, namely, a formal
model of economic growth where the long-run growth of income per capita de-
pends on a broad notion of technology, including the interaction between foreign
technology and local innovation. The analytical framework features elements of
the mainstream, the evolutionary and NIS approaches, with a focus on govern-
ment sponsorship or innovation promoting public financial mechanisms. The
basic setup is a model of optimization consistent with the conventional main-
stream approach, but where government interventions, underlined by the NIS
framework, explicitly account for the financial support of business innovation
activities, therefore enhancing long-run grow and the catching-up potential of
the economy.23
The model in this chapter may be seen as an advance over previous mod-
els of endogenous growth.24 The major theoretical improvement that emerged
from the endogenous growth literature was that it explicitly modelled technol-
ogy as a partly private good—i.e., with at least some degree of market power
(appropriability or excludability).25 In this framework, market incentives could
explicitly be considered to influence the production of new technology, and gov-
ernment intervention plays a potential role to influence its production and foster
long-run growth—though just implicitly, mainly through taxes, subsidies, and
policies akin to the efficient market hypothesis (i.e, institutions and incentives
to affect the ability and willingness of private agents to save, to invest and to
acquire knowledge).
Instead, in our approach, we focus on the government financial sponsorship
of private investments in innovation. We rely on a wide review of the litera-
ture documenting that this is widespread policy practice in the most advanced
economies worldwide, and indeed used as a means to increase the production of
innovation. Our claim is that having an explicit role for government interven-
tion provides a more realistic analytical framework, and endows the researcher
with sounder grounds to provide the policy-making with better insights on the
issue of technology policy.
23see Barro 1990, and Ziesemer 1990, 1991, 1995a, for previous models where the long-run
growth of income per capita depends on public goods or influenced by government policy.
24see Verspagen 1992, and Schneider and Ziesemer 1995, for reviews.
25See Snowdown and Vane, Ch. 11. Let us remember that the received theory of economic
growth started with a public-good characterization of technology in a framework of perfect
competition. In this context, the production of technology could not be influenced by either
market incentives or government intervention; for example, entrepreneurs were deemed unable
to capture as a private return even some of the economic benefits their technology investments
created.
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Finally, Chapter 5 provides a test of the effects of adoption and innovation on
the ability of backward countries to catch-up. The setup is focused on the long-
run productivity effects accrued through the adoption of foreign technology and
local innovation, and the effects of government coordination on local innovation.
Unfortunately, as we explain in the chapter, data availability prevent us from a
complete assessment including further aspects of the NIS framework than the
issue of coordination (i.e., leadership and sponsorship).26
Consistent with our model we find some evidence that support the key the-
oretical claims in this thesis. In the first place, that the interaction of foreign
technology with local innovation has strong and statistically significant long-run
effects on the productivity performance of countries falling behind. Notably, this
result contradicts earlier studies that find a long-run relationship between pro-
ductivity in backward countries and foreign technology alone.27 In the second
place, we find some evidence to support the view that government coordina-
tion is highly correlated with local innovation over the long-run. The effects
of government coordination on local innovation are particularly meaningful for
a group of countries that have been identified in country-case studies as key
examples where government-directed innovation systems have been at work.
The econometric analysis, based on cointegration techniques, is motivated
by the fact that the relationship between technology and economic growth we
deal with is predominantly a long-run relationship. In fact, we provide statisti-
cal evidence whether such long-run association does exist or not between each of
the adoption and innovation sources of technology and a country’s productivity
performance. Further, we elaborate on feasible explanations of why a sound
structural cointegration relationship may fail to show up between the variables
of interests in specific cases. Data limitations imply, however, that our econo-
metrics is based on a small sample of 63 countries out of the 133 countries in
Chapter 2.
In our econometric analysis, productivity is measured using the conventional
multifactor productivity term (MFP); adoption (of foreign technology) is cap-
tured through a measure of the local stocks of foreign R&D;28 innovation is
captured through the share of the labor force involved in cognitive non-routine
activities;29 and government coordination is based on a mild version of this
indicator, in particular, we propose an index based on the simple average of
four components: labor productivity, financial development, human capital and
governance. Our approach to measuring each of these indicators is based on
earlier insights in the literature and fully explained in the chapter.
Remarkably, our statistical approach supports two key claims in this thesis,
namely that the interplay between local innovations and technology adoption
26As it is explained later, most aspects dealing with the NIS framework that will be discussed
here are poorly measured, if at all.
27Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1995, and Keller 2002, 2004.
28These stocks are constructed for each country, based on the import shares of the destina-
tion country with respect to countries at the frontier, and the latter countries’ expenditures
in R&D. See, Coe and Helpman 1995 and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1995.
29We argue in Chapter 4 other indicators used in the literature and the reasons why they
do not fit the goals in our approach.
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provides a meaningful explanation of the ability of backward countries to catch-
up, and that government coordination has a long-run impact on the innovation
process. As we hypothesize in Chapter 5, the long-run associations of interest
are generally more meaningful in the case of successful catching-up countries
than in their counterparts, namely countries that have remained in stagnation,
or that have lagged further behind over long periods of time.
The final chapter, Chapter 6, is devoted to recap over what we claim are the
key contributions of this thesis, the limitations arising from our approach, and
directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Overview of the Problem
2.1 Introduction.
In this chapter, we introduce a methodology to split world economies into suc-
cessful and unsuccessful cases of growth and catching up. For this purpose, we
use data from the Penn World Tables.1 In particular, a sample of 133 countries
is classified into those at the frontier and groups that over the long-term show
patterns consistent with catching up, stagnation, or laggardness. This classifi-
cation and the corresponding analysis involves the comparison, across-countries,
of 10-year averages in levels of income per capita with respect to the average at
the frontier (Section 2.2). Further, we provide also an analysis of the 10-year
average growth rates adjusted by the average growth at the frontier (Section
2.3). Our analysis is conducted over the six decades of the period 1950–2010.
Based on the previous analysis, in Section 2.4 we propose a simple formula
to calculate the number of years each country would need to catch-up given
its current average level of income per capita and historical records of growth.
Our simple mathematical formula shows that countries that have successfully
managed to close the income gap are between 9 and 54 years short of the frontier.
By contrast, countries classified in stagnation are between 38-191 years of getting
at this target, and countries classified in laggardness are between 227-302 years
of getting at the frontier. In Section 2.5, further analysis of β-convergence shows
that there is evidence of unconditional convergence that holds for countries that
classify among the successful catching-ups, but not for those countries that
classify in stagnation or laggardness. Put otherwise, our analysis shows that
there is convergence conditional on being a successful case of catching-up.
Then we investigate, in Section 2.6, how consistent are the observed income
per capita differences with technology differences across countries. To this end,
technology differences are related to differences in the productivity of the work-
ing force. We find that changes in overall productivity are insufficient to explain
either stories of success or the lack of it across our country classifications. In-
1PWT V.8.
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stead, the decomposition of overall productivity into changes in efficiency and
technical changes appears to have more leverage to explain the distinct stories
of growth and catching-up across countries. In our approach, based on related
literature, we associate efficiency to each country’s own productivity contribu-
tions. In turn, we associate technical change to productivity changes associated
to received technology (technology adoption). These productivity decomposi-
tions are based on nonparametric methods of data envelopment analysis (DEA)
that are now firmly established in the literature.2
The final section in the chapter, Section 2.7, provides our concluding re-
marks.
2.2 Backward Countries’ Relative Levels of In-
come
One way to gain understanding on the catching-up dynamics of backward coun-
tries is by comparing those countries that over long periods of time have man-
aged to catch up vis-a`-vis those that have not. Below, we provide a comparison
in this regard.
For each country, the average income per capita is calculated as a 10-year
average. For a cluster of countries with full data availability, there are six
decades with information between the 1950s (the years between 1950-1959) and
the 2000s (the years between 2000-2009). The six decades of the period 1950–
2010 are 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. As many countries do
not have observations going back far enough into the 1950s, we consider two
further clusters of countries spanning the five decades period 1960s–2000s and
the four-decades period 1970s–2000s, respectively.3
Overall, we have a sample of 133 countries: a cluster of 35 countries with data
for the six decades spanning the period 1950s–2000s, a cluster of 46 countries
with data for the five decades spanning the period 1960s–2000s, and a cluster
of 28 countries with data spanning the four-decades period 1970s–2000s. These
three cluster makes for a total sample of 109 countries to which the countries
that make up the frontier (FRCs) are added. These are 24 high-income countries
in the OECD classification standards that became members of the organization
before 1990.4
2See Kumar and Russell 2002, Coelli et al., 2005, and Los and Timmer 2005.
3We use PWT V.8. The sample includes 167 countries, of which 10 are excluded from the
outset on the basis they had relative income per capita greater than 75% of the frontier at the
outset (including Equatorial Guinea). This exclusion criterion is intended to eliminate the rich
oil-producing countries and high-income countries whose income is greater than 75% of the
average of the frontier. Other 24 countries are excluded on the basis that they have data only
for less than 20 years—as explained further below. In the baseline calculations—unless stated
otherwise—we use the rgdpna variable, which reports real GDP at constant 2005 national
prices (in millions, 2005 US$). Ten-year averages are calculated so long as a given country has
information for at least 8 years. A detailed account of the country classification and relative
levels of income is provided in Tables A.1-A.4 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
4There are, moreover, 24 countries with information over the two-decade period 1990s–
2000s. However, this latter group of (mostly Eastern European) countries will be dropped. We
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Admittedly, many of the countries that make up the FRCs have not been
always at the frontier. In fact, Japan and almost all of Europe were catching
up with the US during the 1950s, the 1960s and even the 1970s (one exception
is Switzerland). Since the time when the Committee for European Economic
Cooperation that later became the OECD was settled, Turkey has been far be-
hind other European countries and so have been, although to a lesser extent,
Greece, Spain and Portugal (See Table 2A.1). We do have good reasons, how-
ever, to think that our choice, setting the OECD average (per capita) income as
the benchmark instead of the most customary US figure, is well justified: first,
the OECD average income is higher that the corresponding figures in any other
country classification throughout the six decades period in this study (Tables
2A.2–2A.4); and second, the OECD represents a richer number of countries that
have developed under variegate principles and policy standards.5
We calculate, for each of the 109 countries falling off the frontier, a measure
of the relative income (per capita). This is obtained as the ratio between the
country’s 10-year average income and the average income of countries at the
frontier—the average of the 10-year averages for FRCs countries.6
Consider, for instance, that in the 1950s the 10-year average income per
capita in Colombia was US$2671, and in South Korea (Korea now onwards) it
was US$1435, whereas the average at the FRCs was US$8826. Half a century
later, in the 2000s, the same figures were US$6433, US$23983, and US$32860,
respectively. Clearly, the two countries and the FRCs as a group experienced
improvements in their levels of income per capita, though Colombia less so.
Relative to the FRCs countries, the Colombian income per capita in the 1950s
(around 30% of the FRCs figure) was almost double that of Korea (slightly
above 16% of the FRCs figure). Fifty years later, the relative income per capita
increased to around 73% for Korea, whereas for Colombia it decreased to under
20%.
In Figure 2.1, the 109 countries behind the frontier are attached with a suf-
fix to denote the first decade with available data, and then a comparison is set
between the relative income per capita at the beginning and final decades (i.e.,
either of the 1950s, the 1960s, or the 1970s decades in the vertical axis, and the
2000s decade in the horizontal axis). A 45-degree diagonal is superimposed to
help in assessing the difference between countries that managed to improve their
income position and those that failed to do so. Though difficult to see precisely
since the details are obscured by the large number of countries clustering to-
strongly believe these countries deserve a separate analysis as—at least partly—their success
owes to the transition effect from communist regimes to Western capitalism and the support
given for this process by the most advanced countries in the region. Moreover, the 1990s
and the 2000s have been acknowledged as special decades, characterized by high commodity
prices, low interest rates, and abundant flows of foreign capital (Summers 2014). An analysis
of countries with data for these two decades in isolation would tend to confound cyclical events
with the kind of long-run tendencies that are of interest in this thesis.
5See, for instance, Hall and Soskice 2003.
6See Table 2A.1 in the appendix at the end of this chapter for a list of the countries. Note
that the OECD currently has 32 member countries. However, countries that became members
of the organization after the 1990s are not included in the FRCs classification.
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gether at the bottommost of the figure, we find that of the 35 countries observed
in the six decades (1950s–2000s), 12 managed to improve their levels of income
per capita and got positioned under the diagonal; the remaining 23 failed to do
so and got positioned above the diagonal. Likewise, of the 46 countries observed
in five decades (1960s–2000s), 11 are under and 35 are above the diagonal; and
for the 28 countries observed in four decades (1970s–2000s), 14 are under and
14 are above the diagonal.
There are, however, further differences to consider both within the groups of
countries that managed to improve their income position, and within the groups
that failed to do so. For instance, the relative income per capita of Brazil barely
increased from 21.6% in the 1950s to 22.6% in the 2000s. By taking the ratio
between the latter and the former figures it seems evident that no meaningful
change occurred in the period of six decades in the relative position of Brazil
vis-a`-vis the countries at the frontier (22.6%/21.6% ∼= 1.0). A similar pattern
is observed for Dominican Republic (1.1), India (1.0), Panama (1.2), Sri Lanka
(1.2), and Trinidad and Tobago (1.2). The relative stagnation of these six
countries contrasts with the ability of other countries to narrow their income
gaps by improving their position vis-a`-vis the countries at the frontier: Korea
(4.5), Taiwan (4.2), Thailand (2.8), Cyprus (2.0), Egypt (1.6), and Israel (1.6).
We use an ad hoc 0.75–1.25 threshold to help bring distinction between
these different patterns. Thus, countries for which the ratio of income per
capita between the first and last decade is within the threshold are classified as
stagnant (STCs); countries for which the ratio is above the upper bound are
classified as catching-ups (CUCs); and countries for which the ratio is below the
lower bound are classified as laggards (LGCs). Together, the 133 countries in
the sample split into 24 FRCs, 27 CUCs, 24 STCs, and 58 LGCs.7
Along these classifications, in our analysis we pay further attention to the
specific development circumstances of some groups of countries conventionally
split by their levels of income: the low-income countries (LICs), the lower-
middle-income countries (LMICs), the upper-middle-income countries (UMICs),
and the high-income-non-OECD countries (HInOECDs). And we control for the
success of the South-East new industrialized countries (Nics), and the failure of
the so-called fragile states (Frags).8 Thus, for instance, the CUCs classification
7See Tables 2A.1-2A.4 in the Appendix. Clearly, changes in this ad hoc threshold do lead
to corresponding changes in country classification, though it is dubious that doing so within
reasonable boundaries substantially alters the main conclusions. A larger threshold makes
little sense, as it may lead to classifying more successful catching-up and laggard countries
as stagnant instead. Conversely, a reduction in the threshold would lead to classifying more
countries as being in the catching-up and laggard groups, and less in the stagnation group.
8These classifications are determined according to the World Bank classification standards.
“Fragile states” refers to countries characterized by weak or ineffective central governments—
states that are characterized by inability to maintain control over a country’s territory, non-
provision of public services, widespread corruption and criminality, refugees and involuntary
population movements, and extremely poor economic performance. The current classification
is based on the 2014 version of the index published annually—since 2005—by the Fund for
Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy. The countries in the graph are those considered to
be under alert, high alert, or very high alert. See Tables A.5-A.7 in the Appendix to this
chapter.
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does not include LICs, but does include 6 LMICs, 10 UMICs, 9 HInOECDs
and 1 fragile country.9 And it includes of course the Nics (Taiwan, Hong-Kong,
Korea and Singapore) as well as China and other well-known Southeast Asian
cases of success (Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia).
Figure 2.1: Cross country levels of income per capita (relative to the frontier). The dashed
line is a 45-degree line. A suffix on each country’s name indicates the first decade with avail-
able data—e.g., Hong Kong60 indicates that the data for this country is available for the 1960s
(1960–1969) and 2000s (2000–2009). The figure depicts the performance of each country be-
tween the first and last decade. Note, for instance, that in the 1960s, Hong Kong’s relative
level of income was around 50% of the average at the frontier (vertical axis), and it increased
to over 100% in the 2000s (horizontal axis). In contrast, Argentina was around 70% of the
average at the frontier in the 1950s, and shrunk to around 30% in the 2000s.
Note also that the 27 countries in the CUCs classification include every one
of the successful growth stories reported by the World Bank growth commis-
sion and the innovation policy guide issued by the same organization—except
for Brazil.10 And include nearly all of the same countries as in a recent clas-
9It includes many well-known rich island states (Antigua and Barbuda, Malta, St. Vincent
and Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, and Cyprus, among others.
10World Bank 2008, 2010. The work of this commission was to determine the lessons to be
drawn from a select number of successful stories of sustained high growth—above 7% on a
year-over-year basis—over an extended period of time.
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sification based on the Conference Board Database.11 However, the list here
may not include every country usually dubbed an “emerging market” in other
widespread classifications that are focused mainly on the analysis of shorter and
more recent periods of time.
Indeed, our focus on the long-run implies that we prefer to analyze well-
defined dynamic trends rather than short-run or one-time stochastic changes in
a country’s relative level of income per capita. We think that those long-run
trends are a reflection of policy strategies that are unmistakably able to produce
sustainable paths of economic growth.12 Of course, along those paths many
short-run deviations are possible that not necessarily extend over the long-term.
For example, the circumstances that during the past couple of decades have
led to a profound productivity slowdown in many developed countries might
have created an opportunity for the improvement in the relative performance
of countries falling behind.13 But, it is yet hard to envisage—at the present
time—whether a permanent change is underway in the trends of laggardness,
stagnation and catching-up that we are discussing here. We just can’t judge
whether the relative improvement of today’s backward countries may persist in
the distant future based—for instance—on strong innovation policies in these
countries, or it may get offset at some point by a new era of scientific innovation
at the frontier.
Figure 2.2 shows that there are clear, though non-linear, tendencies in the
evolution of relative levels of income per capita for each group (CUCs, STCs,
and LGCs) and cluster (1950s-2000s, 1960s-2000s, and 1970s-2000s) of countries
in our classification. In Figure 2.2a, the increasing trend in the relative levels
of income per capita fits well the catching-up property argued for the CUCs
group. Notably, this result does not stem from the exceptional performance of
the NICs—which are depicted separately using thin dashed lines. And it does
not stem either from the good performance of the HInOECDs countries—which
are depicted separately using longdash-dotted lines. Indeed, after omitting the
NICs and NInOECDs, a cluster of four countries emerges that shows a long-run
tendency consisting with catching-up over the period 1950s–2000s (Thailand,
Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel). Another cluster shows a similar tendency over the
period 1960s–2000s (including China, Malta, Indonesia, and Malaysia). And
another over the period 1970s–2000s (including Vietnam, Oman, and Macao).
These clusters are depicted with thick dotted lines in the middle of Figure 2.2a.
In turn, Figure 2.2b fits well the relative stagnation attributed to the STCs
group. And in Figure 2.2c, there is a clear decline in the relative levels of income
11Rodrik 2011.
12Sustainable growth and development achievements has been usually associated to the
fundamental factors that are more likely to boost economic growth with persistent effects into
the distant future (see Radelet 2016).
13The debate about the origins of the so-called current process of secular stagnation in the
developed countries is still underway. Many authors point to circumstances associated to high
commodity prices, low interest rates, and abundant flows of foreign capital that might have
led, over time, to a slowdown in industrial countries during the pre-2007 crisis, see Summers
2014 and Teuling and Baldwin 2014.
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per capita that fits well the condition of laggardness attributed to the group of
LGCs. Remarkably, the performance of the countries in these two groups does
not stem from the weak development conditions that are specific to LICs and
fragile states—which are depicted separately using dashed and dash-dotted thin
lines, respectively. In other words, after omitting the LICs and fragile countries,
the performance of the remaining countries in the STCs and LGCs classifications
is consistent with the established conditions of stagnation or laggardness.
Figure 2.2: Relative income per capita FRCs, CUCs (a), STCs (b), and LGCs (c) (natural
logs). Every line represents the (decade-per-decade) median of the distribution within a country
classification. The thick dashed line on the top is the frontier (FRCs). For panels (a)-(c) there
are three other thick-dotted black lines: the longest spans from 1950s–2000s, the medium sized
spans from 1960s–2000s, and the shortest spans from 1970s–2000s. The thin dashed lines in
(a) are the four Asian Nics. The longdash-dotted lines in (a) and (b) are HInOECDs. The
dashed lines in panels (b) and (c) are LICs, and the dash-dotted thin lines are fragile countries.
Figures are obtained using the scatter and mspline commands in Stata V 11.0.
Though not shown in the graph, in our analysis we have have paid attention
too to the dispersion in levels of income per capita across the countries in each
group and cluster. The dispersion is captured here using the absolute value of
the coefficient of variation (the mean-normalized standard deviation) for each
aggregation of countries. In general, we observe declining or at most only mi-
nor increases in this dispersion within each group and time-cluster of countries.
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Though volatility continues to be an important issue, mainly for LICs and frag-
ile states, this reduction of the dispersion suggests a decline of within-group
differences in relative levels of income. And notably, because the reduction oc-
curs within each of the FRCs, CUCs, STCs, and LGCs groups, this seems to
support the idea of convergence clubs emphasized in previous research.14
2.3 Backward Countries’ Adjusted Growth Rates
Catching-up requires of backward countries to grow permanently at higher rates
than the countries at the frontier so that their relative levels of income converge
to the high income level. A simple way to assess this behavior is to calculate by
how many percentage points the growth rate of each country exceeds (or falls
short of) the average growth rate at the frontier. To this end, “adjusted growth
rates” are calculated by subtracting the frontier’s average growth rate from the
growth rate of each other country and averaging the resulting quantities over
each country classification.
For example, over the 60 years between 1950–2010 the average growth rate
was 2.6% in the FRCs (the average of the growth rates across all FRCs coun-
tries). Correspondingly, it was 4.1% in the CUCs, 2.4% in the STCs, and 0.7%
in the LGCs countries. By subtracting the average of the frontier (2.6%) from
each other country, the “adjusted growth rate” becomes 0% for the FRCs, 1.5%
for the CUCs, -0.2% for STCs and -1.9% for the LGCs. Obviously, the “adjusted
growth rate” of zero for the FRCs determines a cutoff below which countries
are unable to catch-up. Further, the large negative adjusted growth rate of the
LGCs, the nearly zero adjusted rate of the STCs and the positive adjusted rate
of the CUCs, are all consistent with our classification in terms of the ability of
each group of countries to catch-up.
Below we present a detailed analysis of the decade-per-decade average growth
rates adjusted by subtracting the frontier’s average growth rate from the 10-year
average growth rate for every other country classification. That is, for every
country classification, we calculate 10-year average growth rates. Then, from
every country average that is obtained in this way, we subtract the corresponding
average growth rate of frontier countries (which is determined by the average of
the 10-year averages across FRCs countries).
As expected, in Figure 2.3a the CUCs countries are featured by positive
adjusted growth rates (they evolve over the zero cutoff line determined by the
FRCs). In other words, catching-up countries are featured because over time
their growth rates exceeded the average growth rate at the frontier—as is shown
by the thick solid lines evolving over the zero-cutoff for the periods 1950s–2000s,
1960s–2000s and 1970s–2000s. As in the analysis of the previous section, this
result does not hinge on the exceptional performance of the Nics countries,
which are depicted apart using a dashed line and indeed show higher growth
rates than the rest of the CUCs after the adjustment.
14The relevant calculations are provided in Table 2A.8 in the Appendix at the end of this
chapter.
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Figure 2.3: 10-year average growth rates FRCs, CUCs (a), STCs (b) and LGCs (c). Every
line segment represents the (decade-per-decade) median of the distribution within a country
classification. The thick dashed line falling short to zero is the frontier (FRCs). For panels
(a)-(c) there are three other thick-dotted black lines: the longest spans from 1950s–2000s, the
medium sized spans from 1960s–2000s, and the shortest spans from 1970s–2000s. The thin
line in (a) represents the Nics. The thin dashed line in (c) represents the fragile states and
the dash-dot thin line represents the LICs countries. Figures obtained using the scatter and
mspline commands in Stata V 11.0.
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For stagnant countries, clearly, there is a different situation. As shown in
Figure 2.3b, the adjusted growth rates for this group oscillate over and below
the zero-cutoff reflecting the well known weakness of many countries that fall
in this group: alternating waves of rapid and slow or negative growth. Brazil,
Argentina, and Mexico are examples of countries where periods of rapid eco-
nomic growth were offset by subsequent periods of sluggishness, stagnation and
recession. In the case of Brazil, for instance, during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s,
the rates of economic growth (non adjusted) were on the rise (3.7%, 4.0%, and
6.1%, respectively) and well above the average growth rates at the frontier
(3.2%, 4.2%, and 2.9%, respectively). However, during the 1980s, 1990s, and
2000s, the growth rates in Brazil slowed down (0.7%, 0.1%, and 2.1%, respec-
tively) at a faster pace than in countries at the frontier (2.1%, 2.0%, and 1.2%,
respectively), which made the country unable to catch-up through the entire
1950s–2000s period.
In turn, for the LGCs countries in Figure 2.3c the adjusted growth rates
evolve mostly below the zero-cutoff. Consistent with our country classifications,
this accurately reflects the tendency of LGCs to fall further and further behind.
And, notably, that behavior does not stem from the volatility that is customarily
expected from fragile states—shown by the thin dashed line—and low income
countries (LICs)—shown by the thick dash-dotted line. True, there have been
some episodes of growth acceleration in many middle-income countries (both
LMICs and UMICs) during the 1990s and the 2000s that pushed the LGCs
over the zero-cutoff. But, as we have pointed out above, at present it is hard
to envisage whether such accelerations are a new and permanent feature of
these countries or just a temporal improvement explained by the productivity
slowdown of the last decade in the countries at the frontier.
Back to Figure 2.3a, we observe reducing adjusted growth rates as the Nics
countries get closer to the frontier. The median (adjusted) growth rate for these
countries (the thin dashed line) increased from 1.3% in the 1960s to 4.5% in the
1970s. Subsequently, it decreased to 3.7% in the 1980s, 2.8% in the 1990s, and
2.0% in the 2000s. And that reduction was explained mostly by the growth
deceleration of the Nics.15 In other words, even though they have generally
outgrown the average at the frontier, the experience of the Nics suggests a
convergence pattern in growth rates as countries catch-up.16
To verify whether that is indeed the case, we calculate the size of the dis-
persion in growth rates within each of the different groups and time-clusters of
15Indeed, the 1.3% adjusted growth rate in the 1960s resulted from a non-adjusted rate
of 5.5% for the Nics versus a rate of 4.2% at the frontier. In the 1970s, the corresponding
non-adjusted rates were 7.5% (Nics) and 3.0% (frontier); in the 1980s 5.8% (Nics) and 2.1%
(frontier); in the 1990s 4.8% (Nics) and 2.0% (frontier); and in the 2000s 3.2% (Nics) and
1.2% (frontier). Thus, after the high growth rates obtained in the 1960s–1970s, between the
1980s and the 2000s growth rates diminished 4.2 percentage points for the Nics and only 1.8
percentage points for the frontier.
16Growth decelerations are not uncommon at high levels of income. Gordon 2014 points
out that it took 28 years (from 1929 to 1957) for the US to go from US$8000 to US$16000
per capita, but then it took 31 years (from 1957 to 1988) to go from US$16000 to US$32000,
which suggests that the next doubling of income per capita will occur close to the year 2100.
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countries. Those calculations—not shown in the graph—suggests again a de-
cline, or at most only minor increases, in the volatility of the adjusted growth
rates. We calculate the dispersion using once again the absolute value of the
coefficient of variation. There are high levels of volatility around the 1970s for
STCs and LGCs that preclude a neat assessment, but the reduction of disper-
sion over time suggests anew the presence of growth convergence clubs among
the countries in each classification of our approach.17 This issue is analyzed
further below in Section 2.5.
All in all, unlike the customary analysis of catching-up which is focused
on the ability of backward countries to generate high and permanent rates of
growth,18 we focus on the relative performance of countries over long periods of
time. This approach allows us to unmistakably distinguish between successful
cases of catch-up, stagnation and laggardness of backward countries with respect
to the countries already at the frontier. The ad hoc 0.75–1.25 threshold that
helps the distinction between these groups does not affect our key conclusion
that high growth rates are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for catching-
up. Though the higher, the better, what matters is that the growth rates
of backward countries are higher relative to the rates at the frontier through
the entire process of catching-up (even if the growth gap narrows as backward
countries get to the frontier).
2.4 An Extrapolation Formula
Catching-up hinges on both the current levels of income and the growth rates of
backward countries relative to the frontier. Thus, a formula that puts emphasis
on both these facts to calculate the number of years that a country needs to
catch-up is suggested in this section. We determine that number by simply
extrapolating past levels of income per capita using the average historical growth
rate. Of course, these are only rough predictions that do not account by the
unpredictable impact of stochastic shocks or the likely policy changes that may
occur in an economy over the long-run.19 These rough predictions, however, are
also illustrative of the most likely catching-up scenarios to be expected with the
hitherto available evidence.
Based on continuous compounding, the question to address is how many
years (N) would it take for country i’s income per capita (Yi) that grows at a
continuous rate (gi), to catch up with the level of income at the frontier (YF )
if the latter grows also at a continuous rate (gF )?
Yi ∗ egiN = YF ∗ egFN
Taking natural logarithms on both sides, and solving for N , the following
17The corresponding calculations are provided in Table 2A.9 in the Appendix at the end of
this chapter.
18See World Bank 2008.
19Summers 2014 and Teuling and Baldwin 2014 are some useful references regarding the
difficulties inherent in elaborating long-run predictions.
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conditions are obtained
N = −yF /yi ∗ (gF − gi)−1 | gF < gi (2.1)
N = −∞ | gF > gi (2.2)
where lowercases are used to denote the logarithm of income and the minus
(-) sign is added to show that the result represents the years a country needs
to catch up. In more general terms, the equations above build on the inverse
relationship between the growth rate of backward countries and the years they
need to catch up, and on the inverse relationship between relative income and
the number of years to catch up. Clearly, these calculations are meaningful
as long as the growth rate of backward countries exceeds the growth rate at
the frontier (eq. 2.1), otherwise the perspectives of catching up fade away (eq.
2.2).20
Figure 2.4 shows this relationship for the 133 countries under analysis. We
present the actual average rate of growth for each country over the period 1950–
2010. The number of years to catch-up are calculated setting yF=median income
in frontier countries (FRCs) and gF=1.4% (the minimum growth rate across
FRCs countries). Of course, the distribution of countries would shift toward the
right had we used gF=0% instead (meaning no-growth across FRCs countries)
as under this scenario the years needed to catch-up are lesser for each country.
But it seems unrealistic to consider the frontier a fixed rather than a moving
target to be reached by backward countries—further explanation in this regard
follows below.
The leftmost extreme limit is set at -250 years such that countries close to
it are deemed unable to catch-up. Horizontal line segments are set to stress
the limits to catch-up imposed by the growth at the frontier. We consider four
cases, namely unconditional (0% growth at the frontier), minimum (1.4%, the
observed minimum at the frontier), median (2.6%, the observed median at the
frontier), and maximum(4.4%, the observed maximum at the frontier). Thus,
by construction, all FRCs countries fall in the region between the min–max
threshold (1.4%–4.4%).
The implications drawn from the unconditional, minimum, median and max-
imum scenarios above can be analyzed by looking at the distribution of countries
in Figure 2.4. The basic percentage points in excess of the growth rate at the
frontier (BP) may be easily gauged for each country from the gap between the
dot representing the country and a given threshold. For instance, the uncon-
ditional threshold implies that there is no difference between the actual and
adjusted growth rates of backward countries: if the actual growth rate is, say,
1%, the adjusted growth is 1%-0%=1% and the BP is 1 (the country falls 1
percentage point over the 0% threshold). Likewise, if the actual growth rate
20Consider a two-country case whose only differences are in levels of income and growth
rates. Assume country A has an income level of 200 and a constant growth rate of 1%, and
country B has a level of income of 100 and growth rate of 2%. Over the long run, we can
expect country B overtakes A as the frontier leader, whereas A will never have any chance to
catch up in return unless its growth rate becomes at least slightly higher than 2%.
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is, say, -1%, the BP is -1 (the country falls 1 percentage point below the 0%
threshold). Notably, we see that even with a growth rate of 0% at the frontier,
many LGCs fall well below the 0% line (which means that they exhibit neg-
ative actual rates of growth in the first place) and group together well to the
left of the -250 years limit in the horizontal axis. Clearly, countries under this
circumstances are unable to catch-up.
When the threshold of reference is the minimum growth rate at the frontier,
it means that the actual growth of backward countries would need to be faster
than 1.4% if they are going to catch-up at any time in the future. In other
words, a country growing at an actual rate of 1.4% would have and adjusted
growth rate of 1.4%-1.4%=0%, and the BP would be 0 (so that it falls just over
the 1.4% threshold). Many countries, mainly from the LGCs classification, still
fail to grow at this rate of 1.4%. Thus, they group together below the minimum
threshold of 1.4% and well to the left of the -250 years limit in the horizontal
axis, making evident once more the inability to catch-up that arises for countries
growing at a slower pace than frontier countries.
Figure 2.4: Distance to the frontier FRCs, CUCs, STCs, LGCs: The horizontal
axis shows the years a country needs to catch-up. Each country is represented with
a dot showing its actual average rate of growth over the period 1950–2010. Note
that, to be able to catch up at any point, the average rate of growth of the country
has to be larger than the growth rate at FRCs countries. The lines at 0%, 1.4%,
2.6% and 4.4% in the vertical axis depicts some possibilities. Countries that are
below the 0% threshold are unable to catch up at all.
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Unlike the evident inability to cath-up that shows up for most of the LGCs
countries, most of the STCs fall shortly below or slightly over the median growth
rate of frontier countries. By the median standard, a country growing at an
actual rate of, say, 3.1%, has an adjusted growth rate of 3.1%-2.6%=0.5%, such
that the BP is 0.5 (meaning that the country falls 0.5 percentage points over
the 2.6% threshold). By contrast, if the actual growth rate is, say, 2.1%, the
adjusted growth rate is 2.1%-2.6%=-0.5%, and the BP is -0.5 (the country falls
0.5 percentage point below the 2.6% threshold). We see that the 2.6% +/- 0.5%
is indeed the range where most of the STCs lie. The relative stagnation of STCs
countries is reflected in their failure to grow faster than the median growth rate
of countries at the frontier (incidentally, this assessment remains substantially
the same if we refer to the mean instead of the median rate of growth at the
frontier).
The remarkable observation in Figure 2.4 is that every country in the CUCs
group gets positioned well over the median growth rate of the frontier countries.
The well known cases of countries exhibiting rapid economic growth during the
last 60 years show up here: China, Botswana, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and
Hong Kong, all fall over the maximum growth rate shown by the countries
at the frontier, 4.4%. And, in fact, we observe some countries that are near
fulfillment or already fulfilled the catch-up process (Taiwan, Korea, Singapore,
Macao, Hong Kong). This fulfillment of the catching-up process is identified
because there are 0 years to catch-up in the horizontal axis.
The inverse relationships between the growth rates—and relative levels of
income—of backward countries and the years they would need to catch-up may
be evidenced by looking at concrete country cases in Figure 2.4. For instance,
though having similar levels of income at US$9200, Dominica (3.7%) and Mal-
dives (5.0%) have had quite different average growth rates over more than 40
years. As a result, we see that Dominica would require 54 years in order to catch-
up, whereas Maldives would require 35 years. Similarly, though facing similar
growth rates of around 4.0%, Thailand (US$7121) and Cyprus (US$20890) have
very different levels of income per capita. As a result, Thailand would require
62 years to catch-up, and Cyprus 17 years.
Similarly, the conditions at the frontier have a large effect on determining
the years needed to catch-up in Figure 2.4. For instance, had we set gF=0%
instead of the minimum growth rate across frontier countries (1.4%), the years
needed to catch-up reduce for Dominica (33 instead of 54 years), Maldives (25
instead of 35 years), Thailand (39 instead of 62 years), and Cyprus (11 instead
of 17 years); this reduction is explained because the assumption gF=0% implies
that the frontier is a fixed target, whereas assuming gF=1.4% implies that the
frontier is getting away at a positive rate. While predicting the exact rate at
which countries will grow in the future is cumbersome, clearly, the latter seems
a more realistic scenario.
Likewise, had we use in the calculations of Figure 2.4 yF = US$12746 (the
2015 level of income per capita above which a country is considered to have
high income in the World Development Indicators) instead of the median across
frontier countries (US$31378), the years to catch-up would narrow further: Do-
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minica (9), Maldives (7), Thailand (15), and Cyprus (+13). In fact, looser
conditions might have been imposed in calculating the ability to catching-up
in our analytical framework. For instance, the World Bank standards focus on
the upgrading of countries to the next level of income. With the figures for
2015, this would mean a target of US$1045 for low income countries (meaning
that the next target for LICs is the income at the bottom of the lower middle
income countries); for LMICs the target would be US$4215 (the income at the
bottom of the upper middle income countries), and for UMICs the target would
be US$12746. Had we apply a similar reasoning, the result would have been a
larger reduction in the number of years to catch-up. Yet, whether one set of
assumptions or the other is the most appropriate is an open question.
Notably, under any conditions our results remain that the CUCs countries
seem more likely to catch-up in shorter times than the STCs, whereas the LGCs
seem to fall further behind. In the first scenario (yF = median income and
gF=1.4% across FRCs countries) a median of 54 years to catch-up arises for
the CUCs, in comparison with 191 years for STCs countries and 302 years for
LGCs countries. In the second scenario (yF = median income and gF= 0%
across FRCs countries) a median of 32 years arises for the CUCs, versus 77
years for the STCs and 264 years for LGCs. In the third scenario (yF = 12746
and gF= 0%) a median of 9 years arise for the CUCs, versus 38 and 227 years
for the other two groups, respectively.
2.5 Conventional Convergence Revisited
The soundness of the above classification of countries may be assessed also by
looking at conventional estimates of β−convergence. In our assessment, the
initial income is the ratio between each country’s average income per capita
in the 1970s and the average income in FRCs countries. We evaluate whether
there is a statistically significant negative association between a country’s initial
relative income per capita and its growth rate over time. The analysis is based on
separate regressions for each country classification (FRCs, CUCs, STCs, LGCs,
Nics, HInOECDs, LICs, and Frags) but we do not impose further “conditions”
with regard country-specific characteristics. In this sense our analysis may be
consider one of “unconditional convergence” as is explained further below.21
Figure 2.5 displays the relationship between the initial relative income and
the growth rates in the decades of 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (there are four
growth rates per country). Linear prediction lines are generated to highlight
the convergence pattern within the FRCs countries; between the CUCs and
the FRCs; between the STCs and the FRCs; and between the LGCs and the
FRCs, respectively. Putting together the CUCs and the FRCs produce steeper
21As it is well known, the general property of convergence is conditional. While countries
differ with respect to some key variables (saving rates, population growth) the tendency is
to grow faster the farther behind they are with respect to their own steady state. When it
comes to technology diffusion, conditional convergence assumes that backward countries get
benefited from inventions at the frontier whenever the right institutions are in place (Barro
and Sala-I-Martin 1997).
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downward-sloping prediction lines than is the case when the FRCs countries
are alone, which is a clear indication of the convergence pattern between the
CUCs and the FRCs countries. Furthermore, we observe that the prediction
lines are clearly negatively sloped and steeper for the CUCs than for the STCs,
whereas for the LGCs they slope slightly positively. This means that there is
a more rapid convergence speed between the CUCs and the FRCs countries
than between the STCs and FRCs countries, whereas between the LGCs and
the FRCs countries a process of divergence seems more apparent instead. Put
otherwise, our analysis suggests a rapid process of unconditional convergence
that applies clearly to the case of the most successful catching-up countries, but
not in general.
Figure 2.5: Analysis of conventional β-convergence CUCs, STCs and LGCs
vis-a`-vis FRCs. The thicker black line and greyest symbols are the FRCs. The
dashed lines on the top correspond to CUCs countries as a whole (the black
line), and after subtracting the Nics and HInOECDs (the grey line). The
dashed-dotted lines in the middle correspond to STCs as a whole (black line)
and after subtracting LICs, HInOECDs, and Frags (grey line). The bottom-
most dotted lines correspond to LGCs countries as a whole and after LICs
and Frags are subtracted.
The reason we deem this a process of unconditional convergence should be
apparent. Clearly, whether the observed convergence occurs because CUCs
countries hold similar country-specific characteristics or institutional conditions
that emulate those of the FRCs countries, cannot be deduced safely from the
data and the analysis here. That, in fact, is an interesting debate that is under-
way in growth economics: economists from different backgrounds would opine
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differently if they are asked whether the relative success of the CUCs is because
of their ability to copy the institutions, adopt the technologies and emulate the
organizational practices and production activities carried out in the most devel-
oped countries or, instead, because of their ability to learn and assimilate those
technologies before embarking in innovation enterprises suitable to local specific
conditions. There would be also quite different answers to the question whether
the CUCs succeeded without (or in spite of) government intervention or, pre-
cisely, because there were explicit government interventions in place aimed to
enforce innovative policies, institutions and strategies according to government-
led national targets. That debate will be the object of discussion in the following
chapter.
The findings in Figure 2.5 are confirmed by the conventional estimates of
β-convergence presented in Table 2.1. The regression equation is
∆y/y = α+ βLN(Y 1970) +Dτ + 
where the initial income, LN(Y1970), is the natural logarithm of the average
income per capita in the 1970s divided by the average income of the FRCs coun-
tries. The dependent variable is the average rate of growth over the decades of
the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, which means that there are four observa-
tion for each country.22 Dτ is a set of time dummies per decade (1980s, 1990s,
2000s) intended to capture any changes in the average rate of growth explained
over time by other than the convergence effect (productivity, business cycles).
Finally,  is the residual term that, we assume, is white noise. Below, our dis-
cussion of the empirical evidence is based on the β-convergence coefficient. The
analysis based on the speed of convergence, obviously, does not affect the con-
clusions. The speed of convergence may be calculated in the usual manner by
noting that β = −(1− e−λ,t) where λ > 0 measures the rate of convergence.23
As the results in Table 2.1 indicate, only countries in the CUCs-1, CUCs-2
and STCs-2 classifications exhibit evidence of unconditional convergence to the
levels of income per capita of FRCs. The estimated β-convergence effect for
the CUCs-1 (-0.009) is negative and statistically significant though quite small
in magnitude. Yet, the effect remains circa -0.009 for the CUCs-1 and CUCs-2
classifications—after dropping the most exceptional cases of catching-up (the
Nics, and the HInOECDs). By contrast, an statistical significant convergence
effect can be obtained for the STCs countries only after dropping out fragile
(Frags) and low income countries (LICs). This result is clearly illustrated by
the β-convergence effect under the STCs-2 classification (-0.003).
The β-convergence effect is not affected by the inclusion of the decade
dummy variables (the coefficient β measures the change in average growth per
unit change in the initial income, net of the effect of the time dummies). Yet,
the regression results indicate a reduction of the average rates of growth over the
22Alternatively, we might run regressions over a single time period (a cross section regression
combining the average growth rates for the four decades 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s into a
single average), the results in such case are not very different from those reported here.
23Durlauf Johnson and Temple 2005.
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1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This is deduced from the statistically significant nega-
tive effects of the time dummy coefficients—mostly for the FRCs, the CUCs-1
and the STCs-2 classifications. In the case of the CUCs-1, the dummy effect
in the 1980s (-0.006) is not statistically different from zero. But the average
rate of growth decreases by -0.013 percentage points in the 1990s and by -0.017
percentage points in the 2000s. Similarly decreasing growth rates show up for
the STCs (mostly in the STCs-2 after dropping the worst-off cases of low income
and fragile states), and for the LGCs countries.
The so-called half-life of adjustment, which is the time that it takes a country
to eliminate half of the initial gap in income per capita with FRCs, confirms
our earlier results above that the CUCs, as a group, is the only one showing
meaningful catching-up properties in relatively shorter time periods. The half-
life of adjustment is calculated as HLA = -ln(1/2)/β, where the denominator is
the β-convergence coefficient found in the regression. The results in Table 2.1
show that it takes around 77 years for the CUCs to eliminate half of their initial
gap with FRCs countries, whereas for the STCs it takes between 230 and 690
years to eliminate half of theirs. And the evidence of unconditional divergence
found for the LGCs implies that no convergence is definitely possible for this
group of countries.
As some critics have suggested, there are non-trivial limitations that apply
in general to the estimation and statistical properties of convergence coefficients,
namely endogeneity, measurement errors, non-linearities, and robustness to con-
trol variables.24 However, in the analysis of the different patterns of convergence
in our country classification, our basic estimates certainly are good enough to
serve our purpose regardless those limitations. They provide sufficient evidence
to reassuring the soundness of our country classifications: the CUCs countries
show relatively stronger convergence effects over the four decades of the 1970s,
1980s, 1990s and 2000s; the STCs countries show a weaker convergence effect;
and the LGCs countries show divergence trends instead.
2.6 Cross-Country Differences in Technology
A key explanation in the literature of economic growth is that differences in
levels of income per capita (and their growth rates) are closely related to dif-
ferences in the productivity of the work force across countries. And workers’
productivity, in turn, is assumed to be closely related to the efficient use of
the overall technology available to each country.25 Noteworthy, this remains a
major explanation to differences in economic growth across countries in spite of
most recent alternative approaches, like the so-called Hausman-Rodrick-Velasco
Growth Diagnostics Framework or the identification of growth accelerations ap-
24See Durlauf Johnson and Temple 2005 for a review of the statistical limitations in the
estimation of the beta-convergence effect.
25Clark and Feenstra 2003. However, the emphasis on the association between economic
growth and productivity is not without disagreement. See, for example, Dougherty and Jor-
genson 1996, and Jorgenson and Vu 2005.
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proach, which provide a rather different approach. In particular, by focusing on
the most binding constraints to development that are specific to each country
(e.g., Hausman et al, 2005; Hidalgo et al., 2007: Hausman et al, 2011).26
In this section, we revisit the received understanding upon these relation-
ships. Based on the classification of countries of this paper, we find that while
there are indeed large productivity differences that resemble the overall differ-
ences in income per capita across countries, over time the cross-country differ-
ences in productivity have changed less than the differences in levels of income.
Further, by breaking down overall productivity changes into efficiency changes
(movements toward the frontier) and technical changes (shifts of the frontier it-
self), we find that, when presented with the same technology frontier, CUCs
countries tend to exhibit higher levels of efficiency than STCs and LGCs coun-
tries. Our reading of this evidence is that in STCs and LGCs countries pro-
ductivity growth is mostly led by the inflow of new technology, whereas in the
CUCs countries productivity growth is mostly led by a better use of the available
technology. Consistent with this analysis, we conclude that there is a need to
investigate further the determinants of the distinct productivity contributions
associated to foreign and local sources of technology.
In our approach to explaining the link between cross-country differences in
levels of income per capita (or their growth rates) and productivity, we consider
first the conventional analysis of variance decomposition. Then, we move into
an analysis of some commonplace concerns with regard to the measurement of
productivity and the corresponding implications upon our understanding re-
garding the ability of backward countries to grow and catch-up. Finally, we
consider the aforementioned split of productivity into efficiency and technical
changes.
2.6.1 Variance Decomposition
Variance decomposition is a way to gauge how the variance of output per worker
across countries relates to the variance of capital and the variance of multi-
factor productivity (MFP).27 We use this technique to determine whether—as
would be expected—countries in the CUCs classification exhibit higher rates of
productivity than STCs and LGCs countries. That is, we investigate whether
the differences in the ability to catch-up among our country classifications are
related to productivity differences.
Consider the standard production function measured in per-worker terms,
Y = AKα, where “α” is the share of capital in total income. Using lowercase
to denote the loglinear transform and expressing the equation in growth rates
yields, ∆y/y = ∆a/a+α∆k/k. The variance decomposition formula is standard
and is given by
var(∆y/y) = var(∆a/a) + var(∆k/k)α2 + 2cov(∆a/a,∆k/k)α
26I am grateful to Carolina Castaldi for comments that call my attenton to this recent
literature which. while just recently, has found quite some application in the empirical growth
literature.
27King and Levine 1994, Caselli 2005.
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Applying this decomposition to the entire sample of countries and decade by
decade we find the usual result that the variance of the MFP term: (var(∆a/a)),
accounts for between 80% to 90% of the observed dispersion in output growth
rates.28 Notably, the result shows little change when calculations are done
decade by decade (1960-1969, 1970-1979, and so on): MFP remains the main
source of the variation in growth rates across countries.29
More relevant for our purposes here, however, is the dispersion of the MFP
term with respect to the performance of countries at the frontier. To this end,
the variance decomposition is calculated year-over-year for each country with
respect to the mean of FRCs. Then, we group the contributions of MFP for
every classification of countries. The kernel density in Figure 2.6a shows that, in
comparison with the STCs and LGCs, the CUCs group has a larger mass to the
right of the FRCs countries. Indeed, the mass distribution of the CUCs entirely
overlaps the STCs group on the righthand side. And the mass distribution of
the LGCs is entirely overlapped by every other group, except for a small mass
in the righthand tail of the FRCs.
In other words, with the FRCs kernel as a benchmark, we find much larger
contributions of MFP to the variance of output per worker in the CUCs than
in the STCs and LGCs countries. In fact, in the STCs countries these contribu-
tions are roughly similar to the bechmark, and in the LGCs countries they are
evidently much lower, as may be deduced from the left-skewed mass distribution
for this group. Notably, this result does not seem to hinge on the performance
of extreme country cases as we observe that the kernel densities remain roughly
the same after the most extreme country cases are dropped out (see Figure
2.6b).
Z-test statistics for the difference between means supports the null hypothe-
sis that CUCs are significantly distributed to the right of the frontier—meaning
that their productivity growth rates were larger—whereas the difference between
the frontier and the STCs is not statistically significant, and the LGCs are sig-
nificantly to the left of the frontier. Moreover, the difference between CUCs
and STCs is statistically significant. And these results hold after adjusting the
sample to eliminate the positive influence of the extreme cases.30
28See the analysis in King and Levine 1994, Caselli 2005. Note that these calculations are
based on a value of α=0.33, and capital and output-per-worker figures are based on PWT
V.8. An in-depth analysis of MFP measures is provided in the next section.
29An exception is a slight decline of productivity differences observed around the 1970s,
which fits well the slowdown of productivity in this decade.
30Z-test statistics are obtained as follows: after getting rid of the influence of extreme cases,
the null hypothesis that the mean of productivity growth in CUCs and STCs is the same is,
Ho : µCUCs − µSTCs = 0
which is distributed at the 99% of confidence with mean, standard deviation, and observations
as follows:
(µ, sd,N)CUCs = (0.013, 0.019, 55) and (µ, sd,N)STCs = (0.003, 0.016, 72)
Thus, (0.013, 0.019, 55)CUCs-(0.003, 0.016, 72)STCs = 0.010 (P > |z| = 0.0008). That is, we
reject the null as the probability of finding a difference of means larger than 0.010 between
the two variables is smaller than 0.01. The results decade-per-decade show similar behavior
29
Figure 2.6: Density kernel: dispersion of productivity growth rates with re-
spect to the FRCs’ mean. The solid line bounds the density of the FRCs dis-
tribution, the long-dashed line the distribution of the CUCs, the short-dashed
line the distribution of STCs, and the dotted line the distribution of the LGCs.
Panel (a) shows the densities for all countries under FRCs, CUCs, STCs, and
LGCs classifications, panel (b) excludes Nics, HInOECDs, LICs, and Frags
countries.
2.6.2 Addressing Concerns on the Measurement of Pro-
ductivity
In this section, we investigate whether the way MFP is accounted for leads to
falsify the result that differences in levels of income are well correlated with
differences in productivity. We revisit three major criticisms usually raised to
the MFP approach, namely: i) misleading patterns introduced by the strict as-
sumption of cross-country and over-time constant factor shares;31 ii) distortions
due to problems associated with changes in a country’s terms of trade;32 and
iii) misleading insights into productivity across countries resulting from the so-
called Gerschenkron effect.33 We find that differences in the overall MFP have
except that during the 2000s STCs and LGCs show better performance. The detailed results
are available from the author.
31Gollin 2002, Pritchett 2000, and Kongsamut et al., 2001.
32For example, Levine and Renelt 1991, Bosworth and Collins 2003, Kohli 2004, Kehoe and
Ruhl 2008. See also Ziesemer 1995b for a review.
33TheGerschenkron effect refers to the difficulties of making adequate comparisons upon the
economic contributions of MFP—both over time and across countries—because technological
progress is uneven across countries (Nuxoll 1994). In particular, the price of capital goods
is lower and tends to decrease faster in advanced than backward countries. Thus, whenever
a more-developed-country price index is used—or a more recent set of prices is used as a
benchmark for making calculations in real terms—MFP levels of backward countries tend to
report higher values than would be the case if each country’s own prices were used instead.
In other words, correcting for the Gerschenkron effect would lead to lower rates of MFP in
30
less leverage than has been attributed in earlier research to explain differences
of income per capita across countries.
Using the production function Y = AKα, the comparison between a given
country “i” and the group of countries at the frontier “F” is given by the
following ratio34
[Ai/AF ] = [Yi/YF ] / [Ki/KF ]
α
Note that in calculating productivity differences, we assume a common share
of capital, α=0.33.35 Taking natural logs on each side of this equation, we get
ln [Ai/AF ] = ln [Yi/YF ]− αln [Ki/KF ]
Rearranging this expression, we can decompose the differences in output across
countries into differences due to capital, and differences due to productivity.
1− ln [Ai/AF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
= α
ln [Ki/KF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
= φkiF
Let us define the ratio
ln [κi/κF ] = ln [Ki/KF ]− ln [Yi/YF ]
such that the righthand component of the last expression may be expressed as36
φkiF = α+ α
ln [κi/κF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
(2.3)
Note that the second term on the right hand side measures the differences in
the capital output ratio between country “i” and countries at the frontier “F .”
This term is positive—it is, makes positive contributions to explain the output
gap—whenever countries at the frontier have a larger capital output ratio, which
can be summed up as follows
κi
Yi
<<
κF
YF
(2.4)
Let us define a “percentage shortfall” as the output gap between a country
and the frontier
P = 1− Yi/YF
backward countries. See Feenstra et al., 2015 for a technical discussion.
34See King and Levine 1994. Note that the analysis here does not use conventional adjust-
ments of labor by human capital. This is because the econometric analysis in the following
section is based on the cognitive non-routine category of workers who already are qualified by
educational attainment.
35Note that changing the value of α, i.e., increasing it, gives more weight to the capital
contribution in these calculations.
36Note that this adjustment implies that if the capital output ratios are the same, there are
still cross-country differences due to α.
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Thus, from Equation (2.3) the corresponding contributions to the decomposition
are obtained, namely the contribution accrued to the capital share component,
αP
the contribution accrued to the capital output ratio,(
α
ln [κi/κF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
)
P
and the contribution accrued to productivity (the residual).
This decomposition is used in previous literature to show that, for the poor-
est countries, the fundamental problem to grow and catch up is associated to
investments in capital, whereas for countries near the richest category, it is pro-
ductivity. To illustrate the approach, in Figure 2.7a countries are split into
quintiles based on increasing levels of capital per worker relative to the high-
est quintile.37 We observe a mechanical association between the percentage
shortfall and the share of capital. For example, with α=0.33 we find that the
contribution of the share of capital is 0.33×90%=0.30, or 30%, in the lowest
quintile (Q1), and 0.33×50%=17% in the 4th quintile (Q4). Likewise, the capi-
tal output ratio is also affected by α—see the second part on the righthand side
of Equation (2.3). In Figure 2.7a, another 10% of the shortfall in the lowest
quintile (Q1), and 1% of the shortfall in the 4th quintile (Q4), are explained by
this component.
Adding up the share of capital and the capital output ratio allows us to
obtain the total contribution of capital to the shortfall, i.e. φkiF . In the low-
est quintile, this contribution is 0.43×90%=39%, and in the 4th quintile it is
0.34×50%=17%. Thus, consistent with the standard analysis, we see that for
countries in the lowest quintile insufficient capital seems to be an issue to ex-
plain the output gap, while in the subsequent quintiles productivity turns to be
more important.
Let us turn now to the same sort of analysis, but using instead the classifica-
tion of countries in this thesis. Figure 2.7b indicates that countries in the LGCs
group (group 1 in the horizontal axis) have a larger output shortfall, followed by
STCs(2) and CUCs(3), with respect to the benchmark, the FRCs(4). Now, we
find that the output gap of the LGCs (over 80%), the STCs (circa 75%), and the
CUCs (60%) are explained in roughly similar ways: 2/3 by productivity, and
1/3 by capital share. Notably, the capital output ratio play no role now—except
for a small contribution to the STCs.
In Figure 2.7c we sweep away extreme country cases (Nics, HInOECDs,
LICs, and Frags)—in order to focus on the behavior of middle-income countries
(LMICs and UMICs) that can be expected under “normal circumstances.” Now,
37For this standard use of the decomposition, see King and Levine 1994. The relevant data
on physical capital stocks and output—rgdpna—are taken from the already referenced PWT
V.8 (see Feenstra et al., 2015). Data availability—for capital and labor—imposes limitations
on the number of countries available for analysis. There are 24 FRCs, 25 CUCs, 24 STCs,
and 58 LGCs.
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we observe roughly similar output gaps among country classifications—higher
for the CUCs though. As is evident from the figure, the mechanical contribution
of the share of capital is roughly the same across country classifications—the
exception being the slight contribution of the capital output ratio for STCs.
Figure 2.7: Percentage shortfall of CUCs, STCs and LGCs with respect to the FRCs. In
all cases, dark-grey, black, and light-grey sections denote the contributions of the capital share,
capital output ratio, and MFP, respectively (average across countries). Panels (a)-(c) are based
on the average over countries in the period 1980–2010. Panel (a) shows the quintiles split
used in previous studies. Panels (b)-(f) return to the classifications in this thesis (LGCs(1),
STCs(2), CUCs(3), and FRCs(4)). Panel (b) shows the overall results for countries within
each classifications. Panels (c)-(f) drop Nics, HInOECDs, LICs, and Frags. Panels (d)-(f)
present the decade-by-decade performance of CUCs, STCs, and LGCs, respectively.
In Figures 2.7d–2.7f the output gaps are calculated decade by decade—still
for the middle-income countries case. We would expect—in line with the anal-
ysis in the previous section—large reductions in the gap of CUCs countries,
no major changes in the gap of STCs countries, and large increases in the gap
of LGCs countries. However, particularly from the 1980s onwards, we observe
that the CUCs’ gap declined just slightly from around 80% to circa 75% (Figure
2.7d), whereas the STCs’ gap kept revolving around the 75% shortfall (Figure
2.7e), and the LGCs’ increased from the 1960s to the 1990s and just slightly
thereafter (Figure 2.7f). It seems apparent that—in particular for the CUCs
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countries—the productivity achievements implied by the small decline in the
output gap are not big enough to explain the much larger increases in relative
levels of income per capita discussed for this group of countries in the previous
section.
The next question of interest is whether the latter assessments change some-
how when we account for the above-mentioned criticisms on the measurement
of MFP. Let us set Figures 2.7d–2.7f a baseline to assess eventual changes in
the output gap.
Regarding the risk of misleading patterns introduced by the strict assump-
tion of cross-country and over-time constant factor shares, we already noted
that modifications in the value of α in Equation (2.3) lead to trivial results.
That is, increasing (reducing) this parameter gives more (less) weight to capital
contribution in the calculations of the percentage shortfall. A more substantial
modification of this parameter would be to take into account country-specific
capital shares. To do so, the following modification to Equation (2.3) is needed38
φkiF = αF + βi + αF
ln [κi/κF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
+ βi
ln [κi]
ln [Yi/YF ]
(2.5)
where βi = αi −αF , i.e., the difference in the capital share between country
“i” and countries at the frontier “F.” The contributions to the shortfall are
modified accordingly, namely the contribution of the capital share component,
(αF + βi)P
the contribution of the capital output ratio,(
αF
ln [κi/κF ]
ln [Yi/YF ]
+ βi
ln [κi]
ln [Yi/YF ]
)
P
and productivity (the residual).
The first thing to note is that the use of country-specific capital shares leads
to increasing the share of capital. Consider that the average of αF increased from
0.36% in the 1960s to 0.41% in the 2000s. In the same decades, the average of
βi for the CUCs slightly decreased from 0.10% to 0.09%, for the STCs increased
slightly from 0.07% to 0.08%, and for the LGCs decreased from 0.17% to 0.13%.
In other words, there are larger contribution of the share of capital to the output
gap than in the baseline, and more so for LGCs (see Figures 2.8a–2.8c).
With regard to the contribution of the capital output ratio, we observe por-
tions of the contribution of less than zero—in particular for the CUCs and LGCs
from the 1980s onward (see Figures 2.8a and 2.8c). As Equation (2.4) indicates,
these negative contributions imply that the capital output ratios where larger
for these groups and periods than in FRCs countries. In turn, by adding up
38The use of country-specific capital shares is subject to the problem that the share of capital
seems to be larger at lower levels of development, which partly owes to economic structure
but also to mismeasurement (see Gollin 2002 and Pritchett 2000).
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Figure 2.8: Development accounting decomposition of the determinants of countries’ percent-
age shortfall. In all cases, dark-grey, black, and light-grey sections denote the contributions of
the capital share, the capital output ratios, and MFP, respectively. Panels (a)-(c) are based on
country-specific capital shares. Panels (d)-(f) take into account country-specific shares plus the
“Gerschenkron effect.” Panels (g)-(i) take into account country-specific capital shares plus the
effect of terms of trade.
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both contributions, those accrued to the share of capital and the capital output
ratio, it seems apparent that the relative stagnation of STCs and laggardness
of LGCs are not—at least from the 1980s onwards—related to investment de-
ficiencies (see Figures 2.8b and 2.8c). At the same time, we still observe small
changes in the overall level of productivity that are inconsistent with the much
larger changes in income per capita levels discussed in the previous section—
more specifically in the case of CUCs countries (see Figure 2.8a).
The correction for the Gerschenkron effect is reported in Figures 2.8d-2.8f.39
We observe slightly smaller values of the output gap for CUCs and STCs, jointly
with an increase in the capital output ratio component for the same countries—
particularly from the 1960s to the 1990s (see Figures 2.8d and 2.8e). Apparently,
real output evaluated at each country’s prices—rather than at international
prices using PPP exchange rates—leads to reduce the ouput gap of CUCs and
STCs. In addition, it seems that using each country’s prices leads to lower
capital output ratios in CUCs and STCs, which is consistent with the fact
that the price of capital tends to be higher (and the corresponding quantity
lower) in countries off the frontier.40 Notably, this adjustment leads to a lower
contribution of productivity in explaining changes in the shortfall.
With regard to the effect of terms of trade, we do not find changes worthy of
note with respect to the overall dynamics of the shortfall, or the contributions
of capital and productivity in CUCs and STCs countries—compare Figures 2.8g
and 2.8h with Figures 2.8d and 2.8e, respectively. But we see a slight increase
in the shortfall of LGCs in the period of the 1960s-1980s (see Figure 2.8i), which
suggests that the terms of trade for this group were weak—that is, through these
decades LGCs countries apparently had lower than average prices for exports
and/or higher than average prices for imports that ended up weakening their
real GDP with respect to the frontier.41
All in all, the overall feature of note throughout Figures 2.8a–2.8i is the
apparent absence of investment deficiencies as an explanation for the relative
stagnation of STCs and laggardness of LGC countries. Capital output ratios
seem to have played a role in explaining the shortfall of STCs countries—mainly
through the 1960s and the 1970s—but these deficiencies were largely addressed
by the 2000s without a corresponding improvement in economic activity as the
shortfall even increased over time. In turn, LGCs countries apparently had
capital output ratios even larger than FRCs in each decade between the 1980s
and 2000s, but their shortfalls still were the largest.
Most remarkable, however, is that productivity changes over time do not
fit the differences in economic achievement that were discussed in the preced-
ing section—particularly with regard to the catching up achievements of the
39The PWT V.8. provides the data needed to calculate this effect (see Feenstra et al.,
2015). We use rgdpo—real GDP on the output side—to address the Gerschenkron effect, and
rgdpe—real GDP on the expenditure side—to correct, in addition, for the effect of terms of
trade.
40Levine and Renelt 1991, Nuxoll 1994, Bosworth and Collins 2003. As pointed out by
Feenstra et al., 2015, from consumption theory we know that those goods whose prices move
down tend to have quantity increases and viceversa.
41See Feenstra et al., 2015.
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CUCs. We conclude that as long as the change in overall levels of productivity
is not a factor to distinguish between the heterogeneous growth and catching-up
achievements of our country classifications, a decomposition to study the eco-
nomic contributions accrued to distinct sources of productivity—and thus the
overall technology available to countries—is warranted.
2.6.3 Efficiency and Technical Changes
The technique of data envelopment analysis (DEA) has become instrumental
to breaking down overall productivity changes into changes in efficiency (move-
ments toward the frontier), and technical changes (shifts of the frontier itself).
Such an approach is useful to make sense of a country’s productivity changes
that show up as movements to “close the gap” with the frontier and those that
are “automatic” in the sense that they move together with the frontier without
a marked tendency to reduce the gap. These features of the DEA analysis allow
us to gain further insight into the subjects of interest in this thesis, namely the
distinct contributions to economic growth that are driven by the adoption of
foreign technologies and by local innovation.
Our interpretation is well founded on the methodological characteristics of
the DEA technique. In this approach, the technical change component indicates
how much each individual country leads to shifts of the frontier, which implies
that the frontier is determined by the most productive countries based on the
records from all countries in the sample.42 Since, in practice, the most important
productive technologies are originated in just a small number of countries and
then spread worldwide,43 it seems sensible to associate the technical change
component with the ability of each individual country to “keep up” adopting
state of the art technologies.
In turn, the efficiency change component indicates by how much each indi-
vidual country manages to get closer to the frontier. Because reducing the gap
depends essentially on the differential between a country’s productivity and pro-
ductivity at the frontier, it seems appropriate to associate the efficiency change
with the ability (or alternatively the failure) of each individual country to make
a more novel use of the same technology that is available to all countries, and
we take it as an indication of the ability to innovate.44
Of course, the distinction between adoption and innovation is much more
complex in reality. As has been pointed out earlier—in the introductory part
of this thesis—(local) innovation cannot be plausibly held as “independent”
of the diffusion/adoption of technological inventions and ideas developed else-
where. The comparison based on the DEA decomposition provides, however, a
neat way to capture the technology issues of the difference in economic growth
42Fare et al., 1994.
43Coe and Helpman 1995, Keller 2002.
44Earlier contributions that use the DEA technique in the context of cross-country com-
parisons are Fare et al., 1994 and Kummar and Russel 2002. Note that we use the notions
of efficiency and technical change differently than Fare et al., 1994. They refer to changes in
efficiency as catching up and changes in technology as innovation.
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across countries that are of importance in our discussion on methodological and
statistical grounds, as we show next.
Consider the following problem that relates the (per worker) capital output
ratio (k/y) of country “i” to the standards in the frontier “F”
Maxu,vci = u
′ki/v′yi, s.t. cF = u′kF /v′yF ≤ 1, u, v ≥ 0
where u, v are parameters. Thus, if ci ≥ 1, country i is efficient relative to
the frontier, and inefficient otherwise. The diagram in Figure 2.9, illustrates the
logic of this approach.45
Figure 2.9: Data Envelopment Analysis (Diagram). For a country
that moves from a(0) to a(1) the overall change in productivity de-
composes into technical and efficiency changes. The technical change
(Tech-ch) is given by the distance [c(1)-b(1)]÷ [c(0)-b(0)]. The ef-
ficiency change (Eff-ch) is given by the distance [a(1)-c(1)]÷[a(0)-
c(0)]. The overall change in productivity (MFP-ch) is obtained by
multiplying these indices, Tech-ch×Eff-ch. Output per worker may
be recovered by multiplying changes in productivity and changes in
capital per worker, i.e., MFP-ch× k.
Table 2.2 shows this decomposition for the decades 1980s–2000s. There are
five important elements worth highlighting that prevailed throughout this three
decades period:
1. MFP changes of the CUCs were increasing, i.e., from 1.13 in the 1980s to
1.76 in the 2000s, and outperformed, by far, the changes of MFP for any
other group;
45Los and Timmer 2005.
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Groups Decade N Eff-ch Tech-ch MFP-ch k/l-ch A-ch
All Countries
FRCs 1980 24 0.994 1.047 1.041 1.069 1.051
1990 24 0.902 1.277 1.150 1.194 1.177
2000 24 0.893 1.402 1.248 1.314 1.280
CUCs 1980 22 1.110 1.021 1.134 1.130 1.174
1990 22 1.200 1.154 1.362 1.423 1.516
2000 22 1.366 1.161 1.507 1.756 1.838
STCs 1980 24 0.984 1.017 1.001 1.056 1.019
1990 24 0.954 1.136 1.073 1.167 1.128
2000 24 1.185 1.043 1.190 1.325 1.345
LGCS 1980 58 0.905 1.041 0.938 1.008 0.942
1990 58 0.824 1.107 0.901 0.986 0.898
2000 58 1.132 0.920 0.979 1.000 0.977
Lower and Upper Middle-Income Countries
FRCs 1980 24 0.994 1.047 1.041 1.069 1.051
1990 24 0.902 1.277 1.150 1.194 1.177
2000 24 0.893 1.402 1.248 1.314 1.280
CUCs 1980 13 1.128 1.024 1.156 1.113 1.180
1990 13 1.298 1.119 1.429 1.403 1.562
2000 13 1.549 1.044 1.549 1.758 1.953
STCs 1980 18 0.989 1.007 0.996 1.061 1.014
1990 18 0.921 1.130 1.033 1.204 1.098
2000 18 1.085 1.056 1.121 1.359 1.303
LGCS 1980 26 0.911 1.019 0.925 1.011 0.928
1990 26 0.778 1.145 0.882 0.988 0.879
2000 26 0.904 1.069 0.928 1.006 0.933
Table 2.2: Multi-factorial productivity based on DEA decomposition. The
Malmquist-based index of mfp (Mfp-ch) is decomposed into efficiency change
(Eff-ch) and technical change (Tech-ch), plus the corresponding changes in
capital per worker (k/l-ch). The top panel shows all the countries in the sam-
ple. The panel at the bottom excludes extreme cases, i.e., Nics, HInOECDs,
Frags and LICs. The last column shows the conventional residual MFP term
based on a CD function with α=0.33.
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2. the main trigger of this performance by the CUCs countries was efficiency,
the indices of efficiency change from the 1980s (1.11) to the 2000s (1.37)
were higher and increased faster for this group than any other, i.e., the
CUCs were closing the gap with the frontier;
3. the good behavior of the CUCs is associated also to large increases in capi-
tal per worker—from 1.13 in the 1980s to 1.76 in the 2000s—which implies
that even for countries in the catching-up path productivity achievements
are closely related to the acquisition of foreign technology;
4. the productivity changes obtained from the DEA framework are similar
to those that are obtained from the conventional—growth accounting—
analysis, which can be seen by comparing the DEA MFP index (MFP-ch)
and the productivity index obtained from the conventional approach (A-
ch);
5. the good performance of CUCs does not hinge only on the exceptional
dynamics of Nics and HInOECDs. The lower panel of the table shows
that the above insights also hold when these extreme country cases are
dropped in order to rely on middle-income countries.
Also of note in Table 2.2 is that MFP changes in FRCs are leveraged mainly
on technical changes, which we can relate to the development of new technol-
ogy at the frontier. In fact, FRC countries systematically define the frontier
technology in the DEA methodology analysis—a fact also documented in pre-
vious literature using the DEA method.46 Finally, it is clear that, over time,
all countries managed to improve their productivity performance, though STCs
less so than CUCs, and LGCs even less so or not at all. Notably, this is a
fact largely consistent with the country classification in this chapter, and pro-
vides reassuring empirical support to our argument about the reasons for their
distinct dynamics.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has been instrumental to show that the ability of countries to catch
up is a rare event. Even countries classified in other literatures as emerging or
rapidly growing because growth has, recently, taken place there at faster rates
than in the past would not necessarily classify here as successful catch-up cases.
This is so, basically, because the patterns of growth and catch-up would need to
be sustainable over long periods of time. We have provided a simple framework
for considering differences in these patterns across countries, and established
classifications consistent with the fact that—with respect to countries at the
frontier—some countries have been successfully catching up, whereas others
have remained stagnant, and others have lagged progressively behind.
46Fare et al., 1994 and Los and Timmer 2005.
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The extrapolation formula that we have put forward draws attention to the
fact that catching up is a relative and dynamic phenomenon, as the frontier
is a moving target. Our analysis has shown that, notwithstanding the final
conditions, it would take a longer time period for today laggard and stagnant
countries to reach the frontier in comparison with countries that show the catch
up pattern. In particular, today laggard countries are between 227 and 302 years
short of the catch-up horizon, and stagnant countries between 38 and 191 years.
In comparison, countries that show consistent historical catch-up patterns are
between 9 and 54 years off the frontier.
Though we find that differences in levels of income per capita and differences
in the productivity of the working force are closely correlated across countries—
as other studies do—we conclude differently from most analyses in the litera-
ture. In particular, we find that changes in overall levels of MFP over time
are insufficient to explain why successful catching-up countries have managed
to reduce their income gaps. Thus, we argue that differences in the overall level
of productivity have less leverage than is commonly understood.
In looking for explanations to this ambiguity, we find that what is most dif-
ferent about catching-up countries has been their increasing efficiency changes
over time. Our discussion is conducted in a context where efficiency changes are
related to the innovation capability of a country—in comparison with technical
changes that we have related to the adoption of foreign technology. We have
pointed out, however, that the DEA-based decomposition upon which our cal-
culations are made provides us, to this stage, only with some important insights
on the statistical features of technology across countries. Such a decomposition
is much more complex in reality on the grounds that, as we have advertised,
(local) innovation is not independent of the diffusion/adoption of technological
inventions and ideas developed elsewhere.
Based on the empirical evidence that we have drawn in this chapter, our core
conclusion is that while productivity achievements across countries are closely
related to the advance of the frontier technology, there are important differences
in the ability of some countries to “close the gap”. Thus, we are in the position
to suggest the need for a theoretical account to explain that behavior, namely
the ability of countries to innovate and how it relates to the distinct growth and
catching-up experiences that have been observed across countries. That shall
be our endeavor in the next chapter.
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Appendix 2A
country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Threshold
Ratio
FRCs Countries
1 Australia 142.0 127.3 114.5 108.8 106.1 107.3
2 Austria 82.7 93.1 99.9 102.6 103.8 101.6
3 Belgium 96.0 94.8 99.5 99.5 99.1 95.2
4 Canada 135.4 122.2 117.8 117.0 107.0 106.2
5 Denmark 109.3 114.7 109.0 108.1 105.5 100.0
6 Finland 78.1 81.0 86.4 93.6 86.7 92.9
7 France 86.9 93.2 99.2 98.5 94.4 87.9
8 Germany 88.9 105.8 104.7 106.1 106.9 97.8
9 Greece 49.5 60.9 79.9 72.9 63.9 67.7
10 Iceland 87.4 85.4 89.1 100.3 89.1 92.8
11 Ireland 79.4 75.5 75.9 76.1 94.3 129.0
12 Italy 69.5 80.7 90.8 95.7 95.4 86.1
13 Japan 35.4 54.0 88.9 100.2 108.6 94.1
14 Luxembourg 148.2 131.2 122.6 125.3 155.6 173.1
15 Netherlands 113.7 116.6 118.5 111.1 112.6 111.2
16 New Zealand 121.6 114.6 93.8 83.1 74.2 72.8
17 Norway 153.9 148.7 150.1 168.6 175.7 175.5
18 Portugal 39.9 46.4 55.4 57.2 63.7 61.8
19 Spain 54.0 69.6 77.6 73.3 77.3 78.9
20 Sweden 113.5 113.6 105.6 101.2 93.0 95.8
21 Switzerland 196.9 189.4 165.2 150.0 133.8 119.0
22 Turkey 36.7 32.5 32.2 30.5 32.4 32.2
23 United Kingdom 121.6 106.4 93.6 91.2 91.9 95.1
24 United States 159.7 142.3 129.9 128.8 128.8 125.9
Table 2A.1: Country classifications on the base of income per capita relative to the FRCs
average. Each column shows the average income per capita in the decade.
Source: Author calculations based on PWT V8. (We use the variable rgdpcna divided by the
country’s population)
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country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Threshold
Ratio
CUCs Countries
1 Botswana 4.7 8.4 14.4 21.3 26.1 5.58
2 China 3.1 3.0 4.6 8.5 16.2 5.27
3 Korea, Republic of 16.3 15.2 21.8 34.8 57.4 73.0 4.49
4 Taiwan 19.5 21.7 30.6 46.4 69.3 81.5 4.17
5 Singapore 31.6 49.3 71.8 97.9 108.6 3.43
6 Maldives 9.2 13.9 21.3 28.1 3.06
7 Malta 20.4 33.1 46.1 56.1 58.3 2.86
8 Thailand 7.7 7.7 10.8 13.5 20.6 21.7 2.81
9 Bhutan 5.5 6.4 9.9 13.2 2.42
10 Hong Kong 48.8 60.0 88.2 107.9 111.1 2.28
11 Malaysia 15.4 19.0 23.1 29.2 31.2 2.02
12 St. Kitts & Nevis 16.8 24.1 31.8 33.7 2.00
13 Cyprus 32.1 31.7 38.6 52.7 62.5 63.6 1.98
14 Vietnam 3.7 4.0 5.0 7.2 1.96
15 Macao 63.6 90.7 98.5 114.7 1.80
16 Grenada 11.0 13.4 16.1 18.3 1.66
17 St.Vincent & Gren. 12.2 14.0 17.9 19.9 1.63
18 Antigua and Barbuda 21.5 29.5 36.2 34.7 1.62
19 Israel 45.3 54.7 79.9 74.6 76.0 72.2 1.59
20 Egypt 8.2 7.4 7.6 10.6 12.2 13.0 1.59
21 Indonesia 6.1 5.9 7.5 9.7 9.7 1.58
22 Tunisia 11.7 15.1 15.7 15.7 17.8 1.53
23 Dominica 18.5 23.1 27.5 28.0 1.51
24 Romania 18.6 29.6 37.5 25.3 27.6 1.48
25 Laos 4.1 4.4 4.8 6.0 1.45
26 Oman 48.2 68.9 68.2 69.9 1.45
27 Cape Verde 6.3 5.6 5.8 6.4 8.4 1.34
Table 2A.2: Country classifications on the base of income per capita relative to
the FRCs average. Each column shows the average income per capita in the decade.
Countries in the CUCs classification are determined on the base of the threshold ratio
between the last and first decade with information being larger than 1.25, i.e. for Egypt
it is 13.03/8.20=1.59, for Vietnam it is 7.22/3.69=1.96
Source: Author calculations based on PWT V8. (We use the variable rgdpcna divided
by the country’s population)
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country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Threshold
Ratio
STCs Countries
1 St. Lucia 19.2 22.6 26.2 23.3 1.22
2 Panama 26.3 27.6 31.0 31.7 29.9 31.7 1.20
3 Trinidad & Tobago 42.9 52.3 50.4 46.0 33.3 49.8 1.16
4 Sri Lanka 9.1 7.4 7.0 7.9 8.9 10.5 1.16
5 Bulgaria 25.3 33.5 25.9 28.9 1.14
6 Dominican Republic 18.8 16.9 18.5 18.6 17.8 20.7 1.10
7 Belize 19.2 17.1 18.7 20.2 1.05
8 Brazil 21.6 23.1 28.8 29.3 24.6 22.6 1.05
9 India 7.4 6.4 5.2 5.2 5.9 7.5 1.01
10 Lesotho 4.0 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.0 1.00
11 Mongolia 10.8 12.5 9.4 10.2 0.94
12 Poland 44.1 38.9 33.6 41.2 0.93
13 Swaziland 12.6 12.7 13.1 11.8 0.93
14 Hungary 51.3 55.1 42.8 46.4 0.90
15 Cambodia 4.8 2.8 3.0 4.4 0.90
16 Mauritius 29.2 18.6 15.7 17.5 22.4 25.6 0.88
17 Sudan 6.4 5.0 4.6 5.5 0.86
18 Albania 19.7 17.7 11.8 16.6 0.84
19 Fiji 13.6 13.7 12.2 12.0 11.4 0.84
20 Morocco 10.8 10.3 9.6 9.3 8.7 8.9 0.83
21 Pakistan 8.1 6.9 6.5 6.9 6.9 6.6 0.82
22 Chile 40.6 35.1 26.4 23.6 30.0 33.4 0.82
23 Syria 14.4 14.1 14.4 12.2 11.7 0.81
24 Costa Rica 32.4 29.5 29.9 25.1 24.5 25.3 0.78
Table 2A.3: Country classifications on the base of income per capita relative to the FRCs
average. Each column shows the average income per capita in the decade. Countries in the
STCs classification are determined on the base of the threshold ratio between the last and first
decade being larger than 0.75 and smaller than 1.25, i.e. for St. Lucia it is 23.3/19.2=1.22,
for Costa Rica it is 25.3/32.4=0.78
Source: Author calculations based on PWT V8. (We use the variable rgdpcna divided by the
country’s population)
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country 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Threshold
Ratio
LGCs Countries
1 Mexico 48.6 47.4 46.3 45.6 38.7 36.1 0.74
2 Mali 3.3 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 0.73
3 Congo, Republic of 11.5 12.0 14.5 10.3 8.3 0.72
4 Mozambique 2.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.8 0.70
5 Ecuador 24.6 20.4 22.1 21.6 18.3 16.9 0.69
6 Burkina Faso 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.6 0.66
7 Nepal 4.8 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 0.65
8 Colombia 30.3 24.5 23.2 22.6 21.9 19.6 0.65
9 Malawi 2.8 3.5 2.9 2.2 1.8 0.64
10 Gabon 52.8 87.3 65.2 49.5 33.9 0.64
11 Suriname 24.3 21.2 16.1 15.1 0.62
12 Benin 6.3 5.1 4.8 4.1 3.8 0.61
13 Bangladesh 6.3 4.0 3.4 3.3 3.7 0.59
14 Tanzania 5.0 4.2 3.1 2.8 2.9 0.59
15 Paraguay 21.6 16.6 16.1 18.4 15.7 12.1 0.56
16 Iraq 19.4 18.2 9.1 10.7 0.55
17 Lebanon 55.1 36.8 31.3 30.2 0.55
18 Guatemala 21.3 17.9 17.6 14.6 12.5 11.5 0.54
19 Mauritania 10.6 11.1 8.1 6.4 5.5 0.52
20 Philippines 17.8 15.7 13.9 12.1 9.6 9.2 0.52
21 El Salvador 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.51
22 Angola 18.8 12.0 8.1 9.5 0.51
23 Sao Tome and Principe 8.8 7.2 4.9 4.5 0.51
24 Namibia 25.1 22.3 17.2 13.2 12.7 0.50
25 Rwanda 5.6 4.2 4.1 2.8 2.8 0.50
26 Jordan 27.4 16.1 19.1 12.7 13.3 0.49
27 Cameroon 11.4 9.7 10.2 5.9 5.2 0.46
28 Burundi 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.2 1.5 0.46
29 Chad 8.7 5.9 3.9 3.6 4.0 0.46
30 Uruguay 58.2 39.9 31.9 29.3 29.7 26.4 0.45
31 Jamaica 29.2 24.0 16.1 16.2 13.2 0.45
32 Peru 38.5 36.6 30.1 23.4 16.6 17.3 0.45
33 Argentina 67.1 56.4 49.0 37.1 32.7 29.8 0.44
34 Guinea 7.0 4.6 4.1 3.3 3.1 0.44
35 South Africa 48.6 43.9 37.0 30.4 22.3 21.0 0.43
36 Ghana 12.6 9.0 5.8 5.3 5.3 0.42
37 Iran 73.1 54.9 32.9 28.2 30.3 0.41
38 Comoros 7.1 5.9 5.4 3.9 2.9 0.41
39 Honduras 22.0 15.8 12.8 11.1 9.4 8.8 0.40
40 Uganda 8.3 6.5 4.6 2.6 2.7 3.1 0.38
41 Ethiopia 4.7 4.3 3.1 2.4 1.6 1.7 0.36
42 Zimbabwe 31.1 28.5 21.9 18.4 11.2 0.36
43 Gambia, The 12.3 8.6 6.8 5.1 4.4 0.36
44 Senegal 12.0 7.6 5.9 4.6 4.2 0.35
45 Nigeria 12.9 10.2 8.7 5.4 4.0 4.5 0.35
46 Cote d‘Ivoire 12.4 12.1 8.1 5.8 4.3 0.35
47 Kenya 11.0 8.2 6.1 5.4 4.4 3.6 0.32
48 Togo 7.8 6.8 4.6 3.4 2.4 0.31
49 Bolivia 32.8 23.4 17.6 12.5 10.5 9.6 0.29
50 Sierra Leone 7.6 6.3 5.3 3.2 2.2 0.29
51 Zambia 13.1 9.8 6.2 4.0 3.3 0.25
52 Central African Rep. 7.7 5.2 3.5 2.5 1.9 0.24
53 Madagascar 10.1 7.2 4.6 3.1 2.5 0.24
54 Djibouti 24.4 11.8 7.0 5.6 0.23
55 Guinea-Bissau 11.0 6.0 4.0 3.5 2.5 0.23
56 Niger 8.5 4.9 3.2 2.0 1.6 0.19
57 Liberia 7.4 4.8 1.1 1.2 0.17
58 Congo, Dem. Rep. 8.7 6.5 4.4 2.7 1.2 0.7 0.08
Table 2A.4: Country classifications on the base of income per capita relative to the FRCs
average. The LGCs is determined on the base of a threshold ratio smaller than 0.75.
Source: Author calculations based on PWT V8.
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country Nics LIC LMI UMI HInonOECDs Frags
CUCs Countries
1 Egypt 1 1
2 Thailand 1
3 Cyprus 1
4 Taiwan 1 1
5 Israel
6 Cape Verde 1
7 Indonesia 1
8 Botswana 1
9 China 1
10 Malaysia 1
11 Romania 1
12 Tunisia 1
13 Hong Kong 1 1
14 Singapore 1 1
15 Malta 1
16 Korea, Republic of 1
17 Bhutan 1
18 Laos 1
19 Vietnam 1
20 Dominica 1
21 Grenada 1
22 Maldives 1
23 St.Vincent & Grenadines 1
24 Antigua and Barbuda 1
25 Macao 1
26 Oman 1
27 St. Kitts & Nevis 1
Table 2A.5: CUCs countries subgroups. Classification into the Low-Income-
Countries (LIC), Lower Middle Income (LMI), Upper Middle Income (UMI), High-
Income-non-OECD-Countries (HInOECDs), South-East Nics (Nics), and fragile
states (Frags). Income classifications are drawn from World Bank income classifica-
tions, fragile countries are classified according to the Fund for Peace and the magazine
Foreign Policy. Countries on display are those considered to be under alert, high alert,
and very high alert.
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country LIC LMI UMI HInonOECDs Frags
STCs Countries
1 Pakistan 1 1
2 Sri Lanka 1 1
3 India 1
4 Morocco 1
5 Brazil 1
6 Costa Rica 1
7 Dominican Republic 1
8 Mauritius 1
9 Panama 1
10 Trinidad & Tobago 1
11 Chile
12 Syria 1 1
13 Lesotho 1
14 Fiji 1
15 Cambodia 1
16 Sudan 1 1
17 Mongolia 1
18 Swaziland 1
19 Albania 1
20 Belize 1
21 Bulgaria 1
22 St. Lucia 1
23 Hungary
24 Poland
Table 2A.6: STCs countries subgroups. Classification into the Low-Income-Countries
(LIC), Lower Middle Income (LMI), Upper Middle Income (UMI), High-Income-non-
OECD-Countries (HInOECDs), and fragile states (Frags). Income classifications are
drawn from World Bank income classifications, fragile countries are classified according
to the Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy. Countries on display are those
considered to be under alert, high alert, and very high alert.
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country LIC LMI UMI HInonOECDs Frags
LGCs Countries
1 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 1
2 Ethiopia 1 1
3 Kenya 1 1
4 Uganda 1 1
5 Nigeria 1 1
6 Bolivia 1
7 El Salvador 1
8 Guatemala 1
9 Honduras 1
10 Paraguay 1
11 Philippines 1
12 Argentina 1
13 Colombia 1
14 Ecuador 1
15 Peru 1
16 South Africa 1
17 Uruguay 1
18 Mexico
19 Bangladesh 1 1
20 Burundi 1 1
21 Central African Rep. 1 1
22 Chad 1 1
23 Guinea 1 1
24 Guinea-Bissau 1 1
25 Nepal 1 1
26 Niger 1 1
27 Rwanda 1 1
28 Zimbabwe 1 1
29 Benin 1
30 Burkina Faso 1
31 Comoros 1
32 Gambia, The 1
33 Madagascar 1
34 Malawi 1
35 Mali 1
36 Mozambique 1
37 Sierra Leone 1
38 Tanzania 1
39 Togo 1
40 Cameroon 1 1
41 Cote d‘Ivoire 1 1
42 Mauritania 1 1
43 Congo, Republic of 1
44 Ghana 1
45 Senegal 1
46 Zambia 1
47 Gabon 1
48 Iran 1
49 Jamaica 1
50 Jordan 1
51 Namibia 1
52 Liberia 1 1
53 Djibouti 1
54 Sao Tome and Principe 1
55 Iraq 1 1
56 Angola 1
57 Lebanon 1
58 Suriname 1
Table 2A.7: LGCs countries subgroups. Classification into the Low-Income-
Countries (LIC), Lower Middle Income (LMI), Upper Middle Income (UMI), High-
Income-non-OECD-Countries (HInOECDs), and fragile states (Frags).
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Group Decade Countries mean sd max min median CV
Cluster 1
CUCs 1950 4 23.34 18.57 45.35 7.70 20.15 0.80
(Excluding the Nics) 1960 25.34 22.62 54.67 7.35 19.67 0.89
1970 34.22 33.51 79.93 7.57 24.68 0.98
1980 37.85 31.13 74.58 10.59 33.12 0.82
1990 42.85 31.19 76.03 12.24 41.56 0.73
2000 42.63 29.60 72.22 13.03 42.62 0.69
STCs 1950 11 22.47 12.92 42.88 7.43 21.59 0.57
1960 21.29 14.24 52.28 6.45 18.55 0.67
1970 20.82 13.97 50.44 5.23 18.48 0.67
1980 20.09 12.65 46.05 5.16 18.58 0.63
1990 19.36 10.21 33.33 5.91 22.43 0.53
2000 22.04 13.30 49.75 6.65 22.60 0.60
LGCs 1950 18 26.65 18.94 67.09 2.55 21.81 0.71
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1960 22.03 16.25 56.44 2.16 17.26 0.74
1970 19.24 14.55 49.00 1.87 16.83 0.76
1980 16.59 12.99 45.59 1.29 13.53 0.78
1990 14.06 11.44 38.74 1.22 11.50 0.81
2000 12.95 10.46 36.13 0.66 10.55 0.81
Cluster 2
CUCs 1960 8 10.78 6.70 20.36 3.08 8.97 0.62
(Excluding the Nics) 1970 14.95 11.45 33.09 2.96 11.71 0.77
1980 19.34 15.28 46.07 4.63 15.06 0.79
1990 21.53 16.23 56.12 6.39 18.49 0.75
2000 24.42 15.98 58.26 8.44 21.98 0.65
STCs 1960 3 10.66 5.81 14.44 3.97 13.57 0.54
1970 10.62 5.71 14.13 4.02 13.70 0.54
1980 10.13 5.55 14.35 3.84 12.20 0.55
1990 9.39 4.67 12.17 4.00 11.99 0.50
2000 9.02 4.38 11.71 3.97 11.39 0.49
LGCs 1960 33 13.76 14.89 73.12 2.53 8.68 1.08
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1970 12.17 16.93 87.33 2.11 6.33 1.39
1980 9.32 12.18 65.24 1.48 4.82 1.31
1990 7.30 9.52 49.52 1.35 3.62 1.30
2000 6.21 7.49 33.91 1.53 3.34 1.21
Cluster 3
CUCs 1970 11 19.47 19.23 63.64 3.69 12.18 0.99
(Excluding the Nics) 1980 26.58 27.98 90.70 4.03 13.96 1.05
1990 30.65 28.75 98.46 4.79 21.34 0.94
2000 33.54 30.84 110.00 5.97 27.97 0.92
STCs 1970 10 21.34 15.36 51.28 4.84 19.16 0.72
1980 21.79 16.30 55.10 2.82 17.42 0.75
1990 18.91 13.00 42.78 3.01 15.91 0.69
2000 20.83 14.36 46.36 4.36 18.39 0.69
LGCs 1970 7 22.59 15.84 55.05 7.41 19.44 0.70
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1980 15.99 10.83 36.85 4.75 12.00 0.68
1990 11.09 10.00 31.28 1.13 8.09 0.90
2000 10.97 9.60 30.16 1.23 9.54 0.88
Table 2A.8: Distribution Statistics for the relative levels of income. Clusters are
formed for countries with data over the same decades. CV is the coefficient of variation
(abs. value).
Source: Author calculations. 49
Group Decade Countries mean sd max min median CV
Cluster 1
CUCs 1950 4 -1.29 2.70 1.13 -4.71 -0.80 2.09
(Excluding the Nics) 1960 1.06 2.42 4.33 -1.47 0.69 2.28
1970 1.89 1.64 3.74 -0.24 2.04 0.87
1980 1.89 1.83 2.93 -0.85 2.75 0.97
1990 1.09 0.68 2.03 0.48 0.91 0.63
2000 1.09 0.93 1.99 0.17 1.10 0.86
STCs 1950 11 -1.66 2.29 2.62 -5.17 -1.69 1.38
1960 -1.26 1.68 0.46 -5.55 -0.83 1.33
1970 0.17 1.88 3.06 -2.85 0.30 11.25
1980 -0.74 1.88 1.41 -5.00 -0.65 2.55
1990 0.80 1.42 2.51 -1.92 1.18 1.78
2000 2.33 1.16 4.55 0.87 2.29 0.50
LGCs 1950 18 -1.80 1.45 0.57 -5.24 -1.90 0.80
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1960 -2.57 1.17 -0.72 -4.87 -2.41 0.46
1970 -1.31 2.60 2.82 -7.28 -0.71 1.99
1980 -3.05 1.46 -0.93 -6.44 -2.73 0.48
1990 -1.47 2.73 1.72 -10.83 -1.35 1.85
2000 1.10 1.54 4.61 -0.95 1.09 1.41
Cluster 2
CUCs 1960 8 -1.08 2.53 3.41 -4.29 -1.33 2.34
(Excluding the Nics) 1970 3.47 3.34 7.43 -2.88 3.67 0.96
1980 1.92 2.79 6.41 -1.04 1.36 1.45
1990 1.63 2.76 6.39 -3.78 1.72 1.69
2000 2.84 2.39 7.99 0.07 2.41 0.84
STCs 1960 3 -1.51 1.09 -0.80 -2.76 -0.98 0.72
1970 1.17 0.37 1.56 0.82 1.13 0.32
1980 -2.36 1.26 -1.37 -3.78 -1.92 0.54
1990 0.41 0.95 1.44 -0.41 0.19 2.33
2000 0.76 0.64 1.35 0.08 0.85 0.84
LGCs 1960 33 -2.28 2.63 3.78 -6.44 -3.03 1.15
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1970 -2.34 2.15 2.61 -6.73 -2.42 0.92
1980 -2.81 1.66 1.03 -6.33 -2.92 0.59
1990 -2.09 2.11 1.23 -10.15 -1.96 1.01
2000 0.40 1.91 3.60 -3.93 0.10 4.76
Cluster 3
CUCs 1970 11 0.57 2.59 4.92 -2.72 -0.26 4.55
(Excluding the Nics) 1980 2.97 1.89 5.58 0.31 3.05 0.64
1990 1.44 1.68 4.04 -1.12 1.45 1.17
2000 2.51 1.92 5.82 0.28 1.67 0.77
STCs 1970 10 -0.29 3.82 3.47 -9.81 0.77 13.24
1980 -0.41 1.73 2.05 -2.96 -0.48 4.26
1990 -1.09 1.80 1.02 -4.26 -0.58 1.65
2000 2.50 1.82 5.41 -0.05 2.89 0.73
LGCs 1970 7 -2.38 5.09 4.97 -9.00 -2.44 2.14
(Incl. Frags and LICs) 1980 -4.83 1.73 -2.46 -6.80 -5.46 0.36
1990 -3.05 4.51 4.29 -11.11 -3.04 1.48
2000 1.49 2.54 6.16 -1.34 1.90 1.71
Table 2A.9: Distribution Statistics: basic points of difference relative to the frontier.
Clusters are for countries with data over the same decades. CV is the coefficient of
variation (abs. value).
Source: Author calculations. 50
Chapter 3
The Theory of Technology
and Growth
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit the debate on the role of technology in
explaining (per capita) income and income growth differences across countries.
We focus on the distinct contributions of technology adoption and innovation
from the perspective of the major theoretical developments included in our
discussion, namely the mainstream neoclassical economics, on one side, and
the evolutionary economics and national innovation systems—NIS framework,
on the other.1,2 More specifically, we discuss the controversy arising from the
critiques of evolutionary economists to the neoclassical analysis of technology
diffusion as the major engine of growth and catching up for less developed
countries, therefore neglecting the importance of learning and assimilation that
1Our focus is on the distinct contributions of foreign and domestic sources of technology
found in, among others, Coe and Helpman 1995, Verspagen 1997, and Keller 2002, 2004. As
we pointed out before in Chapter 1, the thread of the debate on the relationship between
technology and the differences in economic performance between most and less developed
countries goes back, at least in the modern discussion, to Abramovitz 1986, Baumol 1986 and
Gerschenkron 1962. Earlier contributions have been attributed to Veblen 1915, the German
Historical School during the 19th century, and the so-called Hume-Tucker debate around 1750.
2As we pointed out in Chapter 1, the mainstream view in our discussion refers to the neo-
classical debate on convergence spurred by the Solow model (Solow 1956, Romer 1994, Jones
2005, Ang and Madsen 2011 and Aghion et al., 2013). The evolutionary view is represented
here mostly by the recent contributions spurred by Nelson and Winter 1982 (see Nelson et al.,
2018 for a recent appraisal). Yet, the evolutionary line of thinking is traced back to Schum-
peter 1934, 1950, Veblen 1898, the tenets of the German Historical School (Fagerberg 2003)
and even the thought of classical economists such as Malthus and Marshall (Nelson and Win-
ter 1982, Dosi and Nelson 1994). Finally, our discussion of the NIS literature follows from the
ideas presented by, among others, Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993 and Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007.
But, again, we note that the systemic approach characteristic of this approach goes back to
Schumpeter (Fagerberg 2003) and further back to Friedrich List 1841 (Soete, Verspagen and
ter Weel 2010).
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characterize the innovation activities carried out in countries off the frontier.3
And we discuss also the systemic interdependencies that supersede in the NIS
framework the conventional attention to “market failures”.4
The importance of technology in explaining growth differences across coun-
tries is apparent. On some accounts, productivity differences, which a vast
amount of the specialized literature agrees to equalize with technology differ-
ences, are held to explain up to between 60% and 90% of the growth differences
and more than 90% of the difference in levels of income between poor and rich
countries.5
Yet, while the preeminence of technology in explaining growth outcomes is
generally accepted, where the neoclassical and evolutionary economists differ is
when it comes to accounting for the sources of technology explaining income and
income growth differences across countries. Whether technology is associated
with artifacts or with ideas,6 mainstream economists have tended to associate
the growth achievements of less development countries, exclusively, with their
ability to adopt/imitate the technology and production practices of countries
at the frontier.7 Some evidence in this context suggests that foreign technology
accounts for more than 90%, and even as much as 99%, of the productivity of
countries in the receiving end.8
Evolutionary economists, and also NIS advocates, do not dispute the im-
portance of technology diffusion. They even concede that adoption/imitation
are important sources of the innovation issues and networking innovation activ-
ities that concern them much more. They, however, dispute the preeminence of
adoption/imitation over the role and conduct of the innovation activity/policy
in less developed countries.
From the evolutionary perspective, the alleged preeminence of technology
transfers for development outcomes neglects the entrepreneurial features and
the importance of learning and assimilation which they associate to innovation
and put forward as the true engine of the growth achievements in less developed
countries that have succeeded to catch-up.9 The complex link between adoption
and innovation activities in the evolutionary account of economic development is
neatly summarized by Nelson 2008 who points out: “The innovation in catching
up involves bringing in and learning to master ways of doing things that may
have been used for some time in the advanced economies”.10
3Pack and Nelson 1999, Nelson 2008.
4Lee and Malerba 2018.
5Easterly and Levine 2001. The preeminence of technology, however, is by no means
uncontested, see Jorgenson et al., 1987, Dougherty and Jorgenson 1996, Kumar and Russell
2002, and Jorgenson and Vu 2005, among others.
6Romer 1994, Mankiw et al., 1995.
7The controversial nature of the discussion within mainstream realms in this context is
widely documented, see for example, Barro 1991, Pritchett 1997, Lucas 2000, Baumol 2002,
Rodrik 2011, Spence 2011, Phelps 2016.
8Keller 2004, this figure refers to the comparison of estimates upon the relative productivity
elasticity to foreign/domestic R&D in a small sample of nine rich countries. Some counter-
evidence is found in Bernard and Jones 1996a.
9Pack and Nelson 1999, Nelson 2008.
10Nelson 2008.
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Certainly the mainstream does not deny the economic impacts of innova-
tion. In fact, its analysis in this regard lies on the same Schumpeterian views
of innovation/entrepreneurship as in evolutionary economics.11 And, after the
famous Jones’ Critique innovation-based growth models have gained consider-
able attention in the modern analysis that explores the determinants of long-run
growth.12 There are, however, two major areas of difference between both the-
oretical traditions that are important: the first relates to the process of how
innovation occurs in the first place; the second relates to the relative impor-
tance of innovation in explaining the growth achievements of less developed
countries, as this has been an area of neglect in the mainstream approach. As
pointed out by Fagerberg et al., 2010: “[The] popular perception of innovation
[...] is that it has to do with developing [...] advanced solutions for sophisticated
well off costumer [and] carried out by highly educated labor [...] with strong ties
to leading centers of excellence in the scientific world. Hence innovation in this
sense is a ‘first world’ activity” .13
Altogether, our point is that, in trying to assess the economic contributions
of adoption and innovation for catching up, we are faced with the concern central
to this thesis: reasonable answers stem from premises grounded on contesting
theoretical frameworks. The review below aims for a close examination of these
theoretical issues.
Let us pose in a more concrete way what we claim are the core contributions
of this chapter:
First and foremost, we aim to provide an integrated framework for under-
standing what economists from different backgrounds think technology is, and
the relationship between technology and growth. The notion of technology, even
in the narrow field of growth economics, usually reflects quite different mean-
ings among different economists (e.g., productivity, artifacts, ideas, high-tech
inventions, small innovations).14 Thus, to overcome the hurdle imposed on our
review by conflicting definitions and provide a more cogent scenario for analyz-
ing the impact of technology on the growth process, it is necessary in the first
place to put together the different concepts and interpretations of technology
both from the viewpoint of the neoclassical/endogenous growth theory and the
evolutionary/NIS theories.
Second, we use the above conceptual definitions of technology to draw a
distinction between the economic impacts of adoption (of foreign technology)
and (local) innovation, which is one of the key subjects creating major—if lit-
tle promulgated—contention between the mainstream and the evolutionary and
NIS frameworks. We discuss various arguments to show the contrast between
the mainstream’s prominence of technology transfer as a major engine of growth
11Baumol 2002, Aghion and Howitt 2006, Aghion Akcigit and Howitt 2013.
12Jones 1995, Ang and Madsen 2011.
13Fagerberg et al., 2010.
14About the very distinct connotations of technology see Romer 1993, 1994, Lucas 1988,
Verspagen 1992, Fagerberg 1994, Schneider and Ziesemer 1995, and Fagerberg, Srholec and
Verspagen 2010. For the different connotations of technology in empirical assessments see, for
instance, Ha and Howitt 2007, Levine and Renelt 1992, Bosworth and Collins 2003, Griliches
and Mairesse 1995 and Hauk and Wacziarg 2009.
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in backward countries and the evolutionary contention that the true driver of
growth is (local) innovation—the ability to translate technology into new and
ever-changing commercial applications—even if the latter takes place along ma-
jor technology trajectories (steam engine, electricity, electronics, ICT, nanotech-
nology, biotechnology). Lastly, we also stress the systemic aspects of innovation
that are at the core of the NIS perspective.
Our third contribution relates to the distinct policy implications of these
competing views on the relationship between technology and the economy. In
doing so, we discuss how the disagreement relates to contrasting theoretical as-
sumptions with regard to, among other things, the idea that the economy is
populated by rational “optimizing” individuals and the effectiveness of markets
to coordinate the economic activity, both of which result in competing inter-
pretations about the proper role of government in matters of innovation policy.
In particular, we argue that the policy implications that derive from the evo-
lutionary and NIS approaches are not different, but they both differ from the
mainstream because the role of government also differs. Below, we narrow these
policy implication from perspective of NIS approach into three key aspects of
sponsorship, leadership and coordination and discuss why these aspects stand
in stark contrast to the policy implications drawn from the mainstream anal-
ysis which place stress on ideas of distance to the frontier and advantage of
backwardness.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the conceptual un-
derstanding of technology. Section 3.3 provides the baselines of the controversy
between the mainstream and the evolutionary and NIS frameworks over the fun-
damental aspects of technology that positively affect the growth and catch up
processes. Section 3.4 addresses the implications of this controversy in terms of
the ability of less developed countries to realize their advantage of backwardness.
Section 3.5 elaborates on the distinct policy implications of the contesting theo-
retical frameworks under discussion. Finally, Section 3.6 offer some concluding
remarks.
3.2 The Economics of Technology
In spite of it being one of the most often cited concepts, the definition of tech-
nology receives only occasional attention in the economic literature.15 The
costumary practice is to relate technology to “something” that increases pro-
ductive efficiency, offsetting the tendency of other factors (capital, labor) to
yield decreasing returns. Starting from this relation, most writers focus on the
technology features that lead to sustained rates of growth over the long-run,
15Freeman 1994, Bernard and Jones 1996b. Indeed, a safe definition of what technology
is troubles scientists of all fields. Someone has defined it simply as “...anything that was
invented after you were born...” and a whole branch of sociology has been devoted to the
case of technology as a “social construct,” a contention that technology is forged through the
organization, functioning, and needs of the society at large. Mokyr 2014, has posed that “...the
exact interaction between science and technology is a subtle and complex one, time-variant,
and culture-specific.”
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and endeavor to find out whether, or to what extent, those features arise as
a result of positive spillovers or purposeful entrepreneurship swayed by market
incentives.
That endeavor has resulted in many-fold competing notions of technology,
which paradoxically makes it clumsier, rather than simpler, to understand which
are the actual aspects of technology that matter to boost economic growth. Even
more crucial, it makes harder to understand which are the fundamental aspects
of technology that matter to explain the differences in economic performance
across countries (e.g., in terms of per capita income or growth rates).
The view of technology as “something” that is primarily embodied in ar-
tifacts has played a major role in this debate for a long time. In fact, the
embodiment notion remains center stage in the research, or at least part of the
research, that explores the determinants and the economic impact of technol-
ogy diffusion (e.g., the capital accumulation debate).16 Yet, many writers point
out as well the significant impact of disembodied technical changes in fostering
economic growth—which is based on the argument that even without changes
in the quality/number of factors of production, efficiency gains might accrue by
making a better use of the installed capacity. From this perspective, the alloca-
tion and combination of productive factors into their best possible use, rather
than just the overall acumulation of them, is a major technology problem that
all countries need to address.17
So, even though in practice they denote different processes, “technological
change”, “technology progress”, and “productivity” turn out to be used as in-
terchangeable terms stressing the nature of technology as the ability to produce
more output from a given set of inputs.18 From this perspective, a process
of “machine-automation” aimed to the elimination of routine work enhancing
higher efficiency in activities that rely on repetitive processes counts as much as
productivity improvements accrued to the availability of better qualified workers
or the simple reorganization of the production activity.
In addition to these widespread notions, in growth economics technology is
featured overall as a process of knowledge creation which occurs either through
purposeful private R&D activities in the business sector or through economy–
wide investments in human capital (education).19 The contemporary consensus
in growth theory views technology as “something” that improves productivity
and hinges fundamentally on the creation of “ideas”: blueprints that offset the
curse of decreasing returns to capital, allowing the economy to obtain endoge-
16De Long and Summers 1991, provide evidence of a close relationship between invest-
ments in physical assets and economic growth; and Kumar and Russell 2002 hold that capital
deepening explains most of the observed cross-country growth differences (84%). The quality-
adjusted capital (physical and human) pioneered by Dale Jorgenson are deemed to account for
the contributions of technology that are embodied but usually overlooked in the conventional
growth accounting method (Jorgenson et al., 1987, Jorgenson and Vu 2005, 2010).
17Research by Pages 2010 and McMillan and Rodrik 2012 suggests that for many developing
countries the technology problem of major importance is structural change: a process aimed
to shifting resources from less to more productive activities/sectors of the economy.
18Gomulka 1990.
19Romer 1990, 1993, 1994, Lucas 1988.
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nous exponential growth.20
The reasoning behind the twist from the “machine view” to the “ideas view”
is compelling: giving one laptop to one worker makes that worker more produc-
tive (provided she knows how to use it), yet creating a new algorithm (e.g., to
ease internet access) makes everybody better off. In the first case, efficiency
gains hinge on the number of laptops per worker; in the second, the gains de-
pend on the aggregate stock of ideas, not only the number of ideas per worker.
Unlike the laptop, the use of the algorithm for one person does not prevent any
other person of using the same algorithm at the same time.21
One limitation of this perspective, however, is the widespread association of
“ideas” exclusively with advanced scientific and technological endeavors at the
frontier of knowledge. That is, mainstream economists regard “ideas” largely
as technology breakthroughs that boost productivity (machines and equipment,
business models, organizational methods, sophisticated intermediate products),
and stress the benefits of diffusion and adoption of frontier ideas for countries
that want to catch up.22 This, according to evolutionary theorists, is a “narrow”
view in need of further refinement as innovation—the attempt to try out new
ways of doing things even if they have been in used for some time elsewhere—is
an aspect of all economic activities, including low-tech industries; and therefore
there are (potentially large) growth effects also in the innovations activities
conducted in less developed countries.23
The evolutionary approach to explaining the role of innovation in boosting
economic growth holds that once producers have developed a variety of new
products, a selection process takes place by consumers in the marketplace. The
selection process involves substantial competition with other producers and de-
termines whether or not the new products are going to be successful. The market
success of a new product, however, is inevitably a temporary issue. Even if the
new products that survive competition do well for the first generation, they may
do less well for the second generation, and still less for the third, and so on. In
other words, if they are not at least slightly modified the “popularity” of the
new products is a decreasing function of the time a product has been in the
market. At length, the pressures of competition and the consumers’ craze for
the “new” compel producers to permanently seek for newer market strategies
and novel products.24
Thus, according to the perspective of evolutionary economics, even though
the discovery/invention of major technologies helps to resolve the productivity
problem, the problem that remains is what to produce: how to take advantage
of the production possibilities opened up by the new inventions. And from this
perspective, the process of economic growth is overall a reflection of the ability of
20Romer 1993, Jones 2005.
21Jones 2005.
22Romer 1994, Mankiw et al., 1995, Sachs and Warner 1995, Grossman and Helpman 2001,
Sachs and McArthur 2002, Parente and Prescott 1994, 2002.
23Nelson 2008.
24Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002. See also Urban 1996 and Elmaraghy et al., 2013. A similar
emphasis as ours on the role of innovation is found in Baumol 2002.
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entrepreneurs to use the most sophisticated technologies to produce innovative
products aimed to create or maintain consumers’ demand.
However, trying to encapsulate the notion of innovation is a cumbersome
issue. For one thing, there is a plain recognition within evolutionary economics
that there are (probably) many instances where what is called “innovation” cor-
responds simply to the adoption or imitation of products or practices originated
in the leading nations.25 Then, there is a striking amount of dimensions in which
the innovation issue can be analyzed. As Fagerberg et al., have pointed out,
low-tech innovation may be related with any improvements in logistics, distri-
bution, marketing, and new business models, whose main purpose is to increase
productive efficiency—not necessarily to produce new goods.26 Finally, many
innovation studies have extended the discussion to product, process, organiza-
tional, and marketing innovations, innovations resulting from emerging tech-
nologies, “open innovations” and “disruptive innovations” which clearly makes
harder to claim a fair academic understanding of the workings of this source of
technology progress.27
Thus, rather than relying on complex definitional issues, we find it more
appropriate to adopt a broader view of innovation in our discussion. Therefore,
we refer to innovation as (localized) commercial applications of technology which
are featured by the continuous improvement to any of the production processes,
inputs and outputs. We do think of this view of innovation as the dominant
strategy for producers to survive the pressures of competition and selection. And
we do think of our broad view as bringing together supply and demand views
of technology;28 the importance of innovation over price competition;29 the
view of innovation in the theory of monopolistic competition with differentiated
products;30 the modern emphasis on innovation-based growth models;31 and, of
course, the evolutionary perspective on innovation.32
In our view, the conceptual distinction between adoption and innovation
elaborated in this section is in order to better the understanding on the de-
terminants of growth and catching-up. Yet, we also need to understand the
nature of the differences regarding the theoretical frameworks on which these
competing notions of technology are addressed. That is the focus of the next
section.
25Nelson 2008, Lee and Malerba 2018.
26Fagerberg et al., 2010.
27The proliferation of terms related with the notion of innovation is said to have surpassed
the indicators and definitions in the Oslo Manual (Gault 2014).
28Schmookler 1966; Kelly 2002.
29Schumpeter 1934, 1950, Baumol 2002, Lundvall 2007.
30Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Romer 1994.
31Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt 2013.
32Nelson and Winter 1982; Nelson and Winter 2002; Nelson 2008; Fagerber et al., 2010.
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3.3 Technology and Growth Theory
Starting in the second half of the twentieth century, the modern debate on
catching-up and convergence issues has been related to the efforts of less de-
veloped countries to reach the levels of social and economic development of the
so-called “mature industrialized countries”.33 The theoretical perspective on
these efforts can be split into models/theories focused on the levels of physical
and human capital—a line of research spurred by the Solow model—and the
research on institutional and social structures that appear to hold back some
countries.34
The intellectual reluctance with the general property of (conditional) con-
vergence predicted by the Solow model led to further developments under the
endogenous literature, one of whose main predictions was that income per capita
differentials across rich and poor countries can persist indefinitely.35 The new
theory had important implications for the analysis of the convergence possibil-
ities of less developed countries and, among the new insights inspired by this
research, the issue of technology diffusion began to receive a deal of attention.
Building on earlier ideas by Gerschenkron 1962, Baumol 1986 and Abramovitz
1986, subsequent models started to investigate the existence, causes and conse-
quences of economic backwardness, and to study the benefits accrued to poor
countries through the spread of technology from the frontier.36 Conventional
models of diffusion, however, did not pay attention (at least not enough) to
the historical analysis, social capabilities and institutional factors that form the
hallmark of the contributions by Gerschenkron, Baumol and Abramovitz. In-
stead, most of those same aspects were developed in a set of contributions by,
among others, Katz 1984, Lall 1987, Verspagen 1991, Fagerberg 1995, and Pack
and Nelson 1999.
Certainly, not all the research conducted in the field may be classified in
these terms. But some of the major contributions that, in parallel or even prior
contributions to the mainstream, have influenced the analysis of the technology
aspects enhancing economic growth and catch-up, relate to the evolutionary
economics emphasis on the process of capability building, learning and assimi-
lation;37 and the systemic factors that lay at the heart of the NIS approach.38
Our aim, in what follows of this section, is to provide a more in-depth dis-
cussion and comparison of the theoretical developments under each of these
strands of the research, namely, the mainstream approach presented in the the-
ory of growth and the models of technology diffusion, vis-a`-vis the evolutionary
literature and the national innovation systems framework.
33Fei and Ranis 1997.
34Fagerberg 1995, Spence 2011, Stiglitz 2014, Lee and Malerba 2018.
35Romer 1993.
36Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997, Edwards 1998, Acemoglu et al., 2006, Zilibotti 2008, Aghion
et al., 2013. The key features that characterize the mainstream perspective in both types of
models, namely models of growth and models of diffusion, have been amply documented in
the literature (e.g., Durlauf and Quah 1999).
37Nelson and Winter 1982, Pack and Nelson 1999.
38Freeman 1987, Lundval 1992, 1993, Nelson 1993.
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Let us begin with the conventional approach.
The Theory of Growth
The key mechanism that explains economic growth over the long-run in the
neoclassical theory is technology. In the seminal model of Solow the technology
parameter, A, was originally thought of as “something” exogenous that posi-
tively affects the amount of output per worker. Later, with the emergence of
what we can refer to as early endogenous growth models (EEMs) and AK mod-
els, technology was thought of as an endogenous factor.39 The positive effects of
technology on production, however, was not considered as an outcome of delib-
erate choices by individual producers but rather as an unintended consequence
of the aggregate level of technology (e.g., knowledge externalities). In the mod-
ern approach to the theory of growth technology is fully endogenized as the
outcome of purposeful investments by entrepreneurs to develop and accumulate
knowledge in order to maximize profits. These are the so-called R&D–based
and ideas–based endogenous growth models.40
The latter class of models commands further distinction. First generation
models (FGMs) are associated with the idea that technology leads to “persis-
tent” and “increasing” rates of growth in the long run.41 These models have
been abandoned as a devastating consequence of the famous Jones’ Critique and
replaced by second-generation models (SGMs), a number of technically more
appealing models which seek to explain what determines the observed empiri-
cal regularities of diminishing returns to technology investments.42 At present,
SGMs split into the so-called semi-endogenous and product-variety Schumpete-
rian growth models.43
To recap, the seminal assumption of technology as an exogenous factor of
production is formulated—assuming the existence of an aggregate production
function—in the following manner
Y = Af(K,L) (3.1)
where Y, K, and L denote the national levels of output, physical capital, and
labor, and where “A” stands for the unexplained contribution of technological
progress.
39The EEMs classification includes many growth models that through the 1950s, 1970s and
1980s attempted to endogeneize technical progress, some examples are: the learning-by-doing
approach of Arrow 1962, the model of inventive activity of Shell 1966, the two sectors models
of Uzawa 1965, and Phelps 1966, and the Keynesian model of Kaldor and Mirless 1962. These
models greatly influenced the development of the “new growth theory.” See Romer 1986, and
Schneider and Ziesemer 1995 for reviews of the earlier contributions.
40Romer 1994, Ha and Howitt 2007, Jones 2005.
41Examples include models of product variety and quality ladders, i.e., with an increasing
number or a higher quality-set of intermediate inputs (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman
2001).
42Jones 1995, the critique points out that the predictions of FGMs are inconsistent with the
empirical evidence, namely while the resources devoted to R&D trend increasingly upwards
in most developed countries, productivity growth rates do not follow a similar trend.
43Jones 1995, 2005, Ang and Madsen 2011, Aghion et al., 2013.
59
The emphasis on technological spillovers (externalities) in EEMs and AK
models was set up as a mechanism to compensate for the effect of diminishing
returns to capital accumulation. The production function for each producer (j)
is expressed as
Yj = A(R)f(Kj , Lj) (3.2)
where “R” denotes spillover benefits from technology-related investments through
the whole economy: education, firm–market interactions, or public infrastruc-
ture (e.g., roads, airports, public services).44 Human capital, however, has been
the subject of much research in this class of models.45
The endogenous growth literature advanced over the spillovers approach with
a rationale that technology progress hinges fundamentally on private investors’
market-determined choices. The production function—in the class of FGMs—
was written down as
Yj = A(R)f(Rj ,Kj , Lj) (3.3)
where “Rj denotes the producer j
′s investments in R&D. In FGMs a framework
of monopolistic competition is established within which aggregate production
depends on many firms, each with monopoly power.46 An important implica-
tion of these models was that public policy was warranted to influence R&D
investments in the private sector, e.g., through subsidies and taxes.47
Given the lack of empirical support for FGMs, SGMs were set up to inves-
tigate what determines the limits of increasing returns, and the suitable policy
interventions to deal with this problem.
Given the simple structure of the standard production function, this line
of inquiry took either of two directions: i) assuming some limit to the ability
of R&D to generate new knowledge, which recalls an upper bound constraint
to knowledge production that was anticipated earlier in AK models;48 or ii)
assuming some limit to increasing returns in the production of final goods (where
R&D features as an input). The first alternative is currently the hallmark of
semi-endogenous growth models;49 the second is found in recent developments
44See Romer 1986, 1994, Lucas 1988, Barro 1990, and Ziesemer 1995a.
45Human capital has both private and social effects. Better qualified workers are more pro-
ductive, and thus earn higher private earnings—which means higher savings and consumption
expenditures. In addition, more qualified workers are a source of technological spillover that
benefit the society at large. Private effects affect the short-run of the economy, i.e., they affect
the level but not the long-run growth of output per capita—which means that they generate
high rates of growth along the transitional dynamics to a new steady state but the effects
decay asymptotically to zero. Social effects affect the long-run because social accumulation
of knowledge extends over time (growth effects). See Nelson and Phelps 1966, Lucas 1988,
Romer 1990, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005 and Aghion et al.,
2013. See also Schneider and Ziesemer 1995 for a review of earlier literature.
46Romer 1994. The monopolistic approach builds upon earlier developments by Dixit and
Stiglitz 1977.
47Ziesemer 1991, Romer 1993, 1994.
48Romer (1986) developed a model with increasing returns in the production of final goods
and decreasing returns in the production of knowledge. The latter feature is based on the
assumption that each time it is more difficult to increase the stock of knowledge as, for
example, doubling the amount of inputs into research will not double the amount of new
knowledge. See also Gong, Greiner, and Semmler, 2004.
49Jones 2005, Kortum 1997
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of the so-called Schumpeterian growth models.50
The semi-endogenous growth literature holds that an increasing amount of
resources is needed to compensate for the diminishing returns to knowledge
accumulation and to keep the economy growing. So, if the production of tech-
nology is a function of the number of researchers, which in turn is some share
of total population, it leads to the implication that in the long-run economic
growth stems from a country’s (population) size.
A = A(LR) (3.4)
Where LR denotes the share of the working force devoted to R&D activities.
A further implication of the semi-endogenous growth models is that economic
growth is unresponsive to taxes and other public interventions as the impact of
these policy instruments vanishes asymptotically.51
The key assumption in the class of Schumpeterian growth models, on the
other side, is that there is a process of creative destruction that ends up reduc-
ing the preeminence of increasing returns. The effectiveness of R&D investments
vanishes as the economy expands because new innovations are more costly due
to their increasing complexity. In addition, the proliferation of product varieties
implies that the investments in R&D spread each time over a much larger and
slightly differentiated set of products. Unlike the semi-endogenous class of mod-
els, the Schumpeterian models hold that long-run growth is highly responsive to
policy incentives. Because the success of investments in innovation is uncertain,
it requires incentives for firms to devote more resources to R&D activities.
To sum up, the ongoing debate between semi-endogenous and Schumpete-
rian growth models demonstrates that—even within mainstream economics—
the nature of technology progress, its impact on economic growth and the role
of public policy in this regard are not yet safely established.52 The competing
but contrasting theoretical interpretations of these issues has raised scepticism
among many economists about the use of technology policy as a tool to foster
economic growth, and the lack of clear empirical support for either theory pro-
vides further grounds for this disbelief.53
Let us turn our attention now to the models that emphasize on the mechan-
ics of technology diffusion.
50Aghion et al., 2013.
51Semi-endogenous growth literature would face difficulty explaining the successful devel-
opment of several low–population countries—for example, Singapore, Botswana, and Austria.
Another issue of debate is the extent to which population dynamics may be considered ex-
ogenous in growth models, and the arguments raised by population–pessimists—so–called
Malthusians and neo–Malthusians—and population optimists (see Simon 1998). See Prettner
and Trimborn 2016 for a recent assessment.
52Note, for instance, the contrasting views in Jones 2005 and Romer 2000, with regard the
use of subsidies to encourage innovation. See, also, Kremer 1998 on the use of patent rights
in light of distortions generated in the pharmaceutical industry. And the Boldrin and Levine
2002 suggestions to restrict or eliminate patent rights altogether.
53See Gong et al., 2004, Jones 2005, Ha and Howitt 2007, and Ang and Madsen 2011, for
recent empirical tests of these models.
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Models of Diffusion
The endogenous growth literature’s critical advance over the earlier neoclas-
sical model was to help shape the understanding that the production of tech-
nology not only hinges on market incentives—namely the ability of investors
to capture (at least some of) the returns of their technology investment—but
also on policies and institutions that provide further incentives and fix the gap
between social and private returns to technology investments. Yet, when it
comes to the analysis of the different impacts of foreign and local sources of
technology, the dominant theoretical framework is associated with models of
technology diffusion.54
The widespread understanding driven by these models is that the key tech-
nologies that matter to generate economic growth are invented at the frontier
and spread to backward countries through diverse channels (imports of ma-
chines and equipment, learning by exporting, foreign direct investment, licens-
ing). This line of reasoning became popular under the hypothesis of advantage
of backwardness and is now the core of Schumpeterian-based models of distance
to the frontier.55 Yet a similar line of reasoning is found in other theoretical
models, e.g., the so-called North–South models,56 and leader/follower models.57
In this perspective, the potential of backward countries to grow and catch
up is influenced by their absorptive capacities. A considerable research effort
in this area, namely the way absorptive capacities may be developed in order
to exploit the advantages provided by foreign technology advances, has been
on human capital issues,58 and the institutional (free market) conditions that
influence private investment decisions.59 Thus, the logic in this class of models
may be formulated in the following manner
AB = A¯f(HB |IB) (3.5)
where the subscript denotes backward countries, “A” with the upper bar is
the frontier’s level of technology, “H” denotes human capital, and “I” stands
for the institutional environment. For many economists the combination of
technology diffusion with indigenous absorptive capabilities is a crucial part of
54Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Acemoglu 2009, Acemoglu et
al., 2006, Aghion et al., 2013, among others.
55The hypothesis of advantage of backwardness dates back to Gerschenkron (1962). For
examples of models of distance to the frontier see Acemoglu et al., 2006 and Aghion et al.,
2013.
56Acemoglu et al., 2012; Acemoglu 2014.
57Stiglitz 2014.
58Lucas 1988, Lucas 2009, Romer 1993, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Vandenbussche, Aghion
and Meghir 2006, Stokey 2012.
59Hall and Jones 1999, Jones 2005, Acemogu et al., 2006. According to Barro 1997, tech-
nology transfers and thus long-run growth is influenced by trade policies and openness, the
provision of infrastructure and financial markets, policies that affect taxation and incentives,
the protection of intellectual property rights, and the maintenance of law and order.
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the explanation of why there are some countries that manage to grow and catch
up and others that fail to do so.60
Another distinctive feature of models of technology diffusion is a sequential
view in which technology progress is considered to go from a focus on adoption
and imitation in early stages to a focus on innovation in late stages, and where
each stage warrants a different type of government intervention. For exam-
ple, non-competitive arrangements (monopolistic rights) and active government
intervention are justified to encourage risky investments during the adoption
stage. But these measures are seen as unsuitable to encourage innovation, which
is regarded an activity that hinges on limited government intervention, market-
conforming policies, and strong market competition.61
It is worth mentioning that not all models of technology diffusion follow the
line of reasoning we have just outlined. Some of mainstream economists have
formulated models that address issues of diffusion from a “pure economics”
perspective—without explicit reference to institutional and policy intervention
features.62 And, of course, there are also models that provide a rigorous mathe-
matical treatment of the micro–foundations of technology diffusion even without
engaging in cross country analytical issues.63 Yet, in our view, the main theo-
retical objection to the various analytical models outlined above has been raised
by the evolutionary/NIS approaches to the economics of technology. Below we
examine what the disagreements are about.
The Evolutionary Approach
Mainstream economics sticks to the analysis of well–behaved market equi-
librium solutions achieved by rational, perfectly flexible, and foresighted maxi-
mizing individuals making choices over clearly defined scenarios. On the supply
side, the decentralized actions of optimizing producers acting under either per-
fect or imperfect competition settings ensure that all profitable options are fully
exhausted given a set of constraints. And these microeconomic foundations
form the basis for the analysis of all macroeconomic issues, including the analy-
sis of the relationship between technology and economic growth in cross country
settings.
Evolutionary theorists question the ability of markets to generate optimal
solutions in the first place, and then the reasonability of the assumptions held
60Parente and Prescott 1994, 2002, Acemoglu et al., 2006, Damsgaard and Krusell 2010,
Stokey 2012, Aghion et al., 2013.
61Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Acemoglu et al., 2006. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes
2005, and Stokey 2012. According to Zilibotti 2008, the failure of Latin-American countries to
successfully catch up as their East Asian counterparts—starting on equal footing—did, hinges
on a failure to evolve from the stage of adoption under a protectionist framework of import
substitution to a more competitive, innovation-friendly export-oriented strategy. For a similar
rationale, in the context of Asian economies, see Sachs and McArthur 2002.
62Benhabib and Perli 1994, Xie 1994, Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti 2014.
63Perla and Tonetti 2014, Lucas and Moll 2014, Acemoglu and Cao 2015, Perla Tonetti
and Waugh 2015, and Luttmer 2015. See Achdou et al., 2014 for a recent review of this
class of models. A model that combines elements of technology diffusion and firm behavior in
cross-country settings is Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti 2014.
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in their support. In addition, the competitive environment in the evolutionary
approach is radically different. Basically, because there are not well defined
opportunity sets. The relevant knowledge is split among different actors (con-
sumers, producers, businesses, public organizations, universities) so that when
individuals make choices they are mostly in possession of incomplete informa-
tion, unaware of the best alternatives, if any. In addition, decision-makers are
also influenced by their own beliefs and by contextual circumstances (culture,
society, institutions). In conditions of uncertainty, the economy expands as
some producers make profitable decisions—even if not optimal—or contracts as
they make unprofitable ones. Thus, contrary to the tenets of the conventional
analysis, bounded rationality and imperfect foresightedness limit the ability of
individuals to reach optimal solutions.64
The evolutionary analysis of technological change and economic growth is
one of the most important lines of research in this approach. It holds that,
instead of responding optimally to changes in market conditions (consumer’s
preferences, resource availability, productive technologies), the entrepreneurs’
ability to make their best choices would be constrained by lock-in and path-
dependence effects. The strong heterogeneity in the market implies that some
firms are better than others at acquiring/exploiting technological opportunities.
And even for the best producers, they would probably prefer to stick to known
routines and technologies for long periods of time as the adjustment to new
conditions, and the economic benefits of doing so, can be realized only when
the economic system as a whole evolves and adapts to those conditions. Thus,
rather than on continuous equilibrium, along the process of technological change
entrepreneurs are permanently out-of-equilibrium, and adjust to changing con-
ditions only sporadically.65
As we already discussed in Section 3.2, consumer’s selection and produc-
ers’ competition are inherent in the nature of the market. The challenge for
entrepreneurs is to use technology efficiently to produce more products (rather
than more of the same products). This is because, in order to meet the con-
sumer’s search for the “new” and overcome the pressures of competition, en-
trepreneurs need to develop “new varieties” of their products permanently—
each variety slightly differentiated not only from those of other firms but also
from previous versions of their own. This proposition implies that innovation is
not exclusive to leading industries that invest intensively in R&D.
Whereas high–tech innovations (biotechnology, nanotechnology, ICT) cer-
tainly require heavy R&D investments and have mostly a large impact on the
rate of economic growth, low–tech innovations provide, in the view of evolution-
ary economists, another important source of increasing returns and economic
growth. The latter are frequently—though not necessarily always—non R&D–
based innovations focused on solving relatively simple problems (location of
production, marketing and logistic strategies, new designs, new product con-
64Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002. See also Simon 1979 for a general discussion of bounded
rationality. See Thaler 2015 for a discussion of bounded rationality in consumers’ decision
making.
65Nelson and Winter 2002, Nelson 2008. See also Arthur 1994, Arthur et al., 1997.
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cepts and other “minor” issues); they take place often—though not necessarily
always—in low skill labor sectors (food, textiles, footwear, furniture) and gener-
ally involve a wide range of activities (sales, acquisitions, communications).66 In
sum, low-tech innovations define a large set of creative activities that is consis-
tent with the theoretical tenets of a broad view of innovation in the evolutionary
approach.67
With the broad view of innovation presented by the evolutionary theory, the
framework for analyzing the effects of technology on the economy needs to be
modified. We draw attention to three main aspects in this regard.
First is the interaction between (local) innovation and technology diffusion.
Evolutionary theorists highlight the view that “innovation”, finding “new ways
of doing things in a localized context”, requires learning and assimilation rather
than the simple imitation of processes and practices that are common use else-
where.68 Second is the issue that innovation is a “systemic” concept. It has
to do with the evolutionary view that this is a process that commands strong
interaction between innovations conducted in different parts of the economic
system, which might or might not involve pecuniary transactions.69 Third is
the emphasis of evolutionary economists that the process of innovation requires
considerable intervention by the government regardless of conventional market
failures considerations.70 Basically, this implies the need for a systematic ef-
fort by the government to upgrade the contextual environment (socio-cultural,
technological, institutional and policy aspects) and curb the limitations to the
innovation initiatives of the private sector. Further elaboration on this issue
follows below.
Our interpretation of the extensive evolutionary literature on this topic is
that while technology diffusion brings in new ways of production—which fun-
damentally allow to produce more and/or cheaper—or even ideas on new prod-
ucts, new forms or organization and so on, those benefits are not “automatic”.
Deliberate choices at the receiving end of the diffusion channel are necessary
to enhance the economic impact of the introduction of new technology. From
this viewpoint, while technology diffusion relates to high-tech activities and is
important to set technology trajectories or “technological regimes” that allow
backward countries to achieve their targets, the production of innovation hinges
overall on low-tech activities where entrepreneurial skills to create, increase or
improve the commercial applications of technology are a necessary precondition.
66Herstatt and von Hippel 1992, Scott 2006, Hirsch-Kreinsen 2008, Foray and Lissoni 2010,
Huang, Arundel and Hollanders 2010, Stephan 2002, 2010.
67Nelson 2008, Fagerberg et al., 2010. This broad view of innovation is now the core of
policy making, measurement and evaluation of innovation in the empirical front. For exam-
ple, innovation is deemed to comprise technologically new or significantly improved products
(goods and services) and processes, for example, the design of new products, the introduction
of new equipment, the logistic and marketing processes that allow to put the new products in
the market, or create a demand where it did not exist before, and purely organizational and
business practices. See the Bogota Manual (RICYT 2005), the Oslo Manual (OECD 2005)
and World Bank 2010.
68Pack and Nelson 1999, Nelson 2008, Fagerberg et al., 2010.
69Nelson and Winter 1982, Fagerberg 2003, Nelson 2008, Foray and Lissoni 2010.
70Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 385-395.
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National Innovation Systems
There is a considerable body of literature dealing with such subjects as the
product life-cycle, induced innovations, localized technological change, social ca-
pabilities, technological capabilities, and absorptive capacities, that has been put
forth to analyze a variety of factors that promote/dampen either the innovative
potential or the technological upgrading of the business sector in backward coun-
tries: factors’ endowment, technical know-how, social–cultural context, public
policies, institutions, political competition, and so on.71 However commendable
and sometimes also based on similar Schumpeterian notions of innovation, these
strands of the literature generally lack specific discussion of the kind of issues we
are concentrated on, namely the role of (local) innovation, its interaction with
the process of technology diffusion, and the role of government in this context.
An alternative literature that is more closely related to our discussion is the
so-called national innovation system approach—which is deemed to cope with
all market and non-market interactions that play a role to foster innovation.72
From this perspective, the ability to catch up technologically and economically
hinges on the ability of countries to organize the innovation activity at the widest
economic extent. Hereafter, we refer to this perspective as the NIS framework.
The NIS framework may be held to bring in two main objectives. The first
is to provide a language aimed at the description and comparison of national
institutions, competencies, programs, policy strategies and market/non market
incentive structures that play a role in generating and spreading technological
knowledge (as a resource), facilitate learning (as a process), and boost innovation
(as a product). The second is to shape an alternative view to the theory of
technical change, whose distinctive feature is government leadership of the whole
innovation process. In the latest sense, this framework seeks to explain the
determinants and nature of innovation as the major economic engine, and the
way the state may enhance the innovation process in order to influence economic
growth.73
The contentions of the evolutionary economics on the relationship between
technology diffusion, innovation and economic growth; and also the literature
developed under the NIS framework in this regard, have both received scarce to
no mention in the mainstream growth theory thus far.74 However, the converse
is also true with the evolutionary and NIS literatures ignoring, or downplaying,
the neoclassical view on technology progress and the role of innovation in that
71Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969, Abramovitz 1986, Cohen and Levinthal 1989, Basu and Weil
1998, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Basu and Fernald 2002, Parente and Prescott 2002, Cohen
2010, Archibugi and Coco 2004, Fagerberg et al., 2010, Lin and Monga 2011, Acemoglu 2014.
72Nelson 1993, Freeman 1987, 1995, Lundvall 2007, Soete et al., 2010.
73See Lundvall 2007. See Wirkierman et al., 2018 for a recent overview.
74To the best of our knowledge, the NIS framework has received scarce mention, alongside
other references to the evolutionary approach, in Romer 1993, 1994. Acemoglu et al., 2012 and
Stiglitz 2014 also refer either implicitly or explicitly to the systems approach in the discussion
upon the institutional arrangement proper to fostering innovation-led cross-country growth.
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context.75 We now briefly review what, in our view, determines this mutual
neglect.
One area of disagreement, as we have mentioned above, is on matters of gov-
ernment intervention. The conventional mindset is driven by ideas of political
liberalism from classical economics. In this tradition a limited role of gov-
ernment is sine qua non for economic prosperity. Along the provision of public
goods and the enforcement of free–market institutions (property rights) the most
prominent role for the government in this literature is to provide market–based
incentives to entrepreneurs. By contrast both, the evolutionary and NIS frame-
works, hold that appropriate government actions are needed to facilitate/guide
the innovation process. As suggested above, from the evolutionary viewpoint,
government action has an important role in promoting innovation regardless
the conventional market failures rationale. As Nelson and Winter 1982, point
out: “Thinking about the role of government should hinge on assessing the way
in which active policies can modify incentives or fill out the R&D endeavor so
that the [research] portfolio makes sense from a social point of view”.76 Like-
wise, from the NIS perspective, its proponents hold—on the basis of looking
at the historical evidence and the analysis of numerous country case studies—
that substantial intervention is needed to encourage the appropriate level of
innovation and create/enhance competitive advantages overall when it comes to
competition in the international market.77
Another crucial reason for the disagreement is a critique associated with the
lack of technical/mathematical sophistication, particularly in the case of the
NIS framework, which mainstream economists deem necessary to examine the
most substantive questions on the factors and conditions determining economic
growth over the long-run.78 It is certainly the case that the NIS analytical ap-
proach is largely based on nontechnical accounts of the nature and determinants
of innovation, and its role on the economy.79 Yet, we notice that formal mod-
elling is a well-established practice in the evolutionary approach even though this
practice is with quite a different set of mathematical tools than those based on
75Nelson 2008, Dosi and Nelson 2010, Fagerberg et al., 2010, Soete et al., 2010, Lee and
Malerba 2018. Lundvall 2007 pp. 109(ss), citing Arrow, pinpoints that, indeed, innovation
is not suitable for mainstream ways of thinking of rational and maximizing individuals, as
“...innovation has as its most fundamental characteristic that it gives rise to something that is
not known in advance – and it is not possible to apply the principles of rational choice if the
choice set is not defined in advance.” See, also, Nelson and Winter 2002 and Soete, Verspagen
and ter Weel 2010.
76Nelson and Winter 1982, pp. 187.
77Freeman 1995 and Lundvall 2007.
78See, for instance, Romer 1993, 1994.
79The NIS approach overturns the emphasis on equilibrium optimization and privileges in-
stead the qualitative over the quantitative assessment in numerous and exhaustive country
case studies. A method of analysis that resembles the so-called method of Appreciative The-
orizing put forward by Nelson and Winter 1982. NIS systems are considered highly localized,
and with large variation across countries, which implies that any attempt to perform quanti-
tative or aggregate analyses is misleading. For example, in some cases, government interacts
mainly with large firms (e.g., chaebols in South Korea, keiretsu in Japan), in others it builds
upon networks of small firms (e.g., the Italian industrial districts). See Nelson 1993, Freeman
1995, Lundvall 2007, Soete et al., 2010 and Stiglitz 2014 for further references.
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conventional maximization and equilibrium.80 Extending these developments,
namely Markow chains, game theory and the analysis of conditions affecting the
equilibrium/disequilibrium properties of the economic system, in order to study
the NIS approach to innovation is an open area for future research.
It is apparent, on the other side, that the core advantage of the NIS approach
is that it provides a way to organizing numerous types of innovation policies
and innovation related strategies that have been extensively suggested in the
literature.81 In more general terms, it is a framework suitable for the analysis
of innovation under alternative political systems.82 Therefore, it is instrumental
to overcome the “pure economics” analytical approach that features prominently
in mainstream economics, and also to complement the approach undertaken in
the literature that focuses on institutional barriers that hinder entrepreneurship
in less developed countries.83
But still it seems fair to recognize that the comparison between the evolu-
tionary, NIS and mainstream approaches that we have depicted above surely
is much more complex than we have been able to illustrate. For one, we can-
not equate different growth models as belonging all and ‘indistinctly’ to the
mainstream category. Additionally, there are, perhaps, many overlapping areas
between what we refer to as ‘evolutionary view of innovation’ and the way the
research on this front is conducted in what we refer to as the mainstream.84
Moreover, in our view, neither the mainstream approach, on one side, nor the
evolutionary and NIS approaches, on the other, may be regarded individually a
complete account of the key issues that matter in the academic understanding
of the relationship between technology and economic growth. At its best, each
approach can be seen as offering a partial understanding of the different aspects
that need to be considered when we think of the economics of innovation.
The inter-temporal optimization and dynamic analysis that characterize the
mainstream approach is certainly suitable to understand the long-run impacts
of technology policy. In that sense, this approach overcomes the static na-
ture of economic analysis characteristic of the NIS framework. However, the
“broad” view of innovation that is discussed in the evolutionary approach, and
80See the sequence of publications on “The economy as an evolving complex system”: An-
derson, Arrow and Pines 1988, Arthur, Durlauf and Lane 1997, Blume and Durlauf 2005. See
also Safarzyn´ska and van Den Bergh 2010. For an approach and references to evolutionary
games see Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993, Medio and Negroni 1996, and Silverberg and
Lehnert 1993, 1996. There are also various growth models that build on evolutionary per-
spectives: Verspagen 1993, Silverberg and Verspagen 1995, Silverberg 1997. See Nelson and
Winter 2002 for further references.
81See, for instance, the large number of papers presented in the proceedings of Innovation
Policy and the Economy sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research—NBER
(Lerner and Stern 2019), the distinct aims of a range of existing government agencies to pro-
mote innovation (Breznitz, Orston and Samford 2018); and the variety of National Innovation
Systems analyzed by Wirkierman et al., 2018.
82Hall 2001, Hall and Soskice 2003, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Stiglitz 2014.
83Barro 1997, Parente and Prescott 1994, 2002, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, Damsgaard
and Krusell 2010, Lin and Monga 2011, Stokey 2012.
84The author gratefully acknowledge comments by Carolina Castaldi that helped to real-
ize the complexity in trying to neatly distinguish between mainstream and non-mainstream
categories.
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the institutional-comparative focus of analysis that has become customary un-
der the NIS framework, are also highly relevant. In the first case, to better the
academic understanding of this research subject. In the second, to stress the
importance of the complex network of interconnected institutions related to the
production of innovations at the national level. Furthermore, the NIS seems a
more plausible framework to represent the systemic nature of innovation, which
to a large extent involves non-monetary transaction between parts of the sys-
tem and hinges largely on the capacity of the government to lead the innovation
process beyond the fixing of market failures.
Therefore, a unified theoretical framework that takes into account elements
of the three approaches (the mainstream, the evolutionary and the NIS) seems
warranted if one is really interested in explaining the fundamental role of tech-
nology as an “engine” of perpetual growth, and in providing sound justification
for policy interventions in this regard. Below, we briefly reflect on the main im-
plications of our assessment to enhance the understanding of the actual benefits
of economic backwardness.
3.4 Advantage of Backwardness Revisited
One of the most controversial elements mentioned above is undoubtedly the
emphasis on a government-led innovation approach.85 NIS economists agree
that such considerations as imperfect information, incomplete, imperfect or total
absence of markets (e.g., patent protection, risk finance, skilled labor), which
hinder the benefits of the investment, are major “market failures” that hold back
innovation. But, as they point out, the ultimate problem with the promotion
of innovation is associated with its “systemic” nature.86
Writers in the NIS tradition argue, for instance, that even if property rights
are well defined, human capital (education) and (efficient) financial markets are
in place, and policy tools (subsidies/taxes) are available, innovation may still
be precluded by the fact that the government, the education system, the en-
trepreneur and the investor are all different parties.87 The systemic failures
aspect that is overlooked frequently in the conventional analysis focused on
market failures is that, subsidies and property rights notwithstanding, there
may still be low investments in innovation if financial agencies, however effi-
cient, are reluctant to support certain projects, or if they are more risk–averse
than entrepreneurs themselves are; or if the education system, however sound,
falls short of enhancing the kind of qualifications that the production system
85From the mainstream viewpoint, government intervention is not (always) warranted (Le
Grand 1991, Stiglitz 2008). The problem, as suggested in early research on this front, is that
although intervention might be instrumental to address some market failures, it may, as well,
generate higher welfare losses if the failures are exogenous to the market which, therefore,
do not justify the need for policy intervention as, in that case, there is not safe guarantee of
reaching superior Pareto solutions (Bullard and Butler 1993).
86Freeman 1987, Fagerberg 2003, Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007, Hall and Rosenberg 2010,
Soete et al., 2010, Lee and Malerba 2018.
87Lundvall 2007, Soete et al., 2010.
69
requires. Unlike the systems approach, the market failures approach frequently
fails to address the mismatches and misalignments between policies and actors
in the system due to its focus on specific goals: for instance, while the absence
of property rights discourages the production of new knowledge, the solution
of granting patents in many cases ends up reducing, rather than increasing,
innovation by reducing the spread of knowledge.88
Thus, the systemic nature of innovation provides the NIS framework with
a basis to justify the need for active government intervention. For instance,
it justifies the need for a close interaction between public and private sectors
to initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies; it also justifies the
need for for financing mechanisms funded by the public sector when and if ven-
ture capital finance is not efficiently provided by the market; and finally, it
justifies the need for the coordination of complementary innovation–related ac-
tivities conducted by education and training institutions, universities and tech-
nical institutes, public institutions, industry associations, and so on, and for
the enforcement of networking mechanisms between upstream and downstream
production sectors.89
Accordingly, the NIS framework is based on three fundamental premises:
(i) the proposition that the economic contributions of technology depend crit-
ically on the innovative activity carried out not only by private business
entrepreneurs but also by universities, technical institutes and the public
sector;
(ii) the proposition that government financing plays a large role in fostering
innovation at all levels, basically because other sources of financing (banks,
stock market) are generally risk–averse, less inclined to finance projects
that carry out significant uncertainty;
(iii) the proposition that innovation is positively affected by the systemic co-
ordination of innovative activities regardless whether pecuniary transac-
tions are involved or not—through business networking, public–private
alliances, education projects, and so on.
Formally, the NIS framework establishes that, given a technology trajectory (A¯),
innovation in backward countries (AB) hinges on private business innovations
(Z), government-led innovation projects (Z˜), government coordination (N˜), and
government financial support (z˜).
AB = f(Z, z˜, Z˜, N˜ |A¯) (3.6)
It is worth noting that the NIS framework does not dispute the view that back-
ward countries’ growth and catching up processes are benefited by develop-
ments that take place in leading countries (inventions, ideas, business models,
entrepreneurial practices, and so on). But rather than emphasizing on measures
88Kremer 1998, Boldrin and Levine 2002.
89Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Freeman 1987, 1994, 1995, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992,
1993, 2007, Soete et al., 2010.
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to enhance absorptive capacities that are widespread in the literature (human
capital, infrastructure, institutions),90 or accepting the usual tenet that inno-
vation becomes an issue only at advanced stages of development,91 the NIS
supporters stand out for their critical point that the government, rather than
the market, is better positioned to drive the innovation process.
The role of government in the NIS framework is an increasing field of re-
search.92 And the numerous studies in this field support the view that the
NIS framework is an important way to enhance, international competitiveness
and technology specialization patterns other than through conventional price
mechanisms.93 However, we need to recognize that in more general terms what
matters is the method of analysis in this approach. Some studies that are not
based on the NIS framework but push in the same direction reach a similar con-
clusion: appropriate interventions by the government are an important element
to encourage private investments in innovation and knowledge sharing at the
economy–wide level.94
Among the various arguments one could elaborate upon to accommodate
the view that active government intervention is instrumental to enhance the
potential for catching up, one is the fact that technology itself is a source of
comparative advantage. This is an interesting research subject that has re-
ceived much attention in micro and macro economic literatures. Rather than a
idealized view of technology as a global “pool of ideas”, these studies investigate,
for instance, the limits of knowledge diffusion given the undeniable reluctance
of innovators to share the production secrets that give them the opportunity to
capture proprietary rents.95
A clear implication of this literature for the analysis of technology and eco-
nomic growth in cross–country settings is that along the widespread emphasis on
90Barro 1991, Levine and Renelt 1992, Parente and Prescott 1994, Coe and Helpman 1995,
Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister 1995, Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1997, Hall and Jones 1999,
Easterly and Levine 2001, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005, Jorgenson and Vu 2010, Madsen,
Islam, and Ang 2010. The benefits of technology diffusion are associated in this literature
to policies that facilitate international integration—through trade, foreign direct investment,
and so on (Romer 1993, 1994, Sachs and Warner 1995, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Keller
2002, 2004, Lucas 2009).
91For example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997, Sachs and McArthur 2002, Acemoglu et al.,
2006, Aghion et al., 2013, and Lee 2013.
92Nelson 1993, Breznitz 2007, Mazzucato 2013, Mazzucato and Penna 2015, Breznitz et al.,
2018, Lee and Malerba 2018.
93Lundvall 2007.
94Wade 1996, Kasahara 2004, Cimoli et al., 2010, Timmer et al., 2010, Lin, Monga et al.,
2011, Stiglitz 2014.
95Dinopoulos and Syropoulos 2007 analyze how the use of strategies to protect property
rents (patents, infringement litigations, delays in the introduction of new products, and so on)
discourages innovation. Hobday 1995 points out that original R&D tends to concentrate in—
rather than outside—headquarters (with some exceptions in pharmaceuticals and electronics).
Outsoursing of R&D activities is concentrated mostly on local design modifications in order
to meet national regulations or on monitoring local advances in science and technology. Even
large firms such as Samsung depended (by 1995) on original equipment manufacturing (OEM)
by technology leaders for much of their consumer goods sales, whereas in Taiwan and Hong
Kong, despite the growth of design skills, OEM and joint ventures with the market leaders
still accounted for a large proportion of total electronics output.
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price–competitiveness (cheap labor, tax reductions, currency devaluations) and
absorptive capacities, the ability to overcome backwardness hinges to a large ex-
tent on national strategies to generate non–price competitiveness, which means
competitiveness based on innovation.96 Accordingly, competition and integra-
tion in global technology markets require discretionary policy strategies at the
country level in order to overcome the limitations imposed by the economy’s en-
dowments. The latter has been a major concern in the development literature
given the observed patterns of specialization and trade, characterized by the
fact that the technology leading countries tend to concentrate on high-tech and
knowledge-intensive production activities, whereas capital and labor–intensive
activities are outsourced to backward countries.97
The discussion above leads to non-trivial policy implications. For one thing,
the fact that currently most backward countries tend to privilege adoption over
innovation policies relates to a view consistent with the mainstream tenet that
increasing economic growth hinges on technology transfer, for which a focus
on typical market incentives and absorptive capacities suffice. By contrast, the
NIS framework implies more room for government action, and such approach
has gained increasing recognition in the context of the development policy since
it emerged around the 1980s.98 Below we analyze the main policy implications
that derive from this approach.
3.5 Policy Implications
The debate on the proper role of government intervention in the economy is an
old question that goes back to Adam Smith (1776) himself. However, asking it
is still warranted, because the role of government is one of the important policy
questions—if not the most important—whenever economists deal with issues of
growth and catching up.99
Mainstream economics’ suggestion to restrain active intervention is based
on premises that are well known—namely, that intervention reduces the effi-
ciency of the price system and provides opportunities for corruption practices
(rent–seeking). To the extent that those premises are in the received theory
of growth, policy makers—mainly in backward countries—are advised to de-
sign and enforce policies and institutions that stick to the efficient market hy-
pothesis (which entails low or limited government intervention). Consequently,
they tend to pursue their advantage of backwardness by favoring adoption—over
innovation—policies using market incentives (e.g., taxes, subsidies) but avoiding
96Lundvall 2007.
97See Baldwin 1971, Madsen et al., 2010, and Nishioka 2013. See also the map of export
trends in Hausmann et al., 2011. Lall 2000, shows that, as of 1998, just 10 countries accounted
for over 80% of total exports worldwide, and this share rose with technological sophistication
to reach 96% for the top 10 exporters of high technology products. By contrast, the share
of world exports has declined for low-tech products, i.e., from 43% to 26% between 1985 and
1998 for resource-based and primary products.
98Soete Verspagen and ter Weel 2010, World Bank 2010, Lin, Monga et al., 2011.
99See, for instance, Stiglitz and Heertje 1989, Lin, Monga et al., 2011.
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intervention in other ways. This is most likely to be the case even in situations
where the theory recognizes a role for the government in the economy. Note,
for instance, that the support in the endogenous growth literature for public
expenditures in education, R&D programs and infrastructure (roads, airports,
public services), are generally met with varying degrees of skepticism, as the
following quote from Paul Romer reflects
...A lot of people see endogenous growth theory as a blanket seal
of approval for all of their favorite government interventions, many
of which are very wrong-headed. For example ... Infrastructure ...
should be provided in the same way that we provide other physical
goods, with market incentives and strong property rights. A move
towards privatization of infrastructure provision is exactly the right
way to go. The government should be much less involved in in-
frastructure provision. ... Another is the notion that the govern-
ment should directly subsidize particular research programs to pro-
duce particular kinds of ideas. If you compare that mechanism with
the mechanism of subsidizing human capital and letting the market
mechanism allocate where the human capital goes and what ideas get
developed, the human-capital-based approach works better.100
The NIS framework, on the other hand, points toward the need for the
government to lead the innovation process. Which, however, is not a plea for
the state to replace the market as long as the ultimate goal in the NIS framework
is to boost rather than discourage private sector innovation.
In other words, the NIS view is amenable to tenets that uphold overall eco-
nomic stability, enforcement of property rights, and market competition. But,
as we have discussed above, this framework does not imply that intervention
should be confined to offset market failures. And NIS researchers do not ac-
cept that market price interventions (taxes, subsidies, and so on) fully describe
the way innovation policy is conducted in countries at the frontier of technol-
ogy.101 On the contrary, they hold that active intervention in the way described
by the NIS framework has been, and still is, widely used to foster innovation,
economic growth and catching up in developed countries—which they believe
clearly suggest that backward countries have a great deal to learn from those
practices.102
Let us elaborate upon a more detailed discussion of the NIS mechanisms.
On the basis of an extensive literature review, we propose to narrow the aim
of this framework to three crucial aspects, namely sponsorship, leadership and
coordination.103
100Snowdon and Vane, 2005, pp. 690, Interview with Paul Romer.
101Nelson 2008
102Nelson and Rosenberg 1993.
103Nelson 1993, Freeman 1995, Lundvall 2007, Soete et al., 2010, Mazzucato 2013, and
Stiglitz 2014.
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3.5.1 Sponsorship
In the NIS approach, government has a role in facilitating the financing that
allows innovation projects to succeed. Financial support to private business
innovation touches, of course, on many standard arguments of “failures” in the
financial market, as well as on issues of financial regulation, monetary policy,
and more generally, macroeconomic stability. The NIS argument, however, is
that beyond fixing market failures, innovation requires risk capital that private
innovators are generally unable to incur, and traditional financial institutions
frequently have no incentive to provide.104 Indeed, it is generally acknowledged
that innovation activities are hardly financed in competitive market settings.
The sponsorship mechanism in the NIS framework entails a broad range of
public activities and programs designed to financially funding private innovation
initiatives. This includes the direct financing of basic research, scientific projects
or scientific institutions (through fellowships, grants, awards), and government
procurement expenditures (the government acting on the demand side) which
allow private investors to bypass the restrictions imposed by financial markets
and have a direct impact on the technology investments of the business sector.105
It is worth emphasizing in this discussion that whilst financial incentives to
innovation are a well established practice in the most advanced countries, they
are weakly institutionalized in backward countries. Along the obvious case of
resource constraints in many countries, this lack of financing schemes relates
to the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of systemic innovation—in the
broad sense we have been discussing here—and the ways to finance it, are not
informed by the received theory of economic growth.
Certainly, the financial practices to boost innovation that are described in the
NIS literature are not unique to this analytical framework. A stylized fact that
characterizes the financial landscape of technology activities is that large R&D
projects enjoy various sources of finance: through public funds, the stock market
or credit institutions, whereas small innovation projects rely on venture capital
as they frequently they do not fit neither the stock market’s nor the commercial
banks’ criteria for commercial credit or other forms of financing.106 In fact, the
widespread reluctance of financial markets to sponsor innovation projects unless
proper guarantees (collateral assets) and/or convincing cost–benefit analyses are
fulfilled provide quite a generalizable argument for the development of venture
capital markets instead.107
Yet, the creation of venture financial markets is a necessary but not a suf-
ficient condition to ensure that financial resources for innovation are efficiently
provided by the market. There is a number of reasons as to why this might be
the case: first, in many instances this alternative, namely venture financing, is
not available to those firms that need it more (startups and new entrants that
begin to explore the market); second, venture financing is frequently a function
104Lundvall 2007, Mazzucato 2013, and Stiglitz 2014.
105Cohen 2010, Foray and Lissoni 2010, Stephan 2010.
106Cohen 2010, Hall and Lerner 2010.
107Almus and Czarnitzki 2003, Dosi et al., 2006, Hall and Lerner 2010, Becker and Hall 2013.
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of the stage of development of a new product or process; and third, more of-
ten than not venture financing by private investors depend on the event that
innovators are worthy of receiving third–party funds. In this context, public
funds and publicly guaranteed finance for innovation turn out to be the most
obvious sources. And this proposition is even more applicable to backward
countries given the small scale or actual absence of venture capital markets in
those countries.108
In advanced countries, like the major OECD countries, the financing of in-
novation through public channels has a long history as governments in general
have supported the view that innovation commands the use of risk capital. This
includes investment funds which are guaranteed or assigned directly by the gov-
ernment in soft conditions through a variety of mechanisms.109 As Mokyr 2010,
pointed out: ‘it is clear that there [is] more than one way to skin [the] cat,’
in the sense that there are many ways activist governments have over time fi-
nanced innovation activities: tax reliefs, exemptions and deductions, tariff pro-
tection, non-payable allowances. In spite of the widespread criticism related to
the “picking–winners” problem, in many cases these activist interventions are
program or sector specific.
Finally, it is worth noting that the broad practice of sponsorship in countries
at the frontier and countries that have managed to catch up is broadly docu-
mented. Some examples that are recurrent in the literature are: the US National
Science Foundation funding role in the research that led to the development of
Google’s platform, the role of the Small Business Innovation Research Program
in providing venture capital to start-ups in the US economy, and the UK Med-
ical Research Council funding that led to development of molecular antibodies
that are at the frontier of research in biotechnology.110 Similar examples are
common with regard to the financial aspect of innovation systems in Japan,
Taiwan, and South Korea, among others.111
3.5.2 Leadership
The argument that innovation carried out by the public sector itself plays a
leading role in increasing innovation capabilities, and even the commercializa-
tion advantage of key activities in the private sector, is another essential feature
of the NIS framework. In the growth literature there is large, though not full,
consensus that the government should undertake investments in research pro-
grams that by their nature are unattractive for the private sector. This includes,
of course, basic sciences and pioneering fields (the internet, nanotech, biotech).
The point highlighted by the NIS mechanism of leadership, widely supported
on anecdotal evidence, is that the pioneering research initiated by the govern-
ment itself and then handed over to spur a variety of activities in the business
108The limited role of the venture capital market is a feature even in advanced economies,
see Mazzucato 2013, Stiglitz 2014.
109Hall and Lerner 2010, Mazzucato 2013.
110Mowery and Rosenberg 1993, Cohen 2010, Mazzucato 2013.
111Kim 1980, 1993, Freeman 1995, and Wade 2009.
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sector (agriculture, electronics, medicine, transport) has given rise in many in-
stances to marketable innovations which have been key drivers of disruptive
innovations leading to long run growth and further innovation.112
Although the focus on the economic impact of government research activi-
ties is not an exclusive concern of the NIS framework, there are key differences
between mainstream and NIS economists in this regard. It is generally accepted
that research conducted in public laboratories is a centerpiece in increasing
basic science and technology knowledge, and in enhancing the conditions that
lead to the introduction of new technologies by the private sector. The lead-
ership argument holds, however, that—unlike widespread mainstream theoret-
ical tenets—in countries at the frontier of technology, the government itself, in
many instances, conducts research that benefits either directly or indirectly the
business sector—rather than just enabling the market “conditions” that spur
innovation.113
From the NIS perspective, public research has large external effects on the
private sector commercial innovation activity. Technology originated in the
public sector—and subsequently handed out to the private sector—allows the
latter to take over only the more profitable commercialization role without the
cost of investment. Moreover, public research has been extensively argued to
have large influence on the kind and direction of innovation activities conducted
in the private sector, and even to lead to the creation of new markets where they
did not exist before.114
Researchers have largely discussed that a key factor to explain the economic
growth performance of even the most capitalist US economy has been the re-
search conducted by the federal government. In many cases this discussion re-
lates to the economic impact of technologies that were linked earlier to military
purposes, but research conducted in government labs, or directly sponsored by
the government, and subsequently disseminated to the business sector for com-
mercial purpose is widely documented.115 A recent assessment of the research
notes that:
...An extensively studied extraindustry influence on technologi-
cal opportunity is that of government. In numerous sectors, notably
agriculture, aircraft, electronics, and medicine, government has con-
tributed to reducing the private cost of innovation and has influenced
the direction of industrial research by its own research, by its support
of academic research, by subsidizing and sponsoring private sector re-
search and by disseminating technological knowledge developed in its
own labs and elsewhere. The distribution of government expenditures
on R&D across industries is highly skewed, especially in the United
States, where industries supplying the military, and, more recently,
universities conducting research in the life sciences, are the principal
112Cohen 2010, Mokyr 2010, Mazzucato 2013.
113Mazzucato and Penna 2015, Breznitz, Ornston and Samford 2018.
114Viotti 2002, Trajtenberg 2002, Mazzucato 2013.
115Mowery and Rosenberg 1993, and Mazzucato 2013.
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recipients of R&D support. Although its direct role in creating and
disseminating knowledge is substantial in some sectors, its indirect
influence is also felt through a variety of other channels that have
different impacts across industries. Most important is the impact of
government demand on the rate and direction of innovation.116
Another example in regard to government leadership is the NIS project it-
self, which emerged from the concern in industrialized countries over finding
alternatives aimed to enhance competitiveness and growth prospects. The NIS
initiative, in this context, is considered to be a way toward understanding the
determinants and enhancing the creation and diffusion of knowledge through-
out the economy.117 This concern has been central to support a permanent
production of country-based studies and the standardization of performance in-
dicators focused on patterns of knowledge and innovative potentials that allow
comparison across countries.118
3.5.3 Coordination
Coordination, like the other two aspects of the NIS framework that we have
analyzed above, is a broadly used concept in the economic literature. In the NIS
perspective, we have framed it as a way to ensure that the productive effects of
innovation extend across all sectors of activity and benefit the whole economy
through all kinds of market and non-market mechanisms (research networks,
value chains, public private partnerships, laboratories for applied research in
support of small and medium enterprises). 119
Coordination failures have been largely featured in mainstream economics
simply as market failures: situations where the economy exhibits low levels of
activity because of a divergence between actual private and socially optimal
investment decisions.120 Accordingly, these have been argued situations war-
ranting some type of government intervention, though the form and duration of
such interventions remain issues of debate. It is precisely with regard to these
two aspects that the NIS approach differs from mainstream economics.
Regarding the form of government intervention, it operates either through
policies that influence the allocation of resources, or policies that encourage
sectoral complementarities (or a combination of both). Mainstream economics
relies mostly on the allocation mechanism. From this perspective, coordination
failures—the lack of “synergism” or “complementarity” between different eco-
nomic activities—are deemed to arise simply from price rigidities and might be
overcome simply through active monetary policies to improve the coordination
of price adjustments.121 It seems apparent that under the allocation mecha-
116Cohen 2010, pp. 179.
117Freeman 1987, 1995, 2004, OECD 2013.
118Mairesse and Mohnen 2010, Soete et al., 2010.
119Foray and Lissoni 2010, Stephan 2010.
120Bohn and Gorton 1993.
121Ball and Romer 1991, Mankiw and Romer 1997.
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nism, the key incentive to boost innovation hinges on the ability of government
to coordinate price changes throughout all sectors of activity.
The NIS framework focuses instead on the potentials of the complementar-
ity approach. The rationale is similar to the “big-push” approach: investments
in innovation in one sector may fail to occur whenever complementary invest-
ments are not made in other sectors.122 The interactive nature of innovation in
this approach—where innovation is conducted partly by firms in the business
sector, and partly by non-market organizations (e.g., universities, government
labs) domestically and abroad—implies government interventions other than
through market mechanisms. Typically, this involves aspects of networking and
collaboration between the distinct parts of the system, and policies to encour-
age knowledge transfers from international sources.123 These aspects are not
disputed by the mainstream theory, but the latter’s view of them is to en-
hance market transactions, whereas the NIS approach holds them as nonmarket
channels of technology transfer.124 That is, in the NIS framework, issues of
networking and collaboration do not hinge on price incentives, or at least not
necessarily.
Regarding the duration aspect, the mainstream view is that any intervention
to adjust coordination failures should be limited to the time necessary to get
the economy out of the situation with low levels of activity.125 By contrast, as
we have already pointed out, government coordination is a permanent feature
of the NIS approach beyond the concern to fixing market failures. The latter
argument is highlighted also from the perspective of evolutionary economics. As
pointed out by Nelson 2008, innovation, economic growth and catching up are
ever-changing phenomena, which means that they cannot be properly assessed
as if they were states of equilibrium.126
Summing up, the view of innovation as a process led by government co-
ordination rather than as an outcome of the logic of the market is a crucial
hallmark of the NIS approach. And, noticeably, the notion of coordination
underlying both the NIS and evolutionary frameworks, is held as something
more complex than temporal interventions for the sake of addressing market
failures. Under the systemic NIS approach, governments need permanently to
enact broad policy directions, establish/adjust the institutional framework, and
generate networks to promote the creation and diffusion of innovation. Thus,
governments are regarded as key to influencing the entire national innovation
process; the degree to which countries are (un)able to thread the whole NIS is
122Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989, Soete et al., 2010.
123The importance of the coordination mechanism is highlighted as well from the evolutionary
viewpoint, Nelson and Winter 1982 (pp. 358) pointing out that ‘Nothing in those [welfare]
theorems says that planning or regulation cannot be made to work (optimally)’.
124Soete et al., 2010.
125Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989 holds that in the face of coordination failures govern-
ment intervention may help to move the economy from any “inferior” toward a “superior”
equilibrium. That is, consistent with the market-failure approach, they hold that the tempo-
ral intervention of the government must cease at the point where the market has reached a
“superior” equilibrium. See also Ball and Romer 1991.
126Nelson 2008.
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symptomatic in understanding their growth and catching-up performance.127
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The review in this section has sought to contribute to the research effort to un-
derstand the economic impacts of technology diffusion and local technology in
backward countries. In doing so, we have started by looking at the actual under-
standing and use of the notion of technology in mainstream economics and have
called attention to the major shortcomings of that view that prevent us from a
serious analysis of the importance of innovation in studying the determinants
of economic growth.
Then we emphasized the importance of broadening the definition of inno-
vation to include both mainstream views of technology and novel contributions
in this regard by the evolutionary and NIS theories; we have discussed how
these distinct sources of technology (foreign technology and local innovation)
are embedded in the theory, and how the contesting theoretical frameworks put
forward by the mainstream, on one side, and the evolutionary and NIS per-
spectives, on the other, lead to a different understanding of the determinants
of economic growth, and the prospects of backward countries to catching up;
finally, we have elaborated on the corresponding policy implications.
In particular, with regard the last point above, we have stressed that the
conceptual and methodological differences between the mainstream and the evo-
lutionary and NIS perspectives have clear implications for the understanding of
the notion of advantage of backwardness and its corresponding policy implica-
tions. We have pointed out that the evolutionary perspective supports the view
that innovation—broadly defined—offers a better explanation of the growth and
catching up processes in backward countries, hence it calls for the design and
enforcement of a coherent set of economic policies to encourage innovation in the
private sector. In this regard, the NIS framework—whose fundamental premises
have been narrowed here to what we hold are the three essential aspects of spon-
sorship, leadership and coordination—departs from the conventional view that
ask for limited government intervention on the economy instead.
To the extent that those conceptual, methodological, and even ideological,
differences between the mainstream and the evolutionary and NIS perspectives
preclude a fair academic understanding of what are the true determinants of
growth and catching up—and more so when it comes to the case of backward
127There are at least two important criticisms to government intervention in the economy:
First is the possibility of “government failures”, as mainstream economics holds that inter-
vention can do more harm than good to the economy. That possibility is not neglected neither
by the NIS authors, who point to many instances where government intervention has resulted
in big failures, nor evolutionary economist. Moreau 2004, for instance, highlights the need
of government action ‘...in the more realistic framework of the economic system displayed by
the evolutionary approach’ even though the success of public intervention is truly uncertain.
The second important criticism we alluded to, refers to the possibility of political constraints
which are more likely to arise in less developed countries, for example, in the form of barriers
to technology adoption raised by special interests (Parente and Prescott 1994).
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countries—our attempt has been to provide a more coherent basis for the anal-
ysis of innovation and economic growth, and the role of the government in this
context.
In the next chapter we endeavor to elaborate a model suitable for analyzing
those issues.
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Chapter 4
A Formal Model of Growth
and Catching up
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a model that puts together the mainstream, evolution-
ary and NIS perspectives on the ability of countries to catch up.1 In the model,
growth and catching up hinge on the interaction between the diffusion/adoption
of foreign technology and (local) innovation. In the perspective of evolutionary
economics that we have discussed in the previous chapter, we rely on a broad
notion of innovation that includes both low-tech and high-tech innovations; and
we hold that the interplay between adoption and innovation is strongly influ-
enced by the institutional/policy conditions in the domestic economy, which we
relate to the NIS literature. In particular, we highlight the role of what has
become widespread as the public financial sponsorship of innovation.2
Our theoretical framework adds to recent models exploring the dynamics of
adoption and innovation.3 Like those models, the one presented here is a model
of endogenous growth with technology diffusion. Unlike them, however, we do
not hold that adoption and innovation are sequential stages where backward
countries first profit on the economies of scale that are boosted by the inflow
of output-augmenting and cost-reducing foreign technologies and, only upon
reaching high levels of development, are in the position to innovate. Quite to
1As it has been pointed out in previous chapters, the mainstream view in our discussion
relates to the theoretical developments after the Solow model (Solow 1956, Lucas 1988, Romer
1994, Jones 2005, Acemoglu 2014). The evolutionary view relates mostly to the literature that
followed from insights presented in Nelson and Winter 1982, (see Nelson et al., 2018). And the
NIS literature follows from the ideas prominently presented by Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993,
Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007 and Soete et al., 2010. The recent discussion in these literatures
is traced back to many other references provided earlier (Chapter 1) which we omit here to
avoid repetition.
22010, Mazzucato 2013, Kerr and Nanda 2015, Mazzucato and Penna 2015, Gush, Jaffe,
Larsen and Laws 2017, Breznitz et al., 2018.
3Damsgaard and Krusell 2010, Stokey 2012, Benhabib et al., 2014, 2017, Perla et al., 2015.
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the contrary, we highlight that innovation occurs at all times and is in fact the
dominant strategy for producers to survive the pressures of market selection
and market competition.
Our approach also contributes to the research and debate about the appro-
priate policy/institutional measures to support innovation.4 In particular, we
hold that the process of local innovation requires a role of the state that goes
beyond mere market–conforming considerations that are usually highlighted in
mainstream economics.5
It is noteworthy that in Chapter 3, we have established—on the basis of
an extensive review of the literature—that the NIS framework provides a sound
theoretical framework to justify government interventionist policies aimed to en-
hance innovation. We classified the key mechanisms of intervention into three
aspects: Leadership, which relates to public innovation and collaboration with
the private sector; coordination, which summarizes a wide range of strategies
designed by the government to encourage the spread of innovation at the wide
economy level; and sponsorship, which copes with a broad range of public pro-
grams to financially support private innovation initiatives.6 Our focus here
to modelling the sponsorship mechanism is an attempt to provide theoretical
foundations to what has become the most widespread practice to foster the
production of innovation.
As we have anticipated, the notions of adoption and innovation on which we
elaborate here are informed by the evolutionary theory and the NIS literature.
However, in spite of the widespread criticism by evolutionary economists to or-
thodox maximization/equilibrium approaches and differently from the, mostly,
static nature of economic analysis that characterizes the NIS approach, our ap-
proach sticks to the intertemporal optimization and dynamic analysis that is
customarily employed when the purpose is to study the long-run impacts of
technology on economic growth. In addition, in the model below, the process of
intertemporal optimization is carried out by private agents. Thus, our approach
differs also from—in fact it is supplemental to—the institutional-comparative
focus of analysis that has become customary under the NIS approach.
In the following section, Section 4.2, we trace earlier models of growth and
catching up through adoption and innovation in order to contextualize our ap-
4Acemoglu, Akcigit, Alp, Bloom, and Kerr 2013, Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer 2013, Khan
2015, Akcigit, Hanley, Stantcheva 2016.
5This market-conforming setting is usually described as involving pure pecuniary transac-
tions, and confines the role of government to fiscal and monetary policies (e.g., taxes, sub-
sidies), fixing market failures, and enforcing conventional absorption capabilities and market
institutions (property rights, market integration, financial development). See, for instance,
Barro 1997, Rodrik 2005, World Bank 2008, Lucas 2009, Spence 2011, Acemoglu et al., 2012,
Stokey 2012. While it does not deny the importance of those conditions, the NIS perspective
holds—upon the basis of numerous country case studies—that successful cases of growth and
catch-up are related to a more activist role of the state: influencing the establishment of key
business models and economic activities, carrying on R&D activities and funding new indus-
tries on its own, financing venture capital entrepreneurship, and so on (Nelson 1993, Lundvall
2007, Soete et al., 2010).
6See, among many others, Nelson 1993, 2008, Freeman 1987, 1995, 2004. Lundvall 2007,
Soete et al., 2010, Mazzucato 2013, and Stiglitz 2014.
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proach. In Section 4.3, we lay out the basic setup of the model in this chapter.
In Section 4.4 we describe how the government sponsorship mechanism affects
the level of domestic innovation and the process of catching up. In Section
4.5 we develop the solution of the optimization problem using optimal control
techniques. In Section 4.5 we provide some concluding remarks.
4.2 Related Literature
Our aim in this section is to draw attention to some recent and most representa-
tive contributions that investigate the dynamics and economic impacts of these
distinct sources of a country’s technology.
First, note that a great deal of the mainstream literature building on the
distinction between technology diffusion/adoption/imitation on one side, and
the development of original innovations on the other, originates in microeco-
nomic models.7 The theoretical reasoning underlying these models is that R&D
investments in laggard firms are necessary to enhance the process of technology
diffusion.8
Interestingly, some aggregate models of economic growth simply extend this
logic to the interaction between adopters and innovators with different coun-
tries.9 In such setting each country’s technology choices are motivated by purely
economic reasons, for example, free-rider incentives that make it optimal for
some countries to purposely limit their own innovation investments—and fall
behind—in order to grow through the adoption channel, whereas more advanced
countries innovate and push the frontier ahead.10
In more general terms, however, the widespread understanding in formal
models of economic growth is that for developing countries growth and catching
up are determined by the inflow of foreign technology—even if the benefits of
adoption are modulated by local circumstances.11 This idea is underlined by the
notion of advantage of backwardness according to which technology progress in
countries falling behind is exogenously given by the advances at the frontier.12
From this viewpoint, the benefits brought in by the adoption of foreign technol-
ogy depend on the distance to the frontier: the greater the distance the higher
the benefits—as there is more room to grow. Within this framework, to be able
7Cohen and Levinthal 1989, Jovanovic and Nyarko 1996, Griffith, Redding, and van Reenen
2004, Perla and Tonetti 2014, Perla, Tonetti and Waugh 2015, Luttmer 2015 and Acemoglu
and Cao 2015.
8Alternatively, this literature emphasizes the logic usual in search theoretical models: in-
dividual innovators are subject to a stochastic flow of new ideas from the frontier. When they
receive an idea that is better than the one they are now producing with, they adopt it and
it becomes their current state. Otherwise, their state remains unchanged. (See, for instance,
Kortum 1997, Alvarez et al., 2014, and Lucas and Moll 2014).
9For example, Benhabib et al., 2014, Alvarez et al., 2014.
10Benhabib et al., 2014.
11See, for instance, Easterly et al., 1993.
12Gerschenkron 1962, Acemoglu et al., 2006. Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon 1993, propose
a model where the advantage of backwardness leads to shifts in leadership. New technologies
benefit much more lagging nations and allow them to leapfrog and take the leadership.
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to reap the benefits of the technology advance abroad, backward countries need
to enhance their absorptive capacities (through investments in human capital
and infrastructure, and enforcing market institutions), and overcome the con-
straints to technology adoption imposed by domestic political circumstances.13
The idea that technology diffusion requires of the backward country invest-
ments aimed to master/adapt foreign technologies to the local environment may
be traced back at least to the notion of “localized technological change.”14 Ac-
cording to this perspective, the improvement brought in by new technologies is
specific to particular production techniques, which implies that the technology
advance at the frontier can turn out to be inappropriate in backward country
settings. Or at least that firms in developing countries would only learn and
bring in technologies that are closely related with the factors’ endowment of the
economy and their own production activities.15 A recent update of this theory
has broadened the analysis to include the so-called “induced innovations” and
“directed technological changes.”16 In short, these are concepts of technology
that may be described as attempts to show that technology change either im-
proves or gets influenced by a country’s factor endowment: new technologies
are chosen either to improve a country’s well-known techniques, to compensate
for factors that are scarce, or to augment a given factor’s productivity.17
Most, mainstream, growth models that place stress on issues of adoption and
innovation build on the same insights provided by the above lines of research.18
That is, in most of the conventional models of this kind, the key aspects shaping
the ability of countries to grow and catch up out of the advance of technology
are their own investment in human capital, and the spillovers from the cor-
responding investments in more advanced countries, whose impact hinge on
the congruence between foreign and local technology.19 The essential—though
straightforward—implication is the need to allocate resources for investments
in education and training of the work force.20
The other, recurrent, feature in existing models is that they relate the abil-
ity of countries to foster technology—and then economic growth and catch
up—to their institutional/policy framework. The neoclassical context repre-
13See, for instance, Caselli 2005, Caselli and Coleman 2006, Acemoglu et al., 2006, Aghion
and Howitt 2006, Stokey 2012, and Acemoglu et al., 2012. For earlier developments, see
Nelson and Phelps 1966 and Gerschenkron 1962. Parente and Prescott 1994, provide the
usual motivation for the role of political barriers.
14Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969.
15Basu and Weil 1998, Basu and Fernald 2002.
16Acemoglu 2014.
17See Acemoglu 2014 and the references therein.
18Damsgaard and Krusell 2010, Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir 2006, Stokey 2012,
Benhabib et al., 2014.
19Grossman and Helpman 2001, Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir 2006, Damsgaard and
Krusell 2010, Stokey 2012, Benhabib et al., 2014.
20In order to test this proposition some theoretical models are tied up with a quantitative
assessment of the argument, for instance, the potential for adoption (or imitation) is gauged
from a country’s share of population with up to secondary education; in turn, higher levels of
education are associated with the potential to produce innovations of its own (Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir 2006).
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sented in these models—we already pointed out—may be described as a market-
conforming set of institutions (property rights, international integration, finan-
cial institutions) and policies (taxes, subsidies) that provide incentives for the
business sector firms to thrive on innovation.21 Models that relate the failure to
adopt foreign technology to (local) political circumstances belong to this kind.
In short, those models hold that (local) political elites may deliberately block
the adoption of new technologies—or the enforcement of any set of institutions
and policy conditions in this regard—for fear that the new set of conditions
would lead to the reduction of their political power.22
In summary, most existing models of growth and catching up tend to em-
phasize on some of the important though relatively simple set of conditions that
are needed to foster “virtuous circles” of technology investments and economic
growth. A widespread criticism of those models is on their pretension of “uni-
versal validity” which makes them unable to predict the consequences of the
alternative policy regimes that are usually embraced by countries in order to
foster the production of technology and innovation.23 Evolutionary models that
focus on the interaction between technology diffusion and domestic technology,
may be seen as an attempt to fill in this gap.24
The model presented in this chapter adheres to the latter kind of models.
Consisting with the discussion in Chapter 3, we rely on a clear-cut distinc-
tion between adoption and innovation. Whereas in most of the above models
technology is broadly equated to R&D activities and human capital issues, the
model presented here sticks to the thesis—now widespread in development pol-
icy debates—that innovation defines broadly the ability to produce “something
new” in a certain context, in particular “something” that has economic value
and whose production depends in many instances on non-R&D related activi-
ties.25 However, rather than an optimal portfolio of adoption and innovation,
we hold that these two sources of technology are intertwined with each other,
therefore, it is the interplay between adoption and innovation what determines
the ability of backward countries to catch up.
To better understand the key distinction between these two sources of a
country’s technology, we propose to associate technology adoption with the
inflow of high-tech developments which are carried out in the most advanced
countries (ICT, nano-tech, bio-tech, machines and equipment). In turn, we
propose to associate the notion of local innovation with low-tech developments—
the applications of existing technology to the design, production, marketing and
distribution of final consumer products.
We do think that this distinction between technology adoption and inno-
21Romer 1993, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Lucas 2009, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Stokey
2012.
22Parente and Prescott 1994, 2002, Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2003, Damsgaard and
Krusell 2010, Stokey 2012.
23Hall 2001, Hall and Soskice 2003.
24Dosi et al., 1994. Cimoli and Soete 1992, and Kelly 2002, Castellaci 2008 and Ertur and
Koch 2011.
25Nelson and Winter 2002, Lundvall 2007, Nelson 2008, Fagerberg et al., 2010, World Bank
2010.
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vation not only makes good sense; it also helps to reconcile the different em-
phases that are given to these distinct aspects of technology in the mainstream
and in the evolutionary and NIS frameworks.26 By associating technology dif-
fusion/adoption with high-tech activities and (local) innovation with low-tech
activities, our aim is twofold. First, to highlight what we consider the most
salient stylized feature of technology diffusion, which is that key technological
breakthroughs are actually produced in a handful of countries at the frontier.27
Second, to call attention to the, frequently neglected, fact that lots of market in-
novation activities that not necessarily even count as technology breakthroughs,
have a large impact on economic activity and appear to be an essential aspect of
market competition.28 Many examples from the business literature emphasize
that innovation (leading to product-variety), rather than the sole attention to
price/cost margins, is the key element to survive the pressures of selection and
competition. Producers are aware that first, and even second, generation ver-
sions of a given product may do well but, at large, competitiveness stems from
matching the consumers’ never-ending craze for the new.29 Therefore, investing
in innovation, rather than in cost-reducing technologies, appears to be more
important at the firm level in spite of it being a high-risk business.30
Thus, the emphasis on innovation as the most determining factor of economic
growth and catching-up seems well grounded on actual business practices. And
it does not contradict the view that the adoption of frontier technology leads to
significant gains in productivity. Our point here is that the ability to produce
more out of the same inputs, or to reduce production costs, plays an important
role in first-generation products. However, this advantage is common to all
countries (a technology trajectory); and the benefits of scale decline over time
(in second and third-generation versions of the same product). This might be,
at least partially, a reason why the standard view of efficiency cannot generate
long-run growth and catching-up without a focus on the ability of backward
countries to innovate.
Another key difference in the model presented below with respect to those
in the mainstream tradition discussed earlier regards to the institutional/policy
26As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the long lasting tenet in the received theory
of economic growth is that the ability of backward countries to catching up depends basically
on the adoption/imitation of “best practices” and inventions that have been developed in
highly advanced countries (De Long and Summers 1991, Romer 1993, Mankiw et al., 1995,
Keller 2002, Caselli and Wilson 2004). That view is in strong contrast with the importance
of learning and assimilation that characterizes the entrepreneurial environment in the evolu-
tionary approach (Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Nelson 2008), and also in contrast with the
focus on the systemic interdependencies between different parts of the innovation system in
the NIS approach (Fagerberg 2003, Lee and Malerba 2018).
27Keller 2004.
28Herstatt and von Hippel 1992, Hirsch-Kreinsen 2008, Som and Kirner 2016.
29From this perspective, lengthening/shortening the hemline of women’s apparel, adding
fruit and flavors to a yogurt or packing it in single server containers, or changing the design
of automotive bumpers, count as much as new android apps, e-commerce and social media
networking to spur business profits. See Gatignon, Gotteland, Haon and Zimmer 2015.
30Failure rates behind actual cases of success ranging up to 90% even before new products
are launched to the market or before new processes actually implemented (Castellion and
Markham 2013).
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framework. In particular, we set up a framework where innovation is explicitly
affected by the government financial sponsorship mechanism of the NIS frame-
work that we have aimed to characterized in Chapter 3.
4.3 The Model Setup
Consider a context where productivity differences between country “i” and the
frontier are proportional to differences in technology.31
yi(t)/y¯(t) ≈ Ai(t)/A¯(t)
where yi(t) = Yi(t)/Li(t), and y¯i(t) = Y¯i(t)/L¯i(t). We define the frontier, A¯,
to consist of high-tech developments that are available to all countries. Thus
countries strive to reach the frontier enhancing the capacity to produce local
innovation. “Ai” broadly defines the ability of country “i” to seize the op-
portunities associated with both technology diffusion and the ability to produce
indigenous innovations.32 Thus, from the viewpoint of backward countries, A¯(t)
is exogenously given whereas Ai(t) is endogenously determined.
We assume also that Ai(t) denotes the economy-wide aggregate level of in-
novation accumulated across all economic activities (j) and over time (ι)
Ai(t) =
∫ ∫ 1
0
PA(j, ι)djdι
where sectoral innovations are normalized in a 0–1 range, and P is an arbitrary
scale factor. The idea here, following from the literature on the so-called eco-
nomics of ideas, is that the current level of innovation is a composite of the
experience and knowledge accumulated over all economic sectors over time.33
Country i’s final output is produced according to the following production
function
Yi(t) = f {Ai(t), Li(t)}
The technology from the frontier, A¯, influences this production function indi-
rectly through its impact on the dynamics of innovation—as we see below.34
While having labor (L) in the production function seems more natural, the
analysis of the economics of innovation is commonly focused on the productivity
effects of investing on this kind of activities. Therefore, in what follows, we
model the economy in per worker, or intensive, form. In general, to avoid
misinterpretation, we assume that L=1. For further simplification, we assume,
31Alternatively, we might stipulate that differences in output-per-worker across countries
are proportional to differences in productivity, which in turn are proportional to differences
in technology.
32While this is a non-trivial aspect in the growth literature, throughout we hold the strong
assumption that the countries in our analysis do not exhibit absorptive constraints, namely
human capital, standard market institutions, political conditions.
33Romer 1993, Jones 2005, Stokey 2012.
34The author is grateful to Adriaan van Zon for helpful discussion which led to clarify this
effect.
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that all labor is employed in the production of innovation, that labor size and
population size are the same, and that the rate of growth of population is zero.
These simplifications allow us to jump from productivity considerations to the
welfare implications of our analysis without a concern for the distinct scales of
the variables and simplify the constraints on our optimization approach (the
reasons to be explained shortly below).
The production function in per worker terms is
yi(t) = f {Ai(t)} (4.1)
where f {0} = 0, f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0.35 Note that while output is in per-worker units
in Equation (4.1), innovation is still measured at the levels of the variable. This
implies that, at the economy-wide level, productivity depends on the absolute
level of innovation rather than on per-worker innovations, a feature that has
been established earlier in the literature of economic growth.36 Suppose, for
instance, that the production function is given by37
Yi(t) = f{Ai(t), Li(t)} = Ai(t)αLi(t), 0 < α ≤ 1
where there are constant returns to the labor factor and increasing returns to
labor and the level of innovation taken together. Written in per worker terms,
this production function becomes
yi(t) = f{Ai(t)} = Ai(t)α, 0 < α ≤ 1 (4.2)
4.3.1 The problem of the representative agent
Let us assume a representative agent in the private sector who wants to maxi-
mize the value of some utility function U(C). In an economy without govern-
ment consumption and with balanced trade, the real value of consumption is
given by the following identity (hereafter, when it does not lead to confusion,
we suppress subscripts to avoid over-notation)
C = Y − S (4.3)
where Y = yL, C = cL and S = sL are the aggregate levels of output, consump-
tion and savings, and “y” “c” and “s” are their per worker counterparts. The
macroeconomic equilibrium is reached under the assumption of both external
and budget balance. This leads to the resource constraint condition that, at the
economy-wide level, private savings equal private investments.
35The view of production functions with endogenous technology and increasing returns
(See Romer 1986, 1990, 1994, Grossman and Helpman 2001) was abandoned after the Jones
critique (1995). In light of the empirical evidence, the modern debate is about the suitable
determinants of decreasing returns to technology investments (Jones 2005, Ang and Madsen
2014, Aghion et al., 2013. See Section 3.3. Chapter 3 of this thesis for a brief detail of the
discussion). In the context of innovation it also seems more natural to think that innovation
is subject to decreasing returns (See Gordon 2014).
36Romer 1994, Jones 2005.
37See Jones 2005, pp. 1070 ff.
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Following Turnovsky (1996), we assume that investment is subject to ad-
justment costs so that investment resources are limited by the constraint
S = I + κI2, 0 < κ
where the first term on the righthand side of the last expression is “effective
investment” and the second term shows the role of the adjustment cost.38 This
functional form is derived from the Tobin’s Q theory and motivated as a convex
quadratic adjustment investment cost.39 Intuitively, the implementation of new
innovations is a disruptive process leading to a lost of output, and this cost rises
more than proportionally with the level of investment (e.g., production has to
stop while new machines are installed and the more machines are there, the
higher the cost).
For expositional purposes, we relate savings and investment, inclusive of
adjustment costs, through the investment cost function b(I) and write it in per
worker terms as follows
s = b{I} = I + κI2, 0 < κ (4.4)
where I = I/L, b {0} = 0, b′ > 0, and b′′ > 0. Consistent with our assumptions,
this specification implies that the marginal cost of innovation is positive and
increasing in the size of innovation.
Writing Equation (4.3) in per worker terms too, and using Equations (4.1)
and (4.4), the objective of the agent is to maximize the utility of the value of
consumption given by
c = y − s
= f {A} − b {I}
= f {A} − I − κI2 (4.5)
To complete our model description, following Jones 2005, we define the function
B = h{A}L = AβL, β > 0
where B denotes the production of new innovations and h{A} denotes inno-
vativeness per worker.40 Thus, in our simplified framework, if A is the stock
of innovation, Aβ is the amount of innovation per worker. Notice the similar-
ity between this equation and the production function established earlier, both
38The author gratefully acknowledges useful comments and suggestions by Joan Muysken
and Adriaan van Zon which led to clarify the role of adjustment costs in macroeconomic
settings.
39Tobin 1969, Abel 1982, Turnovsky 1996, Heijdra 2009, pp. 40 ff. and Romer 2019, pp.
420 ff. This treatment of investment has been extensively applied in the investment literature.
An often-cited empirical application is Summers et al., 1981. The distinguishing feature of
most studies in this context is its partial equilibrium approach (without an analysis of the
growth and welfare effects). In our analysis, following Turnovsky 1996, we consider that the
same reasoning can be applied to the maximization of the consumption utility function of the
economy as a whole.
40Jones 2005, pp. 1070 ff.
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Y = AαL and B = AβL involve constant returns to labor and both include
increasing returns to labor and innovation taken together, which is so because
innovation is also a production good. Notice also that β > 0 implies that the
production of new innovations depends positively on past innovation.41
To simplify further, we assume β = 1, hence, given an amount of labor,
doubling the amount of past innovations (an input) leads to double the amount
of new innovation (an output)—the “moore law” is at work in the context of
innovation. Setting β = 1, the production of new innovations function becomes
B = AL
Notice, lastly, that as we have established L = 1 earlier, this leads to the
conclusion that B = A. Thus, what is the purpose of setting up the function B
in the first place?
The purpose, as shall be evident shortly, is to get rid of any scale effects
arising from the fact that, while innovation is a stock in Equation (4.2), the
production of innovation is defined in per-worker terms. Clearly, the assumption
L = 1 is not innocuous: since labor (and population) grows at some constant
rate, there would be still necessary to ensure that innovation expenditures and
income keep growing at least at this rate too (like in models with physical
capital where the concern is to ensure that there are sufficient investments to
endow each worker with the same amount of capital). Furthermore, population
growth is at the center of the modern debate between semi-endogenous and
neo-Schumpeterian economists.42 But, while we acknowledge that scale effects
indeed matter, the normalization of labor suffices our main purpose, namely, to
illustrate the potential relevance of public finance in the promotion of business
innovation.
Using the function B = AL, we introduce a rule of change for innovation
based on the standard approach in models of technology diffusion (which allows
us to capture the influence of frontier technology).43 To begin with, taking the
time derivative of this function, we obtain
B˙ = A˙L+AL˙
Then, we assume that, at the economy wide level, innovation changes over time
41As Jones 2005 explains, whereas β > 0 implies a “standing on the shoulders of giants
effect”, β < 0 is also possible, but this implies that new innovations are negatively affected by
past innovation. This “fishing pond” effect implies that innovation becomes increasingly more
difficult over time, namely, if the pond is stocked with only 100 fishes, it would be increasingly
difficult to catch each new fish.
42The semi-endogenous and neo-Schumpeterian models were discussed in Chapter 3 of this
thesis
43Sharif & Ramanathan 1981, Stokey 2012, Banks 2013, Benhabib et al., 2014.
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according the following rule of motion44
A˙L+AL˙ = IA
[
1−
(
A
A¯
)υ]
−DA− V A
where υ, D and V are parameters exogenously given that capture the different
implications of the rate of diffusion, the obsolescence of past innovations and
the expansion of the technology frontier, as is explained further below. Notice
that only “effective investment” are considered in the equation of motion of
innovation. This feature of the cost of the adjustment literature holds because
what investors can control at each moment of time is the effective amount of
investment, not the adjustment cost.45
Dividing everywhere by the labor size, the last equation can be condensed
into the following differential equation in the per worker terms
A˙ = IA
[
1−
(
A
A¯
)υ]
− δA− ϕA− ηA
where η = L˙L denotes the growth rate of the labor force, and δ and ϕ denote the
per worker versions of the obsolescence and the expansion of the frontier. We
keep the simplifying assumptions that η = 0 and L = 1, and write the logistic
equation governing the dynamics of innovation as follows
A˙
A
= I
[
1−
(
A
A¯
)υ]
− δ − ϕ, 0 < υ, δ, ϕ < 1 (4.6)
where the rate of change of innovation is determined by effective investment
expenditures, “I”, and the technology available from the frontier “A¯”.46 Tech-
nology diffusion is modulated by the parameter υ, the closer it is to 1 (0), the
higher (slower) the spread of technologies originated at the frontier.47 Assum-
ing υ = 1 implies that all innovations occurring at the frontier are “instantly”
available for countries off the frontier. The term δ is a constant that accounts
44This is a logistic pattern of diffusion that is widespread in the literature, see Sharif &
Ramanathan 1981, Stokey 2012, Banks 2013, Benhabib et al., 2014 and Luttmer 2015. An
exposition of the growth and catching up effects of the logistic pattern of technology diffusion
in the context of human capital is in Benhabib and Spiegel 2005.
45Hayashi 1982.
46From an economic viewpoint, frontier technology is available to the receiving country
through diverse means (e.g., imports of machines and equipment, foreign direct investment,
licensing). Clearly, there are many implications that would need to be considered under the
assumptions that we have established in the model. For instance, investment inflows have
potential consequences for the assumption of balanced trade and (balanced) fiscal accounts
(investment inflows may lead to current account deficits given the compensations to be paid
for capital services, or if they boost the demand for imports). To simplify the analysis, we will
think that financial flows have at most only a slight effect on our model assumptions about
external and fiscal budget balances.
47A major setback identified in studies of technology diffusion is that frontier technologies
do not fully nor instantly spread to countries off the frontier. See, for instance, Comin and
Mestieri 2014.
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for the obsolescence of past innovations.48 And the term ϕ accounts for the fact
that the frontier grows at some rate, which may be assumed constant as long
as growth at the frontier is not controlled by the countries falling behind.49
Notice that starting with A=0, countries falling behind might eventually
(asymptotically) catch up with the frontier provided I > δ + ϕ; otherwise they
might stagnate whenever I = δ + ϕ, or continue falling behind as I < δ + ϕ. To
see this, note from Equation (4.6) that A˙/A
a
= −(δ + ϕ) as A/A¯ a→ 1 (where
a→ indicates asymptotic approach). This means that the rate of growth of A
is slowed down in the vicinity of the frontier by the obsolescence rate and the
rate of growth at the frontier. On the other side, when A is too small the
expected growth rate of innovation is exponentially determined by the behavior
of I − (δ + ϕ): A˙/A a= I − (δ + ϕ) as A/A¯ a→ 0.
On the other side, υ = 1 and ϕ = δ = 0 leads to the standard logis-
tic differential equation: A˙ = IA
[
1− (A
A¯
)]
. The point where this function
is at its maximum is found by taking the derivative with respect to A: thus
F ′(A) = I − 2 ( I
A¯
)
A. We get the usual result that at the maximum F ′(A)=0,
and A = A¯2 . In other words, the standard logistic diffusion pattern is symmetric
around the midpoint A¯2 . But, in the context of our analysis, this point is delayed
for δ > 0, ϕ > 0 and 0 < υ ≤ 1.
4.3.2 The role of government
We consider a explicit role for the government in promoting the production
of innovation. In particular, we assume that the government sets taxes and
uses the tax revenue to grant transfers in order to boost innovation in the
private sector.50 The government budget position (GD) is made of taxes minus
government expenditures (GC) minus transfers (TR)
GD = T −GC − TR
48The effect of obsolescence seems to be particularly important in analyzing the economics
of innovation due to issues like competition pressures, changes in consumer preferences, and
changes in the relative price of inputs or factors of production. For instance, among a much
larger assortment of IT technologies, cell phones and PCs are usually discarded by the millions
as new varieties are introduced into the market and consumers make the switch to improved
versions (See Baily 1981, Fraumeni 1997, Howitt 1998, Slade 2009.) It is worth noting also
that technology obsolescence plays an important role to explain economic differences across
countries (See Comin and Hobijn 2010).
49Stokey 2012, Benhabib et al., 2014. In general terms, we may set any rule governing
growth at the frontier’s technology, e.g., a exponential rule: ˙¯A = g¯A¯, or a logistic rule:
˙¯A = I¯y¯
(
1− A¯
A¯∗
)
(where A¯∗ represent the limit of human knowledge). While including a rule
of this kind seems more realistic, it would take us through a more complex dynamics.
50Alternatively, the promotion of innovation may be based on innovation subsidies, as we
explain later in Subsection (4.5.5).
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To collect tax revenues the government sets a flat tax rate (τ¯) on income but
allows for the exemption of (effective) investments. Thus, the tax bill is51
T = τ¯ (Y − I) , 0 < τ¯ < 1 (4.7)
A simple case, consistent with our analysis below, is that the government bal-
ances transfer payments with tax revenues, TR = T and government consump-
tion is zero, GC = 0. Thus, a budget balance prevails
0 = T − TR (4.8)
From the point of view of the private sector, the government influences con-
sumption and investment decisions in the following manner. First, it reduces
the value of consumption as the private agent now has to pay taxes
C = Y − S − T (4.3′)
Using Equation (4.7) in Equation (4.3′) and rearranging terms, we get
C = Y − S − τ¯ (Y − I)
= Y − I − κI2 − τ¯ (Y − I)
= (1− τ¯) (Y − I)− κI2
which in per worker terms writes as follows
c = (1− τ¯) (f {A} − b {I})− τ¯κI2 (4.5′)
where, once again, we use the definition S/L = s jointly with Equations (4.1)
and (4.4) in getting to the latter expression. Clearly, introducing a tax rate
as we have done in Equation (4.5′) redefines the problem of the agent. Now
it is related to the maximization of the utility of what is left for consumption
after the cost of investment and taxes are subtracted (note that setting τ¯ = 0,
Equations (4.5) and (4.5′) are the same).
The second way the government influences private decisions is by increasing
the investment in innovation. To this end, the government grants innovation
transfers which are aimed exclusively to enlarge the resources of the agent to
invest in innovation. In so doing, it expects to influence the performance of the
economy leading, over the long-run, to higher levels of productivity and con-
sumption. In the next section we analyze the likely consequences and difficulties
of this policy approach.
51Setting the tax bill this way implies that the tax rate, τ¯ , will show up somewhere in the
solution of the optimization problem. Notice that, alternatively, the tax bill might be set as
T = τ¯ (Y − S) = τ¯ (Y − I − κI2). While doing so simplifies the presentation and leads to a
neat solution of the optimization problem, it is inconsistent with the assumption that the cost
of adjustment is not under the control of the investor, hence, non-deductible from taxation.
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4.4 The Sponsorship Mechanism
In Equation (4.6) effective investment by the private agent (without transfers
from the government) is given, in per worker terms, by I. We assume that
while they pay taxes, the agent is unaware of the government’s policy, which
implies that the use of taxes to grant transfers as a further source of investment
resources works only indirectly through government intervention.
We also assume that the government’s policy is to fully transfer the collected
taxes in order to support investment in innovation in the private sector (this
equivalence to be explained shortly). This way, after the intervention by the
government, private investments are enlarged by an amount equal to IτZ where
τZ denotes the transfers ratio as a proportion of effective investments by the
agent. A key aspect of this transfers mechanism is that, from the viewpoint of
the agent, τZ is a fixed value, e.g., the government announces its policy to the
agent based on some historical average that guarantees the budget balance.
Thus, after transfers, total investments become
I(1 + τZ) = Iz˜, 0 ≤ τZ , 1 ≤ z˜ (4.9)
where z˜ = 1 + τZ amounts to an “sponsorship mechanism” whereby transfers
increase the resources to invest in innovation. Using Equation (4.9) to modify
Equation (4.6) we get (assuming, for simplicity, υ = 1, ϕ = 0)
A˙/A = Iz˜
(
1−A/A¯)− δ, 0 < δ < 1, 1 ≤ z˜ (4.6′)
where, from the point of view of the agent, z˜ is exogenously given. Notice that
with υ = 1 and ϕ = 0, Equation (4.6) and Equation (4.6′) are the same when
z˜ = 1, which would be the case when there are no transfers (and therefore no
taxes).
In order to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of the “sponsorship
mechanism”, notice that, while per worker transfers amount to IτZ , at the
aggregate level, total transfer are given by
TR = (IL)τZ = IτZ (4.10)
where τZ denotes the transfers rate.
Using Equations (4.7) and (4.10) in Equation (4.8), we obtain
T = TR
τ¯ (Y − I) = IτZ
τ¯
((
I
Y
)−1
− 1
)
= τZ
this equation may be alternatively written, as we prefer, in per worker terms as
follows
τ¯
((
I
y
)−1
− 1
)
= τZ (4.11)
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where (I/y)−1 denotes the inverse of the investment ratio: the ratio of investment
to output. Equation (4.11) implies that, depending on this ratio, the transfers
rate is larger than the tax rate which is a key aspect of our model. For instance,
if τ¯ = 10% and I/y = 20% we get, from Equation (4.11), that τZ = 40%.
However, as the investment ratio increases, the transfers rate decreases. For
instance, with τ¯ = 10% and I/y = 30% we get τZ = 23%. And for an investment
ratio (implausibly) larger than 50%, the transfer rate is less than the tax rate
for any value of the latter. This is explained because, as we see from Equations
(4.4) and (4.5′), the increase in the investment ratio leads to a proportional
increase of the savings ratio which narrows the tax base and, therefore, reduces
the transfers fund.
There are further issues to be considered in analyzing the implications of
Equation (4.11). Firstly, as we have noticed above, from the point of view of
the agent, the sponsorship mechanism is exogenously given. This is a strong
assumption to be maintained throughout. Notice that if investors know that
they are entitled to obtain transfers according to Equation (4.11), the spon-
sorship mechanism would become neutral. e.g., the agent would adjust their
consumption/savings behavior in the same proportion of the received trans-
fers, therefore, leaving the actual amount of investments and innovation where
they were. Keeping Equation (4.11) exogenous to the agent’s decision making
precludes this kind of arbitrage.
Secondly, it seems necessary to emphasize that the tax and transfers mecha-
nism that we have obtained in Equation (4.11) implicitly reflects the normative
idea that the government is interested to boost a process of innovation-based
growth.52 This is in contrast to a case where distortionary increases in taxa-
tion lead to reduce consumption without a compensating increase in investment
promotion mechanisms—as we explain below.
Finally, given Equations (4.7)-(4.11) above, we also assume that the gov-
ernment is able to keep a balanced budget. In this context—from the point
of view of government—a desirable economic goal is to preserve the tax base,
influencing decision making in order to achieve an increase in consumption that
is at least proportional to the tax rate. Formally, the aim of the sponsorship
mechanism is to influence the agent to achieve the following result∫ T
0
e−rt
[
(1− τ¯) (f{A} − b{I})− τ¯κI2|z˜>1
]
dt∫ T
0
e−rt
[
f{A} − b{I}|z˜=1
]
dt
− 1 ≥ τ¯ (4.12)
It is easy to verify, using Equations (4.9)-(4.11), that the condition z˜ = 1 implies
τ¯ = τZ = 0 and in this case Equation (4.12) equals zero, whereas z˜ > 1 implies
52We have elaborated previously (Chapter 3) on a large body of literature that brings sup-
ports to the sponsorship mechanism: Nelson 1993, Dosi, Marengo and Pascuali 2006, Lundvall
2007, Hall and Lerner 2010, Mazzucato 2013. Certainly the government support to innova-
tion involves more than financial support, including overall macroeconomic conditions (price
stability, fiscal sustainability, sound financial systems). The relative merit of these practices
and the merit of the innovation policy highlighted in more recent strands of the literature is
a wide and still open area of academic debate (see Page 1994, Wade 1996, Mazzucato and
Penna 2015, Breznitz, Ornston and Samford 2018).
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0 < τ¯ < τZ which, at least potentially, leads to increase consumption over the
long run. We elaborate further on this condition after solving the optimization
problem of the representative agent in the next section.
4.5 Solving the optimization problem
In this section we develop the optimization problem of the private agent which
differs from the social optimum because taxes and transfers are exogenous to
the private agent. Notice that the rationale of the difference between private,
or competitive, and socially efficient solutions of the optimization problem that
we establish here are similar in spirit to Lucas (1988).
In particular, if the agent knows in advance what the taxes they pay will
be used for, e.g, financing investments, the social efficient solution would be
equivalent to a situation without taxes and without transfers. This is because
if the agent knows transfers are granted under the rule in Equation (4.11), they
realize that their investment resources, per worker, are just (1 − τ¯)I + τ¯ y = I˜
and, with the agent in control of I˜, Equation (4.11) is redundant in the first
place as Iz˜ = (1− τ¯)I+ τ¯ y too. Additionally, the social efficient solution, where
the agent is in control of the tax and transfers mechanism, is similar to set a
condition that z˜ = 1 and τZ = τ¯ = 0 as we show in Appendix 4.A.
On the contrary, if the agent is unaware of what the taxes they pay will be
used for, they take the sponsorship mechanism, z˜, as given. Technically, the
agent is not concerned with the fact that their investment behavior affects the
transfers mechanism established through Equation (4.11) and arbitrage behavior
is not possible either, otherwise we would be back to the social efficient scenario
z˜ = 1 introduced above.
Under the competitive solution of the optimization problem there are two
possibilities, either z˜ > 1 or z˜ < 1. Below, we show that only the first of these
scenarios is consistent with a sponsorship mechanism that enhances innovation
and growth; we discuss that the second scenario, namely z˜ < 1, amounts to a
case of confiscatory taxation.
Let us solve the overall optimization problem under the competitive sce-
nario, e.g., taking z˜ as given, before explaining in more detail the social efficient
scenario, and the sponsorship mechanism and confiscatory taxation scenarios.
As we noted earlier, the objective of the representative agent is to maximize
the discounted value of consumption given by Equation (4.5′) that we reproduce
here as
c = (1− τ¯) (f {A} − b {I})− τ¯κI2 (4.5′)
and given that innovation changes over time according to the logistic law of
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motion in Equation (4.6′), which is also reproduced here as53
A˙/A = Iz˜
(
1−A/A¯)− δ, 0 < δ < 1, 1 ≤ z˜ (4.6′)
To be more explicit, let us specify the production function as it was presented
earlier in Equation(4.2), namely
y = f{A} = Aα, 0 < α ≤ 1 (4.2)
Also, let us specify the convex adjustment investment cost function from Equa-
tion (4.4) assuming κ = 1/2
b{I} = I + I
2
2
(4.4′)
The optimization problem, in per worker terms and with future values dis-
counted at rate r, is54
max
∫ T
0
e−rt
[
(1− τ¯) (f {A} − b {I} )− τ¯κI2]dt
s.t. f {A} = Aα
b {I} = I + I
2
2
A˙ = Iz˜A
(
1−A/A¯)− δA
A{0} = A0 > 0, I{0} = I0 > 0, 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < δ < 1, z˜ ≥ 1, κ = 1/2
The current value Hamiltonian Hc is
Hc(I, A, λ) = (1− τ¯) (Aα − I)− I
2
2
+ λ
(
Iz˜A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA
)
This is a prototypical problem of optimal control, we see that investment “I” (the
control) influences the objective function twice, directly, through its own value
53In the specification of our optimization problem we follow the conventional practice in the
literature of investment theory with cost of adjustment (Summers 1981, Abel 1982, Turnovsky
1996, Heijdra 2009, pp. 40 ff., Romer 2019, pp. 420 ff). Setting up the problem the other
way round, e.g., with the objective given as
c = (1− τ¯) (f {A} − I)
and innovation evolving according to
A˙/A = b {I} z˜ (1−A/A¯)− δ, 0 < δ < 1, 1 ≤ z˜
is technically plausible (See Hayashi 1982), buy it leads to a different analytical problem as it
changes the economic intuition and equilibrium solutions—further explanation follows after
solving the optimization program.
54Our model is based on the Stigler-Ozga model of diffusion in advertising theory (see Gould
1976 and Kamien and Schwartz 1991 Section II.9). A similar line of reasoning as ours, namely,
a model that builds on the dynamics of diffusion and local learning capabilities on catching
up and falling behind, is found in Verspagen 1991.
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in the objective function, and, indirectly, through its impact on the evolution
of the state equation. The state variable (A) evolves according to the logistic
diffusion mechanism. The technology of the frontier, A¯, is exogenously given
and influences the objective only indirectly through the state equation. Finally,
from the point of view of the optimizing agent, the sponsorship mechanism, z˜,
is exogenously given, e.g., Equations (4.8)-(4.11) are not part of the agent’s
intertemporal optimization process.
We are aimed to find an expression that reflects the dynamics of investments
in innovation, which is determined by the control. The first order conditions
(FOC) for optimization satisfy Equation (4.6′) and
∂Hc
∂I
= λz˜A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯)− I = 0 (4.13)
λ˙− rλ = −∂Hc
∂A
= λ
[
−Iz˜
(
1− A
A¯
)
+ Iz˜
A
A¯
+ δ
]
− αAα−1 (1− τ¯) (4.14)
plus the usual transversality conditions
Lim
t→+∞ e−rtλ(t) ≥ 0, Limt→+∞ e−rtλ(t)A(t) = 0
Equation (4.13) characterizes the solution for optimal investments in innovation:
it equates the future increase in innovation with the current increase in the
cost of the investment. Equation (4.14) determines the motion of the co-state
variable (the shadow value of innovation). The latter is analogous to the problem
of equalizing the marginal product of innovation to the opportunity cost of the
investment in innovation (given by the discount rate r and taking into account
the rate of obsolescence).55
By log-transforming Equation (4.13) we have
ln (1− τ¯ + I) = ln (λ) + ln (z˜) + ln (A) + ln
(
1− A
A¯
)
Since τ¯ and z˜ are time-invariant, differencing this equation with respect to time
yields
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ =
λ˙
λ
+
A˙
A
− A˙
A¯−A (4.15)
Note, from Equation (4.14), that
λ˙
λ
= r − Iz˜
(
1− A
A¯
)
+ Iz˜
A
A¯
+ δ − αA
α−1 (1− τ¯)
λ
55Second order conditions for optimality are satisfied also; sufficiency is established by
checking that the conditions of the Mangasarian’s theorem are fulfilled (Kamien and Schwartz
1991 pp. 221 ff). Notice that the production function has properties f
′
> 0, f
′′ ≤ 0 and,
from Equation (4.13),
∂2Hc
∂I2
= −1
and, also from Equation (4.13), λ > 0. Hence, the Hamiltonian is concave in A and I.
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this expression can be written more concisely as
λ˙
λ
= r − A
A
(
Iz˜
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δ
)
+ Iz˜
A
A¯
− αA
α−1 (1− τ¯)
λ
= r − A˙
A
+ Iz˜
A
A¯
− αA
α−1 (1− τ¯)
λ
inserting the latter expression for λ˙λ into Equation (4.15) yields (after suppress-
ing redundant terms)
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r + Iz˜
A
A¯
− αA
α−1 (1− τ¯)
λ
− A˙
A¯−A (4.15
′)
Note, from Equations (4.6′) that
A˙
A¯−A = Iz˜
A
A¯
− δ A
A¯−A
using this expression into Equation (4.15′) and suppressing redundant terms,
yields
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r −
αAα−1 (1− τ¯)
λ
+ δ
A
A¯−A (4.15
′′)
From Equation (4.13) we obtain the following expression for λ
λ =
1− τ¯ + I
z˜A
(
1− A
A¯
)
using this expression in Equations (4.15′′) and collecting terms yields
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r +
δA
A¯−A −
αAαz˜
(
1−A/A¯)
1− τ¯ + I (4.16)
Equation (4.16) may be rewritten as
I˙ =
[
r +
δA
A¯−A
]
(1− τ¯ + I)− αAαz˜ (1−A/A¯) (4.16′)
where Equation (4.16′) provides a suitable specification of the differential equa-
tion that describes the dynamics of investments in innovation.
From the state Equation (4.6′), an equilibrium path satisfying A˙ = 0 implies
A = A¯
[
1− δ
Iz˜
]
(4.17)
From Equation (4.16′), the equilibrium path satisfying I˙ = 0 yields56
I =
αAαz˜
(
1−A/A¯)
r + δA
A¯−A
− (1− τ¯) (4.18)
56As noted earlier, setting up the optimization problem the other way round, e.g., with the
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Note that, everything else constant, an increase (decrease) of z˜ increases (de-
creases) the amount of investments and, therefore, the size of innovation both
in Equation (4.17) and in Equation (4.18).
Remember, from the discussion throughout Equations (4.9)-(4.12), that we
have defined z˜ = 1 + τZ , and we have found that τ¯ < τZ which implies that,
by construction, the transfers rate is higher than the tax rate. While we have
presented our case under the assumption that z˜ ≥ 1, the discussion following
Equation (4.11) suggests that, in general terms, there are three distinct possi-
bilities regarding the influence of the sponsorship mechanism on the equilibrium
possibilities of our model, which are determined by z˜ = 1, z˜ > 1 and z˜ < 1.
4.5.1 Equilibria without transfers (z˜ = 1)
As we discussed at the introduction of Section 4.5, this scenario is equivalent
to a social efficient solution, which would be the case when the agent knows
transfers are granted under the rule in Equation (4.11). This is because in
such a case the agent realizes that their investment resources, per worker, are
(1− τ¯)I+ τ¯ y = I˜ and that means Equation (4.11) becomes unnecessary as part of
the optimization program. Technically I˜ and Iz˜ are the same, hence, knowledge
of I˜ by the agent, is like assuming that they can control z˜ and leads to a social
optimum where z˜ = 1, which implies τ¯=0 and τZ=0 (for illustrative properties
we still leave z˜ and τ¯ as indicated in Equations (4.17)-(4.18) ).57
In order to analyze the equilibrium properties of the model under this sce-
nario, let us portray the vector field determined by Equations (4.17) and (4.18)
objective given as
c = (1− τ¯) (f {A} − I) (I)
and innovation evolving according to
A˙/A = b {I} z˜ (1−A/A¯)− δ, 0 < δ < 1, 1 ≤ z˜ (II)
leads to a different analytical problem. The alternative system leads to the following steady
state solution of the differential equation governing the movement of investment
I = 1−
r + δA
A¯−A
αAαz˜
(
1−A/A¯)
which is the “reciprocal” of Equation (4.18). More important, the system formed by Equations
(I) and (II) has no equilibrium solutions.
57Notice that with the agent in control of I˜ = (1 − τ¯)I + τ¯ y the objective function will
become f {A} − I˜ − κI2 and the state equation will become A˙ = I˜A (1−A/A¯) − δA, where
the term Iz˜ has being replaced with the knowledge of the agent of I˜. Under these conditions,
the optimal solutions in Equation (4.17) and (4.18) change to
A = A¯
[
1− δ
I
]
(I)
and,
I =
αAα
(
1−A/A¯)
r + δA
A¯−A
− 1 (II)
where both z˜ and τ¯ have vanished from the social optimum solution—a detailed proof of this
results is in Appendix 4.A.
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in the I-A plane in Figure 4.1 (the parameter values used are: δ = 10%, r = 1%,
α = 0.7, A¯ = 10, the plot is edited for illustrative purposes).58
From Equation (4.17), the A˙ = 0 curve is an increasing function that grows
(asymptotically) as A approaches A¯. This curve has an intercept on the vertical
axis when A
a→ 0 at I = δ/z˜. To characterize the dynamics of the function,
notice that, as innovation investments increase, the change in the A˙ = 0 is
positive, and A is increasing (decreasing) above (below) the A˙ = 0 locus. This
behavior is represented by the horizontal arrows of motion.
From Equation (4.18), the I˙ = 0 locus determines a bell-shape curve. This
function gets close to zero both as A
a→ 0 and as A a→ A¯.59 The curve is
increasing for small values of A and decreasing for large values of A. Therefore,
we observe that innovation investments rise for points above the I˙ = 0 line,
and they fall for points below it. The vertical arrows of motion illustrate this
behavior.
There are two equilibria in Figure 4.1. To characterize each, we follow
Kamien and Schwartz 1991, Section II.9. We linearize the model around the
steady state (Ass, Iss ) getting
A˙
I˙
 =
j11 j12
j21 j22

A− Ass
I − Iss

where the first entry in the righthand side of the equation is the two-by-two
Jacobian matrix (“∆”) whose elements are the partial derivatives of the system
around an equilibrium, which are obtained as follows60
58Parameter values for δ and r are established with respect to A¯. First, we use the parameter
values to obtain the plot from Equation (4.17), and use this result as an input to obtain the
plot from Equation (4.18). Appendix 4.B provides the algorithm in Python used to obtain
the actual plot.
59Technically the first expression on the right hand side of Equation (4.18) should be zero at
both ends A = 0 and A = A¯. But this implies negative investments as then I = −(1− τ¯) where
0 < τ¯ < 1. Likewise, as δ > I
a→ 0 in Equation (4.17) implies A < 0. To ensure non negativity
we need to impose conditions as δ ≤ Iz˜ in Equation (4.17), and αA
αz˜(1−A/A¯)
r+ δA
A¯−A
≥ (1 − τ¯) in
Equation (4.18). Also, as was discussed earlier, the catching up process implies A << A¯ as
backward countries get to the frontier only asymptotically. Finally, notice that we assume
that the initial levels of innovation and investment are strictly larger than zero.
60Obtaining the element j21 is a bit trickier than in the other cases; we use the fact that,
at the steady state, the following expressions are equivalent
Aα−1z˜(1−A/A¯) =
[
r
A
+
δ
A¯−A
]
(1− τ¯ + I)
and,
Aαz˜
A¯
=
[
r
A¯−A +
δA
(A¯−A)2
]
(1− τ¯ + I)
These expressions are used to simplify the partial derivative j21.
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Figure 4.1: Phase diagram under scenario z˜ = 1. The arrows of motion show that
the leftmost side equilibrium is unstable and that on the rightmost side is saddlepoint
stable. Note that here τ¯ = 0, τZ = 0 and z˜ = 1, other parameter values are: δ = 10%,
r = 1%, α = 0.7, A¯ = 10, the plot is edited for illustrative purposes, e.g., the origin
has been moved to the right for better depiction of the arrows of motion (values for δ
and r are established with respect to A¯. First, we use the parameter values to obtain
the plot from Equation (4.17), then we use this result an an input in Equation (4.18).
Appendix 4.B provides the algorithm in Python used to obtain the actual plot).
j11 =
∂A˙
∂A
∣∣∣∣
A˙=0
= −AssIssz˜
A¯
j12 =
∂A˙
∂I
∣∣∣∣
A˙=0
= Assz˜
[
1− Ass
A¯
]
j21 =
∂ I˙
∂A
∣∣∣∣
I˙=0
=
(
2δAss(
A¯−Ass
)2 + 2rAss − rA¯Ass (A¯−Ass) − α− 1Ass
(
r +
δAss
A¯−Ass
))
(1− τ¯ + Iss)
j22 =
∂ I˙
∂I
∣∣∣∣
I˙=0
= r +
δAss
A¯−Ass 102
The characteristic roots of the matrix ∆, ε1 and ε2, are obtained as usual
ε1,2 =
tr(∆)±√[tr(∆)]2 − 4|∆|
2
where tr(∆) and |∆| are, respectively, the trace and the determinant of ∆.
In order to characterize the equilibrium behavior we need to assume suitable
parameter values, namely r = δ > 0 and I > 0.61 We find, for high values of A,
that tr(∆) = j11 + j22 > 0 and |∆| = j11 × j22 − j21 × j12 < 0, hence if follows
that the system is saddlepoint stable for the intersection of the loci A˙ and I˙ in
the rightmost part of Figure 4.1. Since, from the information provided in the
Jacobian matrix, j11 < 0 and j22 > 0, we deduce that the innovation process is
stable while the investment dynamics is unstable.
The leftmost equilibrium, on the other hand, is featured by low values of
A which implies that j21 < 0, tr(∆) > 0 and |∆| > 0. Also, we note that
this equilibrium features tr(∆) < |∆| which implies that the roots are complex
conjugates. The (imaginary) roots may be written as62
ε1,2 =
tr(∆)
2
±
√
4|∆| − [tr(∆)]2
2
Thus, on the lefthand region we have two complex roots with positive real
parts, tr(∆) > 0 and |∆| > 0. The solution is characterized as an unstable
focus that oscillates and moves away from the equilibrium unless A(0) = Ass
and I(0) = Iss.
63 Graphically, from Figure 4.1 we see that the instability of the
system on the lefthand region is characterized because the linearized locus A˙ is
flatter than the linearized locus I˙.64
In economic terms, the qualitative properties of the system described in
Figure 4.1 imply that only when the initial level of innovation is sufficiently
61Note that r = δ = I = 0, or sufficiently close to zero, implies ε1,2 = 0; and, on the other
hand, r = δ = 0 and I > 0 implies ε1 = 0 > ε2. In these cases, Equations (4.17)-(4.18)
are either inconsistent or redundant: in the first case there are no equilibria; in the later,
with a root equal to zero, any point may be an (knife-edge) equilibrium. Also, note that when
r = 0 < δ and I > 0, the roots are real and distinct with ε1 > 0 > ε2. In this case, the solution
hinges on the value of δ: a large δ leads the solution to be dominated by the positive root and
both A and I grow without bound; if δ is small, on the other hand, the solution converge
to a saddlepoint equilibrium. Finally, when δ = 0 < r and I > 0 there is also a saddlepoint
equilibrium. But, in the latter case there are roots that are complex conjugates—as explained
in the main text.
62We may write the two complex roots as
ε1,2 = a± di
where a = tr(∆)/2 and d =
√
[tr(∆)]2−4|∆|
2
. Then, to obtain the expression on the text, we
use the property of imaginary numbers i2 = −1.
63Note that a stable focus, one oscillating inwards instead, would have been characterized by
two complex roots with a negative real part, tr(∆) < 0 (Kamien and Schwartz 1991 Section
B5). In our approach, a negative value for the trace only arises for very small parameter
values and r < δ, namely δ = 0.1 and r = 1, 0E − 0.5.
64Compare this equilibrium on the lefthand region with the saddlepoint equilibrium on the
righthand region, so characterized because the linearized locus A˙ stepper than the linearized
locus I˙.
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large, the economy gets on the path to the equilibrium on the rightmost side.
As it stands, under the scenario z˜ = 1 the equilibrium on the right hand side is
unique and unaffected by the sponsorship mechanism.
4.5.2 Equilibria with positive transfers (z˜ > 1)
We have established that when the government has an interest in promoting
innovation and, in more general terms, economic growth, it can do so by setting
a flat tax rate on consumption in order to fund further investment in innovation
(see Equation (4.5′)). More specifically, from Equation (4.11), we see that, by
setting a flat tax rate on consumption (τ¯ > 0), the government raises funds
to grant innovation transfers in a way such that, by construction, the transfers
rate is higher than the flat tax rate, e.g., τ¯ < τZ (given a suitable value for the
investment ratio I/y) and the sponsorship mechanism is larger than 1, z˜ > 1.
For instance, we have seen, assuming I/y = 20%, that setting τ¯ = 10% leads
to a transfers rate of τZ = 40% and a sponsorship mechanism of z˜ = 1.4. To
illustrate the impact of this kind of change, in Figure 4.2 we plot together the
equilibria found under the conditions τ¯ = τZ = 0 (scenario z˜ = 1) and the
equilibria found under the new conditions, namely, τ¯ = 10% and τZ = 40%
(scenario z˜ = 1.4). To simplify the presentation, we focus on the right hand
region saddlepoint equilibria for both these scenarios (we do not repeat the
arrows of motion and we do not discuss anymore the unstable equilibria on the
left hand region as in this regard the analysis remains unchanged).
Note, furthermore, that all parameter values that we have established above
remain, namely, δ = 10%, r = 1%, α = 0.7 and A¯ = 10. Since, consistent with
Equation (4.11), we need to ensure that the investment ratio is I/y = 20% (for
the scenario z˜ = 1.4 to hold), this ratio is obtained from the fact that in E0,
I = 0.7 and A = 5.57, hence y = Aα = 3.36 and I/y ≈ 20% (note that the plot
is enlarged in the I-axis direction to ease the illustration).
Thus, we imagine a situation where, starting from the equilibrium point E0,
a tax τ¯ = 10% is levied on consumption that supports a sponsorship mechanism
of z˜ = 1.4 which, in turn, leads to a new balanced growth path and a new
saddlepoint equilibrium at E1, therefore increasing the steady state level of
innovation even with the same value of investment.
Clearly, a policy shock of this kind would impact first the investment dy-
namics at point E0 (remember that investment is the unstable variable) leading
it to jump onto the stable trajectory whereas A remains constant in the first
instance. This would eventually raise the ratio I/y affecting the transfers rate
through the condition in Equation (4.11). For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that such a change is not very large and the investment ratio remains circa
I/y = 20% in getting from the equilibrium E0 to E1. Notice that this is a safe
assumption for infinitesimal changes from E0 to E1 led by the increase in z˜. Yet,
by way of illustration, we use sufficiently large changes of numbers for plotting
and still keep I/y = 20% constant.
The positive influence of the sponsorship mechanism has two components.
The first, as may be seen from Equation (4.17), is that the value of z˜ > 1
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shifts the innovation locus downwards to the right with a lower intercept at
δ
z˜|z˜>1 <
δ
z˜|z˜=1 . More formally, from Equation (4.6
′) and using the rules of
the Implicit Function Theorem, we may see that along the A˙ = 0 line the
derivative of A with respect to z˜ is negative, which implies that an increase in
the sponsorship mechanism shifts the A˙ line down to the right
∂A
∂z˜
∣∣∣∣
A˙=0
= − IA
(
1− A
A¯
)
Iz˜
(
1− 2A
A¯
)− δ < 0
The second component in the movement from the point E0 to the point E1 is
that the increase in the sponsorship mechanism drives an expansion of the I˙ = 0
bell-shape line. This can be seen, more formally, using Equation (4.16′) since,
along the I˙ = 0 line, the implicit derivative of I with respect to z˜ is positive
∂I
∂z˜
∣∣∣∣
I˙=0
=
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ
A¯−A
> 0
Figure 4.2: The sponsorship mechanism scenario with z˜ > 1. Here E0 relies on
τ¯ = 0, τZ = 0 and z˜ = 1; E1 relies on τ¯ = 10%, τZ = 40% and z˜ = 1.4, other
parameter values that we have established earlier remain, namely, δ = 10%, r = 1%,
α = 0.7, A¯ = 10. The plot is edited for illustrative purposes, e.g., the I-axis enlarged.
As it stands from Figure 4.2, and following from our discussion at the end
of Section (4.4), an innovation policy based on the sponsorship mechanism is
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adequate to boost the production of innovation and spur a virtuous cycle of
growth and development provided the government is interested in the promo-
tion of innovation and is able to regulate the sponsorship mechanism without
incurring in either unsustainable fiscal deficits or negative consumption effects.
Graphically, the equilibrium with transfers needs to lie to the right of the
equilibrium without transfers; and the steady state value of innovation in the
equilibrium with transfers has to be large enough to lead a large increase in
productivity, and therefore consumption, at present value terms—remember
that we have defined productivity (output per worker) as an increasing function
of innovation.
For instance, in the context of our example, the transition from the equi-
librium point at E0, where τZ = 0% (and z˜ = 1), to the new equilibrium E1,
where τZ = 40% (and z˜ = 1.4), the increase in transfers that has been supported
by an increase of 10% in taxation, needs to ensure an increase of at least 10%
in productivity if the sponsorship mechanism is to be considered a successful
policy (below we show a numerical example in this direction). Clearly that is
a difficult task for policy makers given the many uncertainties involved in the
production of innovation, which however have not been a reason for the policy
not to be adopted in practice.65
4.5.3 Equilibria with confiscatory taxation (z˜ < 1)
If the government is unable, or unwilling, to promote innovation, which as we
have pointed out earlier amounts to a situation where taxation is positive (τ¯ > 0)
and transfers are zero or negative (τZ ≤ 0), we observe z˜ ≤ 1.
In strict sense, positive taxation with zero transfers still leaves z˜ = 1. But,
from Equation (4.18), we see that an increase in the tax rate still has a positive
impact on investment, which is explained because, as we established in Equation
(4.5′), effective investment is tax-deducible and the cost of adjustment, by its
very nature, can not be taxed either.
It is when taxes are levied on investment that we get to a situation analyt-
ically equivalent to z˜ < 1, therefore, we refer to this as a case of confiscatory
taxation.
In particular, notice that, if taxes are levied on investment (a tax on gross
output rather than on consumption), Equation (4.7) would modify to
T = τ¯Y
and the equilibrium solution, Equation (4.18), would modify to
I =
αAα(1− τ¯) (1−A/A¯)
r + δA
A¯−A
− 1, 0 < τ¯ < 1 (4.18′)
where the term (1 − τ¯) in the numerator of this equation implies that in the
steady state investment is reduced in a proportion equal to the size of the tax.
65Mazzucato 2013, Mazzucato and Penna 2015, Breznitz 2007, Breznitz 2018.
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Graphically, and qualitatively, the economy would be in a situation equivalent
to z˜ < 1.
As we observe from Figure 4.3, in this scenario the saddlepoint shifts inwards
in comparison with the scenario where z˜ = 1 analyzed above. Notice that we
obtain the new figure using the same parameter values as established earlier,
namely, δ = 10%, r = 1%, α = 0.7, A¯ = 10 (the plot is enlarged in the I-axis
direction to ease the illustration).
Figure 4.3: The sponsorship mechanism scenario with z˜ < 1. Here E0 relies on
τ¯ = 0, τZ = 0 and z˜ = 1; E2 relies on the assumption of an investment tax equivalent
to z˜ = 0.6, other parameter values that we have established earlier remain, namely,
δ = 10%, r = 1%, α = 0.7, A¯ = 10. Again the plot is edited for illustrative purposes,
e.g., the I-axis enlarged.
From Figure 4.3, the transition of the the equilibrium point from E0 to E2
led by an increase in taxation on gross output, has two components. First, from
Equation (4.17), we see that there is a reduction in the value of innovation which
shifts the A˙ = 0 locus upwards to the left with an intercept at δz˜|z˜<1 >
δ
z˜|z˜=1 .
Second, from Equation (4.18′), we see a reduction in the size of investment,
which shrinks the I˙ = 0 locus.
Figure 4.3 suggests that inappropriate government interventions that lead to
reduce the steady state value of innovation, also have negative welfare effects as
such interventions lead to a reduction of output (per worker), therefore reducing
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consumption.
Furthermore, as the equilibrium shifts to the left from E0 to E2, the dash
lines describing the innovation and investment loci under intervention suggest
here the possibility of poverty traps induced by the government: the economy
gets trapped in a low saddlepoint equilibrium. We notice that those possibilities
have been researched in numerous studies.66
Finally, if follows also from the analysis of Figure 4.3, that the system might
even be devoid of equilibria when and if z˜
a→ 0. This technical possibility of
the model arises because, in more general terms, the sponsorship mechanism
influences the qualitative structure of the dynamics of the system, therefore
leading to scenarios with two, one or no equilibria. While it is tempting to relate
the possibility of non existence of equilibria to actual economic situations, we
refrain to do so leaving it as a subject for future research instead.
Summing up, there are three distinct scenarios with regard to the role of
government in easing the financing needs of the private sector innovation activ-
ity:
(i) z˜ < 1, consistent with the political barriers to technology adoption high-
lighted in some strands of the development literature;
(ii) z˜ = 1, which is a scenario without intervention;
(iii) z˜ > 1, consistent with the NIS perspective that public funds stimulate in-
novation investments and therefore lead to increasing stocks of innovation
in present value terms.
The setting just outlined illustrates a critical feature distinguishing the NIS
framework. From the conventional viewpoint, the best government can do is
setting up institutions and policies to get the economy from scenario i) to ii);
under the NIS view, the crucial point is to guarantee the financial sponsorship
needed to get from scenario ii) to iii) and this has been the theoretical foundation
of the innovation policy followed by both countries at the frontier and successful
catching up countries.
4.5.4 A numerical application
As we established earlier, Section 4.4, from the point of view of government, a
desirable economic goal is to influence the optimizing agent in order to achieve
an increase in consumption that is at least proportional to the tax rate, which
formally was written above in Equation (4.12) as∫ T
0
e−rt
[
(1− τ¯) (f{A} − b{I})− τ¯κI2|z˜>1
]
dt∫ T
0
e−rt
[
f{A} − b{I}|z˜=1
]
dt
− 1 ≥ τ¯ (4.12)
Notice that this condition may be easily verified using Equations (4.9)-(4.11) to
determine a value for z˜. Also, we can use Equation (4.17) to determine a value
66Parente and Prescott 1994, 2002; Damsgaard and Krusell 2010; Stokey 2012.
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for A given the sponsorship mechanism and a (constant) value of investment. In
general, z˜ > 1 implies 0 < τ¯ < τZ which, at least potentially, leads to increase
consumption over the long run in an scenario with taxes and transfers.
In this section, we estimate the impact of the sponsorship mechanism on the
steady state value of A using Equation (4.17). As it turns out, with a constant
value of investment it is unnecessary to use Equation (4.18) to determine the
steady state value of A, therefore, note that the numerical exercises below are
unrelated to the graphical analysis in Subsections 4.5.1-4.5.3.
Under suitable parameter values, namely, assuming initial values A = 1,
α = 0.7 and I = 0.2 such that, at the origin, A = y = 1 and I/y = 20%; and
assuming that τ¯ = 0 at the origin, we find from Equation (4.11) that τZ = 0
and, hence, z˜ = 1. Furthermore, we may assume δ = 0.1 and A¯ = 2, such that
we implicitly establish that the rate of obsolescence is half the investment ratio
and that, at the origin, the economy is around halfway of the frontier (with
A=1 and A¯ = 2). Plugging these parameter values into Equation (4.17) yields
A = A¯
[
1− δ
Iz˜
∣∣∣
z˜=1
]
= 2
[
1− 0.1
0.2× 1
]
= 1.0 (a)
Next, in an scenario with taxes and transfers, which leads taxes from τ¯ = 0 to
τ¯ = 10%, and keeping other parameter values constant, we find from Equation
(4.11) that τZ = 40%, hence, z˜ = 1.4. Plugging again these values into Equation
(4.17) yields
A = A¯
[
1− δ
Iz˜
∣∣∣
z˜=1.4
]
= 2
[
1− 0.1
0.2× 1.4
]
≈ 1.3 (b)
where comparison of scenarios (a) and (b) show that, starting from the same
initial conditions for other variables, the change in the sponsorship mechanism
from z˜ = 1 t0 z˜ = 1.4 leads to an increase of approximately 30% in innovation.
Now, given that, as we have pointed out above, the value of output is deter-
mined by Aα with α = 0.7, we obtain 10.7 = 1.0 when z˜ = 1; and 1.30.7 = 1.2
when z˜ = 1.4. Furthermore, as we have assumed a constant value of investment,
I = 0.2 and the cost of investment is given by Equation (4.4′) as b{I} = I+ I22 , we
obtain that the net value of consumption (after taxes) is c = 1−0.2− 0.222 = 0.78
when z˜ = 1; and c = 0.9 ∗ (1.2 − 0.2) − 0.222 ≈ 0.88 when z˜ = 1.4, where mul-
tiplying for 0.9 in the latter expression is because the agent now pays a fix tax
rate on consumption (τ¯ = 10%).
Assuming, for simplicity, that T=1 and there is no discount (r = 0), plug-
ging the above calculations into Equation (4.12) yields, under the parameter
configuration of this example,[
(1− 0.1) (1.2− 0.2)− 0.222
]|z˜=1.4[
1− 0.2− 0.222
]|z˜=1 − 1 ≈ 13% ≥ τ¯ = 10% (4.12′)
hence, consisting with the desirable economic goal, the change in the sponsorship
mechanism from z˜ = 1 t0 z˜ = 1.4 drives a net increase in consumption of
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approximately 13% which compares favorably with the change in taxation from
τ¯ = 0 to τ¯ = 10% at the origin—starting from similar initial conditions for
other variables.
Let us recall that the positive change in welfare is achieved here under the
assumption that there is no opportunity for arbitrage by the agent leading to
offset the power of the mechanism.
Notice that, under perfect arbitrage, the change from τ¯ = 0 to τ¯ = 10% with
I/y = 20% still leads to a change from z˜ = 1 to z˜ = 1.4 in the initial conditions.
But, after taxes, the agent would adjust the investment ratio from I/y = 20%
to I/y ≈ 15% yielding[
(1− 0.1) (1.2− 0.15)− 0.1522
]|z˜=1.4[
1− 0.2− 0.222
]|z˜=1 − 1 ≈ 0% (4.12′′)
which, of course, entails a failure of the sponsorship mechanism.
On the other side, if, as a consequence of the sponsorship mechanism the
agent increases the after tax investment ratio over I/y = 20% the increase in
welfare is even higher. But, clearly, since the increase in investment entails a
reduction in consumption the increase in investments cannot be without bound.
In particular, under the conditions we have established above, under the
sponsorship mechanism of z˜ = 1.4 consumption increases when the after tax
investment ratio increases from I/y = 20% to I/y = 28% and decreases thereafter
for higher ratios; and for an investment ratio larger than I/y = 40% the net
increase in consumption is smaller than the initial change in the tax rate from
τ¯ = 0 to τ¯ = 10%.
4.5.5 The change of transfers into subsidies
With a promotion of innovation strategy based on innovation subsidies rather
than on transfers the analysis throughout Subsection (4.3.2) and Section (4.4)
remains essentially unchanged (save for the correspondent relabeling of trans-
fers and the term τz as a subsidy rate instead, say τz). Also, the term z˜ would
vanish for Equation (4.6′) as the state equation would be unaffected by the
subsidy while that is not the case for the objective function. Similar to our
reasoning in the equilibrium with transfers, from the point of view of the agent,
subsidies are exogenously given, e.g., Equations (4.8)-(4.11)—after the corre-
spondent relabeling of the transfers rate into the subsidies rate—are not part of
the intertemporal optimization process of the agent.
One straightforward possibility to include the subsidy and still assuming
taxation is on gross consumption, leads to the following modification of the
objective function (alternative possibilities to be explained below)
c = (1− τ¯)
(
Aα − (1− τz)
(
I − I
2
2
))
= (1− τ¯)Aα − (1− τ¯) (1− τz)
(
I − I
2
2
)
(4.19)
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where we have included already in this equation the explicit forms of the produc-
tion and investment functions and, for simplicity, we maintain the assumption
that both the tax-deduction ad the subsidy are inclusive of adjustment cost.
The current value Hamiltonian of this new problem is
Hc(I, A, λ) = (1− τ¯)Aα − (1− τ¯) (1− τz)
(
I − I
2
2
)
+ λ
(
IA
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA
)
where we notice that the sponsorship mechanism, z˜, has vanished from the con-
straint and, instead, the subsidy rate, τz, appears now in the objective function.
The first order conditions (FOC) for optimization of the innovation subsidies
mechanism satisfy
∂Hc
∂I
= λA
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯) (1− τz) (1 + I) = 0 (4.20)
λ˙− rλ = −∂Hc
∂A
= λ
[
−I
(
1− A
A
)
+ I
A
A¯
+ δ
]
− αAα−1 (1− τ¯) (4.21)
∂Hc
∂λ
= IA
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA = A˙ (4.22)
plus the usual transversality conditions. Note that Equation (4.22) reproduces
the relevant state equation for the present problem (without the sponsorship
mechanism z˜ in it).
We follow a similar procedure as was explained (step-by-step) in the op-
timization approach of the problem with transfers, namely, we take logs and
difference Equation (4.20) with respect to time, which yields
1
1 + I
I˙ =
λ˙
λ
+
A˙
A
− A˙
A¯−A (4.23)
using Equations (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22) into (4.23) and collecting terms yields
1
1 + I
I˙ = r +
δA
A¯−A −
αAα
(
1−A/A¯)
(1− τz)(1 + I)
(4.24)
The crucial point to note from Equation (4.24), is that the tax rate, τ¯ , does not
show up anymore in the optimization problem, but the subsidy rate, τz, does.
This is explained because a time-invariant tax on consumption does not affect
the relative price of investment and, therefore, does not affect the intertemporal
consumption decision of the agent.67 The subsidy rate only affects investment
and, as a result of this treatment, this rate shows up in the optimization problem
of the agent. Equation (4.24) may be rewritten as
I˙ =
[
r +
δA
A¯−A
]
(1 + I)− αA
α
(
1−A/A¯)
1− τz
(4.24′)
67Heijdra 2009, pp. 455 ff.
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Finally, from the state equation, Equation (4.22), an equilibrium path satisfying
A˙ = 0 in the optimization problem with the innovation subsidies mechanism
implies
A = A¯
[
1− δ
I
]
(4.25)
which compares with Equation (4.17) because the sponsorship mechanism is not
in Equation (4.25).
From Equation (4.24′), the equilibrium path satisfying I˙ = 0 yields
I =
αAα(1−A/A¯)
1−τz
r + δA
A¯−A
− 1 (4.26)
which compares with Equation (4.18) because the sponsorship mechanism is not
in Equation (4.26) and instead there is the new innovation subsidies mechanism
(1− τz) dividing the numerator of this equation. As it stands we may calculate
1
1− τz
= z
and rewrite Equation (4.26)
I =
αAαz
(
1−A/A¯)
r + δA
A¯−A
− 1 (4.26′)
where comparison of Equation (4.26′) and Equation (4.18) shows that, quali-
tatively, the dynamic effects of the innovation subsidies mechanism, z, and the
sponsorship mechanism, z˜, that we developed earlier are essentially the same,
namely,
(i) z ≤ 1|τz > 0 in the case of confiscatory taxation;
(ii) z = 1|τz = 0 in a scenario without government intervention;
(iii) z > 1|τz > 0 , consistent with a policy based on the innovation subsidies
mechanism.
Therefore, the dynamics of the system with subsidies may be studied using the
same phase diagrams presented above.
Notice, however, that numerically the results change. Using the examples
following Equation (4.11), we see that, for a given investment ratio (I/y = 20%),
a transfers rate of 40% that is financed with a tax rate of 10% on consumption,
implies a sponsorship mechanism of z˜ = 1 + τZ = 1.4, whilst a subsidy mecha-
nism of the same size (40%) implies a innovation subsidies mechanism of
1
1− 0.4 = 1.67
Notice, finally, that there are further alternatives to the specification of the
innovation mechanism through subsidies rather than through transfers. For
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instance one may specify that taxation is on gross output (investment is not
excluded), which leads to modify the objective function, Equation (4.19), as
follows
c = (1− τ¯)Aα − (1− τz)
(
I − I
2
2
)
Note that, through the optimization procedure along the lines already described,
the relevant state equation for this problem is still given by Equation (4.22) and
its solution in Equation (4.25). Instead, the new tax and subsidy arrangement
leads to modify Equation (4.26′) into
I =
αAα(1−τ¯)(1−A/A¯)
1−τz
r + δA
A¯−A
− 1 (4.26′′)
the crucial point to note here is that now the tax rate (τ¯) shows up in the
numerator of Equation (4.26′′), e.g., the tax rate is not neutral anymore in the
intertemporal consumption decisions of the agent. The impact of the subsidy
policy is now captured by the term
1− τ¯
1− τz
(4.27)
that appears in the numerator of Equation (4.26′′). Noticeably, with a policy
of taxes on gross output to subsidy investment, the numerical impact is higher
as it implies that each period more resources are subtracted from output to put
them on investment. This is a new aspect of the model that leads to modify the
reasoning in Equation (4.11). Specifically, in the new scenario of noneutrality
of taxation we find that
τ¯ y = Iτz
after rearranging terms implies that
τ¯(I/y)−1 = τz (4.28)
where, with the tax on gross output, the subsidy rate is equal to the tax rate
times the inverse of the investment ratio (I/y). As it stands, here again the suc-
cess of the innovation subsidies mechanism depends on the agent ignoring the
policy such that arbitrage decision making based on the mechanism is not pos-
sible, e.g., while both taxes and subsidies show up in the optimization problem
of the agent, they ignore how subsidy decisions are made by the government,
therefore, Equation (4.28) is not part of the optimization process of the agent.
From Equation (4.28) we have that, given a investment ratio (I/y = 20%),
nonneutrality of taxation and no arbitrage decision-making, a tax rate of 10%
implies now a subsidy rate of 50%. Using these tax and subsidy rates in Equation
(4.27) implies an impact of
1− τ¯
1− τz
=
1− 0.1
1− 0.5 = 1.8
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which is higher than the effects we found earlier for a similar tax (τ¯ =10%)
and investment ratio (I/y = 20%) in the sponsorship mechanism (z˜=1.4); and
it is also higher than the innovation subsidies mechanism when the tax is on
consumption, Equation (4.19), where we saw that the impact is 11−0.4 = 1.67.
To sum up, while there are obvious changes in terms of the numerical re-
sults, under a scenario where the tax is on gross output and the whole amount
of taxation is used to subsidy investment, the qualitative dynamics of the sub-
sidies mechanism remains unchanged and can still be analyzed from the phase
diagrams provided above in Subsection (4.5.1)-(4.5.3).
4.6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a model here that builds on the interaction between the
adoption of foreign technology and the process of local innovation, and iden-
tify this interaction as a crucial feature to understand the ability of backward
countries to catching up. More in particular, we set up an environment where
innovation, along technology trajectories that are associated with state-of-the-
art inventions and working practices that are common to all countries, leads to
speed the rate of economic growth and thus determines the catching up process.
We have also described a formal framework where the government financial
sponsorship mechanism help to overcome the financial constraints that limit
the ability of entrepreneurs in the private sector to innovate. The case for
sponsorship mechanism, which depends here on a more extended NIS frame-
work, provides a theoretical basis to better understand the crucial relationship
between the production of innovation and the process of catching up; also, it
provides a technical basis for the modern discussion on the appropriate role of
government in the promotion of innovation.
Let us briefly mention what we think are other key takeaways from the
model:
First, the sponsorship mechanism provides a richer characterization of the
role of the government in the economy. In earlier advances of the endogenous
growth literature the most influential arguments are in line with conventional
neo-classical prescriptions—more savings, more schooling, and proper institu-
tions.68
Second, the model creates an enriched framework in which to consider the
interaction between the diffusion of new technology, its adoption and the need
to foster innovation along common working practices, technological inventions
and modes of production. That approach seems warranted to inform the inno-
vation policy in developing countries along the policy practice in countries at
the frontier.69
Third, the model provides an input to better the academic understanding
on the determinants/limits of the advantage of backwardness. Unlike the usual
68Romer 1994 and Parente and Prescott 2002.
69World Bank 2010, OECD 2013.
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tenet that backward countries benefit automatically from the technology ad-
vance at the frontier, the model presented here has stressed that the benefits of
foreign technology are mostly indirect and occur through the local innovation
effort. In this context, the model integrates the role of the indigenous innovation
policy as a means to realize the benefits of technology diffusion.
It is worth stressing that in the systemic approach the production of in-
novations, and not just the adoption of output-augmenting and cost-reducing
technologies, is the key determinant of a country’s long-run competitive advan-
tage; and therefore the true engine of economic growth over the long-run.70
All in all, our aim in this chapter has been to capture the widespread fact of
reality that innovation is the true engine of growth, if alongside the contributions
of technology diffusion. The government—through its own innovation effort and
the institutional/policy framework—has a great deal of influence both upon the
transitional dynamics, and the final state of the economy.
70Lundvall 2007.
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Appendix 4A: The Social Optimum
With the agent in control of (1− τ¯)I+ τ¯ y = I˜ the current value Hamiltonian Hc
becomes
Hc(I, A, λ) = A
α − I˜ − I
2
2
+ λ
(
I˜A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA
)
or, written in extensive form
Hc(I, A, λ) = A
α − [(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα]− I
2
2
+ λ
(
[(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα]A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA
)
The first order conditions (FOC) for optimization satisfy Equation (4.6′A),
(4.13A) and (4.14A) where the labels are intended to ease comparison with
the corresponding equations in the main text
A˙ = [(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα]A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δA (4.6′A)
∂Hc
∂I
= λ (1− τ¯)A
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯)− I = 0 (4.13A)
λ˙− rλ = −∂Hc
∂A
=− λ
[
[(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα]
(
1− A
A¯
)
− δ
]
+ λ
[
[(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα] A
A¯
− τ¯αAα−1A
(
1− A
A¯
)]
− αAα−1 (1− τ¯)
(4.14A)
plus transversality conditions.
Log-transformation of Equation (4.13A) and differencing with respect to
time yields
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ =
λ˙
λ
+
A˙
A
− A˙
A¯−A (4.15A)
From Equation (4.14A) we obtain
λ˙
λ
= r − A˙
A
+ [(1− τ¯) I + τ¯Aα] A
A¯
− τ¯αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯)αA
α−1
λ
and, from Equation (4.6′A) we obtain
A˙
A¯−A = [(1− τ¯) I + τ¯A
α]
A
A¯
− δ A
A¯−A
using these two expressions into Equation (4.15A), suppressing redundant terms
and rearranging, we obtain
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r − τ¯αA
α
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯)αA
α−1
λ
+ δ
A
A¯−A (4.15
′′A)
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Finally, using Equation (4.13A) into (4.15′′A), we obtain
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r + δ
A
A¯−A − τ¯αA
α
(
1− A
A¯
)
− (1− τ¯)
2
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
1− τ¯ + I (4.16A)
which may be written equivalently as
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r + δ
A
A¯−A −
(
τ¯(1− τ¯ + I) + (1− τ¯)2
)
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
1− τ¯ + I
we may simplify further the latter expression to obtain
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r + δ
A
A¯−A −
(
τ¯ − τ¯2 + τ¯ I + 12 − 2τ¯ + τ¯2)αAα (1− A
A¯
)
1− τ¯ + I
which reduces to
1
1− τ¯ + I I˙ = r + δ
A
A¯−A −
(1− τ¯ + τ¯ I)αAα (1− A
A¯
)
1− τ¯ + I
from which we obtain
I˙ =
(
r + δ
A
A¯−A
)
(1− τ¯ + I)− (1− τ¯ + τ¯ I)αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
(4.16′A)
Where Equations (4.6′A) and (4.16′A) provide the dynamic equations of in-
terest to the maximizing agent. From the state Equation (4.6′A), an equilibrium
path satisfying A˙ = 0 implies
A = A¯
[
1− δ
I˜
]
= A¯
[
1− δ
(1− τ¯)I + τ¯Aα
]
(4.17A)
From Equation (4.16′A), the equilibrium path satisfying I˙ = 0 yields
1− τ¯ + I
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I =
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
(4.16′A-a)
Notice that we may write the left hand side of the latter equation as
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I − τ¯ I + I
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I = 1 +
(1− τ¯)I
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I
Thus, we can write Equation (4.16′A-a) as
(1− τ¯)I
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I =
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1 (4.16′A-b)
the latter expression may be alternatively written as
I =
(
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1
)
1− τ¯ + τ¯ I
1− τ¯
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which also leads to
I =
(
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1
)
+
(
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1
)
τ¯ I
1− τ¯
Taking the second component from the right hand side to the left hand side,
and solving for I we obtain
I
(
1−
(
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1
)
τ¯
1− τ¯
)
=
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1
which, finally, leads to a suitable expression of the dynamic equation governing
innovation investments under the social optimum scenario
I =
αAα(1−AA¯ )
r+δ A
A¯−A
− 1
1−
(
αAα(1−AA¯ )
r+δ A
A¯−A
− 1
)
τ¯
1−τ¯
(4.18A)
Is is easy to verify, from Equation (4.18A), that the only maximizing option is
found when τ¯
a→ 0 in which case Equation (4.17A) becomes
A = A¯
[
1− δ
I
]
(4.17A)
and Equation (4.18A) becomes simply
I =
αAα
(
1− A
A¯
)
r + δ A
A¯−A
− 1 (4.18A)
From which we may conclude that, when the agent is aware that taxation would
be fully used to finance investment, the social optimal solution is equivalent to
have τ¯ = 0 and no sponsorship mechanism.
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Appendix 4B: The algorithm in Python
import numpy as np
from scipy.optimize import minimize
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from matplotlib.patches import Polygon
ax = plt.subplot(111)
alpha=0.7
r=0.1
Abar=10
delta=.5
A=np.arange(0.0, 10.0, 0.01)
s1=(Abar*delta/(Abar-A))
s2=((alpha*A**alpha*(1-A/Abar))/(r+delta*A/(Abar-A))-1)
# Equilibria without the sponsorship mechanism z=1
line, =plt.plot(A,s1,’k-’)
line, =plt.plot(A+1.2,s2,’k-’)
# Equilibria with the sponsorship mechanism z > 1
z=1.4
s1z=(Abar*delta/(z*(Abar-A)))
s2z=((alpha*A**alpha*z*(1-A/Abar))/(r+delta*A/(Abar-A))-1)
line, =plt.plot(A+1.2,s1z,’k:’)
line, =plt.plot(A+1.2,s2z,’k:’)
# Editing section (the algorithm still runs if this block is dropped out )
plt.plot(5.7,1.18,’ko’)
plt.text(-.46, 2, r’I’,fontsize=10, weight=’bold’)
plt.text(9, -0.1, r’A¯’,fontsize=14, weight=’bold’)
plt.text(-.4, 0.34, r’ δz˜ ’,fontsize=18, weight=’bold’)
plt.text(7.61, 1.9, r’A˙ = 0’,fontsize=14, weight=’bold’)
plt.text(5.15, 1.6, r’I˙ = 0’,fontsize=14, weight=’bold’)
plt.text(3.94, 1.15, r’E0|z˜ = 1’,fontsize=14, weight=’bold’)
plt.axis([0,9,0,3.5])
plt.xlabel(’A’,fontsize=14)
frameon=False
plt.show()
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Chapter 5
Econometrics of Adoption
and Innovation
5.1 Introduction.
Whether the ability of less developed countries to catch up hinges primarily on
technology diffusion or on domestic technology is an intriguing question at the
heart of growth economics. It is, moreover, a question that raises huge policy
implications which, however, stem from what researchers hold as a feasible the-
oretical explanation upon the ultimate determinants of growth and catching up.
Therefore, in this chapter we endeavor to assess whether, and to what extent,
the contesting explanations of the relationship between technology and long-run
growth underlined in the mainstream economics, and in the evolutionary and
NIS frameworks, are empirically relevant.1
In particular, we endeavor to assess to what extent long-run growth hinges
on foreign technology—as most mainstream studies hold—and to what ex-
tent it hinges on indigenous technology, or the interaction of foreign and lo-
cal technology—as the evolutionary framework holds. We also assess to what
extent local technology, or innovation for that matter, hinges on government
coordination which is a means to capture the influence of a country’s national
innovation system in this regard—as we explain below.
The widespread belief that long-run growth and catching-up are closely re-
lated to worker’s productivity, which in turn relates to the available technology,
1Let us recall the reader that the mainstream view in our discussion relates to the logic
spread in the neoclassical and endogenous model according to which technology is produced
exclusively in countries at the frontier, whereas adoption/imitation are the alternatives left to
countries falling behind (Solow 1956, Lucas 1988, Romer 1994, Jones 2005). The evolutionary
and NIS theories make the case for a broader view of innovation and a concern about the
whole system of innovation, which in turn commands active government intervention beyond
the market failures fixing paradigm. See Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Nelson et al., 2018 on
the evolutionary approach. See Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007 and
Soete et al., 2010 on the NIS perspective. For a trace to earlier literature see Chapter 1.
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is beyond question.2 With regard to the debate on the productivity contribu-
tions accrued to foreign technology and (local) innovation, this is yet an open
question relating to the causes of the observed disparity in growth and levels of
income across countries.3 Below, we refer to these two sources of productivity
simply as adoption (of foreign technology) and (local) innovation.
We present below a workable version of the theoretical model developed in
the previous chapter. In the model of this chapter, each country’s growth and
catching-up performance hinges on the interplay between adoption and innova-
tion. Then, we formulate a set of hypotheses upon the long-run relationships
between productivity, the interaction of foreign technology and local innova-
tion, and government coordination. We test our hypotheses by means of well
established cointegration techniques.
A key feature of our analysis is the distinction between countries that over
long periods of time have succeeded to catch-up and countries that have not.
More specifically, we distinguish between countries at the frontier of technology
(FRCs), successful cases of catching-up (CUCs), countries in stagnation (STCs),
and countries that have kept lagging further and further behind (LGCs). This
classification is based on the dynamics of each country’s income per capita
relative to the average of the FRCs.4
The variables that we deem relevant to capture the effects of interests are
drawn from the innovation literature and the received theory of economic growth.
We use the conventional index of multifactor productivity, MFP; an index of
foreign technology that is based on R&D expenditures in FRCs countries;5 and
an index of innovation capacity that is based on the share of labor in cognitive
non-routine activities.6 To measure government coordination we use an index
that is a simple average of labor productivity, financial development, human
capital and governance, each of these components is in turn made up of other
sub-indicators—as explained below.
2One of the key claims in the growth literature is that technology differences, measured
as a residual, account for up to 90% or more of growth differences across countries, and more
than 90% of the gap in income levels (e.g., Easterly and Levine 2001). Some contributions
(i.e., Keller 2004), state that diffusion accounts for the lion’s share of domestic improvements
in MFP—asserted to be more than 90% in many cases. The preeminence of technology is not
safely established though: while some authors hold the technology view, others hold that capi-
tal accumulation is the subject of interest, e.g., Jorgenson et al., 1987, Jorgenson and Vu 2005,
2010. And even among the former, lots of controversy arises on the proper concept/aspect of
technology to focus on (see Bernard and Jones 1996a and 1996b for discussions).
3Previous contributions on the foreign/domestic sources of technology include Amable
1993, Coe and Helpman 1995, Verspagen 1997, and Keller 2002, 2004, among others.
4Our basic sample consists of 133 countries. The number of countries in the econometric
analysis is determined by data availability, as explained below. One purpose for future research
is the expansion and refinement of the database we have initiated in this regard.
5This is the same strategy used earlier by Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe, Helpman and
Hoffmaister 1995, Keller 2002.
6According to recent advances in the labor-segmentation literature, workers in this category
are characterized by mental rather than manual/physical skills, and are employed on tasks
that require problem-solving rather than following well-defined instructions/procedures, thus
they are most probably involved with the innovative aspect of production, for example, Autor,
Levy, and Murnane 2003, and Autor and Dorn 2013.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, we elab-
orate on the model and theoretical justifications that motivate the hypotheses
to be tested in a later section. In Section 5.3, we discuss the criteria for the
classification of countries in the groups mentioned earlier; and we explain also
the measurement, computation and assumptions made for the different vari-
ables entering the model. In Section 5.4, we discuss the econometric framework
underlying the analysis. In Section 5.5, we conduct the cointegration analy-
sis, fit the vector error correction models and explain the estimated results for
each country in the CUCs classification; we also present and discuss the average
results for every country classification. Finally, Section 5.6 provides the usual
concluding remarks.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
As we have argued in earlier chapters, mainstream economics, on one side,
and the evolutionary and NIS frameworks, on the other, command different
perspectives on the aspects of technology that matter to explain long-run growth
and catching-up. Let us recap on some key aspects of the dissent that result
purposeful for the objectives in this chapter.
In the mainstream’s perspective growth and catching-up hinge more or less
automatically on technology diffusion: a setting where backward countries thrive
through the mechanical application of technologies produced at the frontier.7
Although this view builds on earlier contributions that became widespread under
the notion of advantage of backwardness,8 they generally rely on more limited
intervention by the State in the economy.9
The models of distance to the frontier pertain to the latter type.10 The key
to this approach is that adoption and innovation follow sequential stages: at
low development levels countries rely heavily on the adoption of technologies
developed at the frontier; and, at high development levels, innovation becomes
the fundamental engine of growth. The benefits of being backward are realized
whenever the right conditions hold, namely, market institutions are in place and
market transactions are conducted with limited intervention by the government.
Further models attempting to provide explanations about the difference in
achievements between countries at the frontier and backward countries that do
not rely on explicit forms of government intervention relate to the so-called issue
of appropriate technology.11 The line of reasoning is that the adoption of new
7De Long and Summers 1991, Romer 1993, Lee 1995, Mankiw et al., 1995, Keller 2002,
Caselli and Wilson 2004, Caselli 2005, Acemoglu et al., 2006, Caselli and Coleman 2006,
Comin and Hobijn 2010.
8Gerschenkron 1962.
9Gerschenkron’s argument of advantage of backwardness was exactly the opposite of “lim-
ited” State intervention, namely that although “backwardness” provided opportunities, exten-
sive government intervention is necessary to escape it. The author acknowledges J. Fagerberg
for helpful suggestions that made this point clear.
10Acemoglu et al., 2006, Zilibotti 2008.
11Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969, Acemoglu 2014.
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technologies is specific to particular production techniques so that investors in
backward countries would only learn and bring in technologies that are closely
related with the factors’ endowment of the economy and their own produc-
tion activities.12 A similar perspective, namely an upgrading of a country’s
technological background that does not rely on explicit forms of government
intervention, can be found in recent approaches to this research that concen-
trate on the complexity of the type of products a country is able to produce
which, in turn, determines its growth and development possibilities.13 The fact
that remains here is that countries benefit more or less automatically from the
adoption of inventions that reduce the cost and/or increase the efficient scale of
production.
Noteworthy, in contrast to the above literature, an explicit focus on the role
of government to impact the technology background, hence the development
possibilities of backward countries, is found in the case where policy interven-
tion is deemed necessary to conduct the indigenous construction of absorptive
capacities, e.g., infrastructure, institutions, human and social capital.14 In this
approach, the debate that remains is whether intervention creates more havoc
than opportunity given the probability of “market failures” to be replaced by
“government failures”.
Evolutionary economics and the NIS framework are closer in spirit to the
latter view. But they set a different view of technology and the role of govern-
ment. In the first place, evolutionay economists emphasize on issues of learn-
ing and assimilation over, but not instead of, technology transfer; secondly,
it relies on a broad view of innovation, which we have suggested amount to
distinguish between high-tech and low-tech dimensions of technology.15 Thus,
even though evolutionary economists do not deny the importance of technology
diffusion/adoption, they are more likely to stress the importance of indigenous
innovation as an engine of growth.16 From this perspective, the most salient
feature of innovation is the ability to produce “something new” that has a com-
mercial value (as there are buyers willing to pay for it).17
The NIS literature, on the other hand, associates the success of innovation
with the ability of countries to thread the whole system of innovation at the
country-wide level.18 The argument is that the relationships and interactions
between innovations generated in different parts of the economic system involve,
12Basu and Weil 1998, Basu and Fernald 2002.
13Hidalgo et al., 2007, Hausmann et al., 2011
14Nelson and Phelps 1966, Abramovitz 1986, Hall and Jones 1999, Lin, Monga et al., 2011.
15Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Nelson 2008, Fagerberg, Srholec, and Verspagen 2010. The
contrast is raised between high-tech innovation—aimed at pushing forward the technology
frontier—and low-tech innovations, which even if negligible in terms of fostering changes at
the world frontier, still may involve new products and processes enhancing growth in any
type of businesses and in multiple areas of activity, namely, management, design, logistics,
distribution, and marketing.
16Fagerberg 2003, Nelson 2008.
17Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Fagerberg et al., 2010. Noticeably, this view is supported
by development in the business literature, see Gatignon et al., 2015.
18Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993, Lundvall 1992, 1993, 2007, Fagerberg 2003, Soete et al., 2010,
Lee and Malerba 2018.
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to a large extent, non-price relationships, and commands active government in-
tervention beyond the fixing of market failures.19 In addition, this perspective
holds that rather than through cost reductions (low wages) or economies of
scale, the most important competitive advantage of countries over the long-run
is their innovation capacity.20
Let us formalize the differences between the mainstream and the evolutionary
and NIS approaches in the context of the relationship between a country’s tech-
nology and its ability to grow and catch-up. To this end, consider a framework
where differences in levels of (per capita) income across countries are propor-
tional to the ratio between (local) innovation, Z, and (the adoption of) foreign
technology, A¯.
Y ∗/Y¯ ∗ ≈ Z/A¯ (5.1)
Let ω > 1 be the factor by which innovation depends on past innovations:
Zt = ωZt−1. Thus, the current state of innovation that is associated with
technology adoption and past innovativeness at the local level is given by21
Zt = aωZt−1 + b(A¯− Zt−1) + cZt−1(A¯− Zt−1)
where a, b, and c are parameters that, respectively, denote the weights of past
innovations, the adoption of frontier technology, and the interaction between
both of them. Subtracting Zt−1 on both sides and dividing throughout by Zt−1
we find, after some algebra, an expression that relates the rate of growth of the
economy, (g∗t ), with the rate of growth of innovation,
g∗t =
Zt − Zt−1
Zt−1
= (aω − 1) + b(Ft − 1) + cZt−1(Ft − 1)
where Ft = A¯/Zt−1 captures the conventional notion of distance to the fron-
tier.22 Notice that the farther a country falls behind (the smaller Zt−1 is with
respect to A¯) the larger the value of F . In this case, the major source of growth
is through adoption. Conversely, when Zt = A¯, the adoption effect fades away
and the only source of growth is innovation.
This equation encapsulates the three distinct sources of technology progress
and economic growth introduced earlier: if backward countries benefit mostly
from adoption, the parameter b should be large (relative to the other two pa-
rameters) and more so the further a country lags behind; if the economic perfor-
mance depends mostly on the interaction between (local) innovation and foreign
19A fundamental tenet of the NIS approach is that innovation is, overall, a process of
interactive learning across the distinct parts of the system. Interactive learning defines a
process where the distinct parts of the innovation system communicate and even cooperate
in the creation and utilization of new economically useful knowledge. This entails interaction
between firms, firms and university labs, and firms and government labs, for example, and
between the parts of the local system with foreign system (Nelson et al., 2018).
20Lundvall 2007.
21See Acemoglu et al., 2006 for a similar approach. The inclusion of the last term in our
approach emphasizes the view that local innovations occur through the interaction between
local “creativeness” and foreign technology.
22Acemoglu et al., 2006, Aghion and Howitt 2006.
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technology, the parameter c should be larger instead; finally, the parameter a
is of major relevance only for countries that have already reached the frontier.
The econometric assessment of these sources of technology and growth is our
first aim in this paper.
Let us now assume that the contextual conditions needed to promote busi-
ness innovation are summarized in a function θ(h) as follows
g∗t = θ(h) [(aω − 1) + b(Ft − 1) + cZt−1(Ft − 1)]
Our second aim is to empirically evaluate whether, and to what extent, public
actions aimed to coordinate these contextual conditions in θ(h) are important
to promote innovation and, hence, economic growth and catching-up.
Mainstream economics characterizes the set of conditions in θ(h) as pure
market conditions and market conforming policies. Under this framework it is
generally meant that the intervention of government in the economy should be
limited to compensate for economic inefficiencies accrued to market distortions,
or doing things for which markets are not good enough. For example, to create
macroeconomic stability, distributional equity and sustainability, and to correct
for resource misallocation due to misleading price signals, externalities, and
information asymmetries. The construction of absorption capabilities is consid-
ered to be important, but to a lesser extent than in the alternative literature we
will discuss shortly. Basically, in the mainstream, those capabilities are related
to human capital and free market institutions: property rights, international
economic integration, financial development.23
In contrast, under the NIS approach, contextual conditions relate to a more
complex institutional/policy framework. In Chapter 3, we have identified—on
the basis of specialized literature—three key roles of the government in this re-
gard, namely sponsorship, leadership, and coordination.24 A serious setback for
the empirical assessment of these three aspects, however, is that they involve
elements that are either poorly or not systematically measured, if at all, and
more so in countries off the frontier. For instance, records of public expendi-
tures on R&D conducted in government labs, which relates to our definition
of leadership; and records of direct/indirect financing of business R&D with
public sources or other government schemes of finance to boost business innova-
tion, which relates to our definition of sponsorship, are generally unavailable or
reported un-systematically for most of the developing countries in our database.
Likewise, a strong version of government coordination would need to account
with indicators of the active government intervention that figures prominently
in the discussion in the specialized literature.25 Alternatively, one would need to
account for some metrics upon the coordination of economic decisions between
23Barro 1997, Rodrik 2005, 2006, Lucas 2009, Spence 2011, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Stokey
2012.
24Nelson 1993, Freeman 1995, Lundvall 2007, Soete et al., 2010, Lee and Malerba 2018,
among others.
25Breznitz 2007, Mazzucato 2013, Mazzucato and Penna 2015, Breznitz, Ornston and Sam-
ford 2018.
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government and firms as has been documented in empirical literature (e.g., the
deliberation councils between government and the business sector in Japan,
Korea, Taiwan and other Asian countries).26
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, none of the desirable indica-
tors of coordination that we have mentioned exists. Therefore, to measure the
coordination aspect we need to rely on more conventional indicators that are
normally counted elsewhere in the literature as “absorptive capacities”, namely
macroeconomic stability, financial stability, provision of human capital, infras-
tructure, governance which, in general terms, allow us to capture the ability of
government to enforce a regulatory framework favorable to private-sector eco-
nomic activities. This, however, means that our approach below relies on just a
mild version of the government coordination aspects that are emphasized in the
NIS approach. A clear implication is that our test of coordination cannot be
neatly distinguished from the analysis of the impact of absorptive capacities/
technological capabilities elsewhere in the literature.27
Summing up, our goal below is to evaluate the following three hypotheses:
i) that there is a structural long-run relationship between foreign technology
and productivity; ii) that there is a structural long-run relationship between
the interaction of foreign technology with (local) innovation and productivity;
and iii) that there is a structural long-run relationship between (government)
coordination and productivity. Moreover, we predict that the structural associ-
ations of interest are more meaningful for the countries at the frontier (FRCs)
and countries that have succeeded to catching-up (CUCs) than for countries
that remain stagnant (STCs) and laggard countries (LGCs).
5.3 The Data
Cross-Country Classifications
Our classification relies on the sample of 133 countries introduced earlier in
Chapter 2. Thus, there are 24 high-income countries that make up the frontier of
technology and income (FRCs), 27 countries deemed successful cases of catching-
up (CUCs), 24 countries deemed in stagnation (STCs), and 58 countries deemed
as laggard (LGCs). This classifications rely on whether the relative differences
in income per-capita of each group with the FRCs has reduced, remained the
same, or increased over time.28
26Page 1994, Wade 1996, 2009.
27The author gratefully acknowledges this point to insightful comments by J. Fagerberg.
Clearly, the construction of a more appropriate dataset to take into account the distinct
aspects of coordination, alongside the issues of sponsorship and leadership that are mentioned
in the text, is a huge endeavor beyond the ambitions of this thesis. Therefore, we let the
construction of a consistent database as an issue for future research.
28Recall that the data is obtained from the PWT V.8. It includes 167 countries. 10 countries
are excluded as they had a relative income per capita larger than 75% of the frontier at the
outset (these are rich oil-producing and other high-income countries). The frontier is made of
the OECD countries that became members before 1990. We use the rgdpna variable, which
reports real GDP at constant 2005 national prices (in millions of 2005 US$). 10-year averages
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Income per-capita is calculated as 10-year averages—provided sufficient avail-
able information. Thus, for countries with full data availability, there are six
decades with information between the 1950s (1950–1959), and the 2000s (2000–
2009); the six decades are 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.29 By
relative income we mean the ratio between each country’s 10-year average and
the corresponding 10-year average of countries at the frontier, which is itself an
average (of the 10-year averages) across FRCs countries.
The classification of countries as CUCs, STCs, or LGCs is based on the
ratio of the relative income between the last and first decades. For instance, the
relative income of Brazil in the 1950s was 21.6% (of the average at the frontier),
and increased to 22.6% in the 2000s. The ratio between the latter and former
numbers yields 22.6%/21.6% ∼= 1.0, which means that no meaningful change
occurred in the relative position of Brazil vis− a`− vis the FRCs countries. By
contrast, the same ratio calculated for Taiwan yields 4.2, for Thailand (2.8),
Costa Rica (0.78), and Djibouti (0.23). Thus, we set the following ad hoc 0.75-
1.25 threshold: CUCs are determined as countries where the aforementioned
ratio is larger than 1.25; LGCs are countries where the ratio is smaller than
0.75; and STCs are countries falling in between the cases 0.75 ≤ STCs ≤ 1.25.30
As we pointed out earlier, the number of countries in the cointegration anal-
ysis below depends on data availability for other variables in the system (foreign
technology, innovation and coordination). After matching the data for each of
these variables, our econometrics relies on a sample of 62 countries (23 FRCs,
12 CUCs, 13 STCs and 14 LGCs) spanning over a 30-year period between 1980–
2010.
Productivity
We obtain measures of MFP for each country using conventional growth ac-
counting. Consider the standard production function (measured in per-worker
terms), Y = AKα, where Y and K are output and capital per-worker, α=1/3 is
the share of capital in total income, and A is the conventional productivity term.
Using lowercase to denote the loglinear transform and expressing the equation
in growth rates yields ∆y/y − α∆k/k = ∆a/a.31
are calculated in all cases (as long as a country has information at least over 8 years). A
detailed account of the classification and relative levels of income is provided in Appendix
Tables 2A.1-2A.4 (Chapter 2).
29Some countries do not have enough observations back to the 1950s. In fact, in the six
decades between the 1950s and 2000s, there are only 35 countries with information. Another
group of 46 countries have data only for five decades (between 1960s–2000s), and 28 countries
only for four decades (between 1970–2000).
30Of course, changes in this ad hoc threshold lead to changes in the classification, though it
is dubious that doing so within reasonable boundaries will bring substantial alteration in the
main conclusions to be reached throughout.
31The data is obtained from PWT V.8. (rgdpna and comparisons to rtfpna)
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Foreign technology
We use as indicator of foreign technology the expenditures on R&D carried
out by FRCs.32 The standard practice—after Coe and Helpman 1995—consists
in calculating import weighted foreign R&D capital stocks according to the
following rule33
wrdi,t = wrdi,t−1(1− δ) +
∑
j
ωi,j,terdj,t (5.2)
In particular, for country “i”, the import weighted foreign R&D capital stock
that is locally available at time “t”, wrdi, is equal to the stock that was available
at time t-1 net of depreciation, plus a weighted sum of the current expenditures
on R&D in countries at the frontier “erdj”. The weights are given by the
bilateral share of imports between country “i” and country “j”, (ωi,j).
The rationale for this methodology is that there are spillovers in the process
of international technology diffusion and trade is an important channel of dif-
fusion. Backward countries benefit from R&D expenditures at the frontier to
the extent that the research outcomes end up embodied in the goods imported
from those countries (machines and equipment, intermediate goods).34
Clearly, international trade is not the only channel of technology diffusion,
researchers (or even producers) in backward countries may benefit from research
conducted in advanced countries that gives them the possibility to know from
new technology and ideas without incurring further opportunity costs; they may
benefit of direct contact with original inventors through seminars and confer-
ences or as the knowledge on those ideas and technologies becomes available
in libraries and the internet; finally, foreign direct investment and licensing are
other important sources of international technology spillovers frequently studied
in the literature.
Noticeably, whereas the latter forms involve the need for incentives, i.e.,
in order to attract foreign investment, and market transaction (patents, copy-
rights), the former forms of diffusion, namely through international trade, are
relatively “automatic”, i.e., they take the form of pure technology spillovers.
Certainly, the relative importance of each channel is an empirical question, but
as Keller points out in its extensive investigation: “many economist believe,
though, that most international technology diffusion occurs not through market
transactions but instead through technology (spillovers)”.35
32Coe and Hepman 1995, Keller 2004.
33Equation (5.2) resembles the capital accumulation equation, Kt = Kt−1(1− δ) + I, with
stock K=wrd and investments flows I=
∑
j ωi,jerdj . Here, the initial stock is calculated as
wrdi,0 =
∑
j ωi,j,terdj,t/(g + δ) where g is the average of early growth rates of the R&D
stocks at the frontier (theoretically, g needs to be calculated from early growth rates up to
the initial period, yet in practice data availability prevents that kind of calculation and g is
replaced with the average growth rate through the period of study). See the appendix in Coe
and Hepman 1995.
34Coe and Hepman 1995, Keller 2004.
35Keller 2004, pp 758 ff.
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Coe and Helpman (1995) show that—for a group of OECD countries—there
is a sound relationship between the long-run productivity growth of backward
countries and foreign R&D expenditures. They point out that higher bilateral
import shares allow for larger technology transfers from the frontier. In their
analysis this relationship holds and is both economically and statistically sig-
nificant. Keller (2002), on the other hand, suggests that unweighted foreign
R&D capital stocks—hence constructed without using the share of imports—
yield similar results as those originally obtained by Coe and Helpman (1995).
The unweighted version of Equation (5.2) is
rdi,t = rdi,t−1(1− δ) +
∑
j
erdj,t (5.3)
Based on the above findings by Coe and Helpman (1995) and Keller (2002),
both the weighted and unweighted versions of foreign R&D capital stocks seem
relevant channels of diffusion of technology from the frontier. We, therefore,
use both these approaches in our analysis. In particular, we introduce the
unweighted version as a weakly exogenous variable in the cointegration analysis
below, and we use the weighted version to construct the following interaction
term between foreign technology and local innovations (z) for each country.
zrdi,t = wrdi,t × zi,t (5.4)
This treatment of variables is in fact appropriate, namely, the weighted version
of foreign technology, used to construct the interaction term, is based on the
assumption that countries in the receiving end profit on the technology that is
embodied in imported goods used as inputs/factors in the production of local
innovation. By construction, the unweighted version of foreign technology is a
different variable. It builds on the assumption that backward countries benefit
from research conducted in advanced countries by other than the trade channel,
e.g., knowing from new technology and ideas without incurring further oppor-
tunity costs (direct contact, seminars, conferences, the internet). Noticeably,
in our econometric analysis the use of the weighted version to construct the
interaction term through Equation (5.4) and then the unweighted version as
a further exogenous variable is an appropriate treatment to address eventual
collinearity problems.
To construct the foreign R&D capital stocks, we first calculate annual R&D
expenditures for each country in the FRCs classification. To this end, we use
the share of expenditures on R&D (as % of GDP) and total GDP values. The
annual R&D expenditures calculated in this manner are then used to calcu-
late the stocks indicated by Equations (5.2) and (5.3).36 The bilateral import
shares are obtained from the IMF historical statistics on trade—this informa-
tion is available for the period 1981-2010.37,38
36See https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm. FRCs’ GDP figures
are obtained from PWT V.8, as noted earlier in the text.
37IMF, Database, Direction of Trade Statistics.
38In the construction of our indicators we are constrained by data availability/quality for
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Local innovation
A country’s potential for local innovation (z) is captured by the share of
workers employed in cognitive non-routine activities (h). We generate an index
of innovation for each country i and year t in the following manner
zi,t = Ib
(
hi,t
Li,t
)
where L denotes the total workforce, and Ib denotes that innovation is itself an
index with base year b. This index of innovation is inspired by two recent de-
velopments in the literature. First, research findings on the determinants of job
segmentation that point to a process of transition/polarization in the job market
toward innovation related activities.39 In particular, machine automation and
digital technology lead to the shrinkage of routine occupations—those that are
performed by following a pre-established, well-defined set of instructions—and
to the increase of non-routine occupations—those involving decision-making,
problem-solving, and human interaction skills.40
The second development that justifies our argument points to findings that
lots of the innovations that spur economic growth—even in developed countries—
are generated by specialized workers in operative processes rather than through
R&D activities.41 That is, while innovation is conventionally assumed to be a
product of “high-tech” sectors (nanotechnology, biotechnology, ICT, machines
and equipment) where specialized R&D workers are endeavored to develop new
breakthroughs, in practice lots of innovations occur in “low-tech” sectors (food
production, metal products, paper and printing) and are often initiated by the
staff responsible for ongoing functions: managers, engineers, technicians, master
craftsmen, and other qualified workers; or by specialized departments (manage-
ment and quality control). Of course, low-tech innovations refer to more simple
developments (e.g., organizational and marketing innovation, logistics innova-
tions, new products design and development, new business models) which how-
ever are able to boost productivity.
Our contention that the share of workers in cognitive non-routine activities is
suitable to capture the notion of innovation drawn from the NIS literature seems
well justified. Notably, measuring innovation in this manner could improve ear-
lier attempts to understand whether and how local innovativeness contributes
to a country’s productivity performance. For instance, whereas the focus of
some years. To get a database that is consistent we rely on data with no more than five blanks
between years with information. Missing data between years are interpolated arithmetically.
See Tables 5A.2, 5A.3 and 5B.2 for details on data availability constraints.
39Autor Levy and Murnane 2003 and Autor and Dorn 2013.
40In fact, the literature on job segmentation has established four classifications to distinguish
between working occupations characterized by mental and physical activities: i) cognitive non-
routine, ii) cognitive routine iii) manual non-routine, and iv) manual routine. The first of
these classifications is deemed to capture the extent to which occupations are characterized
by mental rather than manual/physical skills, and the extent to which workers are employed
on tasks that require problem-solving capacities rather than following a well-defined set of
instructions/procedures (Autor Levy and Murnane 2003, Levy and Murnane 2007).
41Herstatt and von Hippel 1992, Hirsch-Kreinsen 2008, Som and Kirner 2016.
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analysis in many empirical studies is on educational attainment, which mea-
sures, at best, the potential capabilities of a country’s workforce,42 our index
of innovation focuses on what those capabilities are actually used for in prac-
tice. Moreover, our index allows for a realistic split of worker occupations into
adoption and innovation activities as long as the focus on the types of tasks
workers are actually devoted to, allows an educated guess of how those workers
do interact with technology.43
While we are aware of alternative indicators that have been built to measure
the economic contributions of technology,44 we do not see that they match our
purposes: firstly, because the focus of those indicators is on general aspects of
technology, technological capabilities, or absorptive capacities, which makes it
hard to decouple the contributions of adoption from those of innovation;45 sec-
ondly, because those alternative indicators are generally available for a smaller
number of countries or a shorter period of time than is the case with our in-
dex of innovation, e.g., the Global Innovation Index (GII)—now 12 years long
but only 4 years (from 2007 to 2010) compatible with other indicators in our
sample—makes it unsuitable for the scope of our analysis in this thesis.46
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first contribution to use occupational
working categories to trace a relationship with the ability of countries to undergo
adoption and innovation activities, and to do so for a relatively large sample,
including developing countries. Previous failure to do this may be due to the
fact that the corresponding theoretical background is relatively recent and the
required statistical information too sparse.
To operationalize the index of innovation, we draw the cognitive non-routine
share of workers for countries for the period 1980–2010 using information from
the International Labor Organization. This source provides information on em-
ployment based on the ISCO and correspondence tables.47 We include within
the cognitive non-routine category three major groups: i) legislators, senior
42Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister 1997, Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir 2006, Madsen
et al., 2010, Messinis and Ahmed 2013, and Islam et al., 2014.
43Levy and Murnane 2007.
44for instance Archibugi, Denni and Filippetti 2009.
45The innovation surveys conducted in many countries capture well the kind of innovation
activities we are concerned with. Unfortunately, those surveys are not yet well established in
countries off the frontier in the classification standards for the countries in this thesis. See,
for instance, Mairesse and Mohnen 2010, ECLAC 2011.
46Archibuggi et al., 2009. Some of the most important indicators on technology and inno-
vation that are available are: the Summary Innovation Index (34 countries, since 2000); the
Global Summary Innovation Index (25 countries, since 2006); the Technology Index produced
by the World Economic Forum (TI-WEF, 75 countries since 2002 and 125 since 2007); the
Knowledge Index (World Bank, 132 countries, since 2006); the Technological Activity Index
(UNCTAD, available since 1995) and, lastly, the Global Innovation Index (GII) released by
Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO since 2007. The GII index cover 129 and 80 indicators
on innovation inputs and outputs, which makes it highly complete and a source of reference
for future research on this front (The author gratefully acknowledges Carolina Castaldi for
bringing the GII index into this discussion).
47The ISCO classification has gone through four rounds of change, namely, ISCO-58, ISCO-
68, ISCO-88, and ISCO-08. The correspondence tables and statistics are provided on the
International Labor Organization website: http://laborsta.ilo.org
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officials, and managers; ii) professionals; and iii) technicians and associate pro-
fessionals.48
Government coordination
As we have mentioned above, measuring coordination the way it is described
in our theoretical account of the innovation systems literature is a difficult
task.49 The concept involves elusive elements of government goodwill that are
hard to be captured in any single indicator. Therefore, following a similar ap-
proach as the mostly ad hoc practice to develop composite synthetic indicators
of technology,50 we develop an indicator of coordination intended to capture
the most salient features of this concept. In doing so, we indicate the economic
intuition to proxy the different aspects of coordination that we have derived in
the theoretical approach. Also, we use data from commonly used datasets.51
Our mild index of government coordination is a simple average of four com-
ponents: labor productivity, financial development, human capital and gover-
nance. These components are deemed to reflect the ability of government to
offset market failures and increase productivity gains across different manufac-
turing sectors, to ease the allocation of finance to productive activities, to ensure
the connection between education and the production sector, and to enforce a
business-friendly policy environment.
In other words, our coordination index relates industry-specific productivity
achievements with the availability of financial and human capital resources,
and overall government policy practices. Noticeably, the possibility that some
country is high on one aspect and low on another cannot be ruled out. This
is a common weakness in the construction of synthetic indicators and implies
that at least some of the various factors in our index of coordination may be
substitutes rather than complements.52
Each components in the overall index of coordination is made up of other
sub-indicators. Let us start with labor productivity. The NIS framework empha-
sizes on networking and collaboration practices that bring together innovations
48The details with regard construction of this indicator are provided in Appendix 5A at the
end of this chapter.
49See Chapter 3.
50Archibugi et al., 2009.
51There are other technical alternatives to generate composite indicators like the one of
interest here, namely, Exploratory Factor Analysis(EFA), Principal Components Analysis
(PCA) and k-mean clustering (Forgy 1965, Wansbeek and Meijer 2000). The general ap-
proach is to use the correlation and variance structure of the data to derive the information
that is common to the indicator(s) of interest. Some approaches (PCA, k-mean clustering) are
a-theoretical, while others (EFA) are based on a modeling approach prior to the extraction of
information from the source variables (but the researcher still needs to guarantee the model
is correctly specified). As it stands, these different approaches do not excuse the researcher
from the definition and operationalization of the concepts and the construction of the dif-
ferent variables to capture the effects of interest. While interesting, the exploration of those
alternatives are involving and beyond our scope here. Therefore, we leave this possibility as
a subject for future research.
52This, again, is a point that we owe to insightful comments to the author by J. Fagerberg.
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produced in different parts of the system, which presumably allows both low-
tech and high-tech sectors of production to thrive together. To capture the gains
in productivity across economic sectors we generate an overall index of labor
productivity that is a geometric average of the constant-price value added per-
worker in each country i, sector of activity j, and year t: Pijt = V Aijt/Lijt.
53
OLPi,t =
(∏
j Ib(Pi,j,t)
)1/N
; j = 1, 2, ...N
where Ib is again used to denote an index: in this case that means that labor
productivity is itself an index with base year b.
We follow a similar procedure to generate an indicator of financial develop-
ment, which is made up of three distinct elements: domestic credit granted by
the bank sector (public and private) to private sector enterprises (% of GDP),
stock market total value traded (% of GDP) and number of publicly listed
companies on a country’s stock market.54 Formally, the index of financial de-
velopment for each country i is given by
FDi,t = (Ib(BCi,t)× Ib(SMV Ti,t)× Ib(CLSMi,t))1/3
where BC denotes bank credit, SMVT the stock market value traded, and CLSM
the number of companies listed in the stock market.
In turn, we construct an index of human capital as a geometric average of
two elements: the average years of total schooling for the population over the
age of 15 (AS15+), and the government total expenditures on education as a %
of GDP (GEE).55
HCi,t = (Ib(AS15+i,t)× Ib(GEEi,t))1/2
Finally, we measure government policy as the arithmetic average of three com-
ponents: government effectiveness (Geff), regulatory quality (RQ) and rule of
law (RoL).56
GPi,t = (Geffi,t +RQi,t +RoLi,t) /3
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services,
and policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility about the gov-
ernment’s commitment to such policies. Regulatory quality captures perceptions
53The data about labor productivity is drawn from the United Nations Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO-INDSTAT4 ISIC-Rev3). To construct our index, we use measures
of labor productivity for all manufacturing sectors according to the ISIC-Rev3 (excluding re-
cycling activities). Table 5B.1 in the appendix section at the end of this chapter presents
a glimpse of how so-called low- and medium-tech sectors/activities (LMT), and high-tech
sectors/activities (HT) are distributed across industries.
54See Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine 2012. The data for these indicators has
been obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database.
55See Barro and Lee 2013. The data for these calculations has been obtained from the
World Development Indicators.
56The choice of an arithmetic, instead of a geometric mean, in this case is because all the
components in the index range between negative and positive numbers.
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of the ability of the government to formulate and implement policies/regulations
consistent with private sector development. Lastly, rule of law captures the ex-
tent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the law, the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. Each indicator is is reported in units of a stan-
dard normal distribution ranging between -2.5 (poor performance) to 2.5 (high
performance).57
Given these components the government coordination is given by the arith-
metic mean of the four sub-indicators:
GCi,t = (OLPi,t + FDi,t +HCi,t +GPi,t) /4
Figure 5.1 portrays the relationship between countries’ productivity and each
of the stocks of foreign technology (Figure 5.1a), local innovation (Figure 5.1b),
and the interaction between foreign technology and local innovation (Figure
5.1c). Graphical inspection seems to support our claim that the association
between countries’ productivity (measured in the vertical axis) and each of the
other variables is stronger for countries that have successfully managed to catch-
up. That is, in all cases the slope of the CUCs classification is steeper than for
countries deemed in stagnation (STCs), and indeed the slope of countries con-
sidered laggards (LGCs) is flatter in every case. Note that, in all three cases
(Figures 5.1a-5.1c), the lines for FRCs are closer to those of STCs that the
CUCs. This seems consistent with the characterization of stagnant countries:
the productivity levels of STCs are just enough to maintain a tight match with
the FRCs countries, whereas CUCs (LGCs) exhibit higher (lower) levels of pro-
ductivity.
Figure 5.2 portrays the relationship between countries’ innovation (measured
in the vertical axis), and government coordination. Again, we see that the
association between the two variables is stronger (the slope is steeper) for CUCs
than for the other country classifications. The lower levels of coordination in
LGCs cause these countries to group toward the left of the figure. The lower
levels of innovation in these same group is apparent from the flatter slope of the
regression line (relative to other country groups).
5.4 Analytical Framework
There are five variables in our model: xt = (at, zrdt, zt, gct, rdt)
′
, namely the
productivity term (at), the interaction between foreign and local technology
(zrdt), local innovation (zt), government coordination (gct) and foreign R&D
57The data for this indicator is based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators released by
the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). The three indicators used in the
arithmetic average are available from 1996 onward (with blanks in 1997, 1999 and 2001), we
filled in the blanks with the same values of the previous year and assume that back to 1980
the indicator values are the same as those of 1996. Even though this procedure implies little
dynamics over time for the indicator of government policy, it adequately reflects the hindrance
put up by governance constraints on the development outcomes of the countries in our sample.
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Figure 5.1: Productivity vis− a`− vis foreign R&D, innovation and their interaction
in FRCs, CUCs, STCs and LGCs. Relationship between countries’ productivity (a)—
in the vertical axis—and stocks of foreign R&D (rd), innovation (z), and interaction
between foreign technology and local innovation (zrd)—in the horizontal axis. All
variables are index numbers (1981=100) expressed in logarithms. The line segments
show the predictions from linear regressions of “a” on each of the other variables across
countries. In all cases the solid line portrays the prediction for FRCs, the dashed line
the CUCs, the dotted-dashed line the STCs, and the dotted line the LGCs. Each
country is observed yearly between 1981–2010.
(rdt). The cointegration analysis of this system is based on the Johansen ap-
proach as we assume the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors which leads
to the need to impose identifying restrictions in order to estimate the struc-
tural relations among the variables.58 An additional advantage of using this
approach is that it allows to decompose the structural shocks to the variables in
the system into transitory (short-run) and permanent (long-run) effects. Even
though we are mostly concerned with the long-run impact of permanent shocks,
a meaningful cointegration relations requires that both short-run and long-run
parameters are well-signed and statistically significant.
58Johansen 1988, 1995. The Johansen methodology allows for testing the presence of several,
say K-1, cointegration vectors in a set of K I(1) variables. Further, this approach allows for
a complete specification of the long-run and short-run dynamics, and for testing relevant
restrictions on the cointegrating space aimed to the identification of structural relationships
between the variables in the system.
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Figure 5.2: Innovation vis − a` − vis government coordination in
FRCS, CUCs, STCs and LGCs. Relationship between countries’ in-
novation (z in the vertical axis), and government coordination (gc
in the horizontal axis). All variables are index numbers (1981=100)
expressed in logarithms. The line segments show the predictions from
linear regressions of “z” on “gc” across countries. In all cases, the
solid line portrays FRCs, the dashed line the CUCs, the dotted-dashed
line the STCs, and the dotted line the LGCs. Each country is observed
yearly between 1981–2010.
We test the unit-root properties for each individual time-series country per
country, and examine the cointegration properties of the five variables system
for each of the 62 countries in the sample. To report the empirical results
we present an extended discussion for the individual countries in the CUCs
classification and the average results for each of the FRCs, CUCS, STCs, and
LGCs classifications.59
The vector error correction model (VEC) is defined by the following equation
∆xt = γ + τt+ α[βxt−1 + µ+ ρt] +
p−1∑
j=1
Γj∆xt−j + t (5.5)
where xt is a K×1 vector that includes the five variables in our system (K
59As we deal with a large number of countries, an alternative analytical approach is panel
data cointegration (for a review, see Baltagi 2014). Clearly the cointegration test on a single
time series is different from the test on panel data. But panel data cointegration tests that
are based on the average of the test computed for each individual are indeed comparable
at the country level. The problem is that the panel data approach does not allow to test
for more than one cointegration vector among the variables in the system, does not allow
to impose identifying restrictions and produces estimates that are very different from the
estimates based on the Johansen technique, e.g., the inference of cointegration found with the
Johansen approach is not always confirmed—as expected—by the cointegration test on the
time series of the same country in the panel data approach.
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denotes the number of variables), γt and τ are each K×1 vectors of parameters
(short-run constants and time trends); t is a linear time trend; α and β are K×r
vectors of parameters (β is called the cointegrating vector and α the short-run
adjustment coefficient sometimes also called a loading-vector), µ and ρ are each
K×r vectors of parameters (long-run constants and time trends); and Γj ...Γp−1
are K×K vectors of parameters. In our analysis below, we consider in all cases
a restricted trend in the cointegration relation, and a constant in the short and
long-run relations. Thus, we assume τ=0.
To determine the number of cointegration relationships we report the results
of the trace test.60 Among K variables which are unit roots there are at most
K-1 cointegrating vectors. The trace test is used to determine how many r ≤
(K – 1) distinct eigenvalues (λ) exist that are significant, and hence how many
cointegrating relationships are in the system. The test proceeds by testing the
following set of null hypotheses61
H0 : r = 0, H0 : r = 1, ..., H0 : r = K − 1
The trace statistics is given by
λtrace = −T
K∑
i=r+1
ln(1− λˆi)
where T is the number of observations and λˆi denotes the i-th estimated eigen-
value. For any given value of r, large values of the trace statistic are evidence
against the null hypothesis that there are r or fewer cointegrating relations in
the system.
In setting up the cointegration rank we checked also themaximum–eigenvalue
statistics (MES) and information criteria: namely Schwarz Bayesian information
criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC).62
We also checked that the rank condition is consistent with stable processes.
This property implies that if the rank condition is adequately chosen it should
lead to no more that K-r unit moduli if the system is to be stable. For reasons
of space, below we report only the results of the trace statistics.
5.5 Results
As it was anticipated in the previous section, we run our econometrics country-
per-country for each of the FRCs, CUCs, STCs, and LGCs classifications. Yet,
60Johansen 1994, 1995.
61For example, if K=2 and H0: r=0 cannot be rejected a model in first differences is
considered. Otherwise, H0: r=1 is tested and a cointegrating rank of 1 is considered if the
null cannot be rejected. If H0: r=1 is rejected, H0: r=K and a model in levels (a stationary
VAR) is considered (Lutkepohl 2005, pp. 328–330).
62Under the null hypothesis the MES assumes a given r against the alternative that there
are r + 1 cointegrating equations. In turn, choosing the number of cointegration equations
that minimizes the SBIC and HQIC provides a consistent estimation in this regard.
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to conserve space, below we report and discuss in detail the results for the CUCs
and the average of the main results for this and every other classification. The
analysis of the dynamic multipliers is also presented for each classification of
countries.
CUCs
To carry out the unit root test we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller test
(ADF) modified by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock 1996.63 We also use the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS), which in contrast to the ADF
test is used to test the null hypothesis of stationarity.
Table 5.1 shows that under the ADF test in levels the null hypothesis is not
rejected. However, for the first differenced variables the test is not rejected in
some cases either, which reduces the statistical support to conclude that some
variables are I(1) processes, namely productivity (a) in Cyprus, Egypt, Hong
Kong and Korea; innovation (z) in China, Egypt, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel,
Korea, Singapore and Thailand; and government coordination (gc) in China,
Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore. Under the KPSS test, the null hypothesis
that the variables are stationary in levels is rejected in all cases with higher
levels of confidence than for the first differenced series. Therefore, in all these
cases we render the series I(1).64
Testing for the cointegrating rank and the parameters of the VEC models
requires some care in choosing the appropriate lag structure. Our analysis
below seems too restrictive in this regard as with 5 I(1) series and 30-yearly
observations per country, the system allows just for a limited analysis of the
lagged effects before running out of degrees of freedom.65 This data limitation
is not easy to address which prevent us from using a larger sample. Therefore we
conduct our analysis below allowing for at most 3 lags and using conventional
information criteria and stability conditions to determine the proper lag order
63The modified ADF test is based on a transformation of the original time series using
generalized least squares (GLS) methods which improve the asymptotic power of the stan-
dard test in the presence of nuisance parameters affecting the deterministic and unobserved
components, and the distribution properties of the data (Elliott et al., 1996).
64We find out that many variables generally show increasing trends, which are dealt with by
including a trend at the levels of the series. But there might be still cases of structural breaks:
sudden shifts and cases where the series tend to oscillate or stagnate over time. Perron 1989
and Zivot and Andrews 1992 provide insights in this regard. Note, however, that the large
number of countries we are dealing with prevents us from a close inspection on specific cases.
65For instance, with a lag length of 2 there are 28 usable observations in the system. With
r=3 and K=5, there are nsr=9 parameters to be estimated per equation in the differenced
part, namely 3 adjustment coefficients, 5 lags (1 lag less than in the corresponding VAR) and
a constant. In turn, in the long-run cointegration vectors there are nlr=3 parameters to be
estimated per equation, namely 2 parameter coefficients plus a trend (the constant term is
not directly estimated). Taking the short and long run together, the number of parameters
per equation is calculated as
nparms =
(nsr + nlr)K − r2
K
≈ 10
which clearly is high for 28 observations (it leaves 28-10=18 degrees of freedom).
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ADF test KPSS test
Group Country Variable Levels Differences Levels Differences
All/1 rd 0.595 (6) 0.391 (5) 0.149** (8) 0.405* (8)
CUCs China a -2.29 (1) -3.72*** (1) 0.15** (8) 0.17 (8)
z -1.85 (1) -1.38 (1) 0.12* (8) 0.26 (8)
zrd -2.47 (1) -0.38 (1) 0.14* (8) 0.33 (8)
gc -0.82 (1) -0.01 (2) 0.39*** (1) 0.44* (8)
Cyprus a -0.48 (1) -0.23 (4) 0.15** (8) 0.42* (8)
z -2.27 (1) -3.75*** (1) 0.12 (1) 0.15 (8)
zrd -1.26 (1) 1.48 (1) 0.16** (8) 0.42* (8)
gc -2.02 (1) -2.43* (1) 0.10 (8) 0.12 (8)
Egypt a -0.90 (1) -0.15 (7) 0.15** (7) 0.42* (7)
z -1.56 (1) -1.21 (3) 0.19** (1) 0.19 (1)
zrd -1.20 (1) 1.19 (1) 0.16** (8) 0.43* (8)
gc -2.88 (1) -2.56** (2) 0.13* (8) 0.14 (8)
Hong Kong a -1.58 (1) -1.86 (2) 0.20** (1) 0.13 (1)
z -1.49 (1) -1.99 (1) 0.20** (1) 0.25 (1)
zrd 0.18 (8) 1.45 (1) 0.15** (8) 0.41* (8)
gc -0.77 (1) -1.58 (1) 0.38*** (1) 0.67** (1)
Indonesia a -2.18 (1) -2.14* (1) 0.12* (1) 0.12 (8)
z -2.31 (1) -1.02 (1) 0.16** (1) 0.39* (1)
zrd -0.36 (8) 1.39 (1) 0.15** (8) 0.42* (8)
gc -1.84 (1) -2.71*** (1) 0.14* (1) 0.13 (8)
Malaysia a -2.37 (1) -2.77*** (1) 0.08 (1) 0.08 (1)
z -2.12 (1) -3.34*** (1) 0.16** (1) 0.14 (8)
zrd -2.39 (1) 1.81 (1) 0.33*** (1) 0.43* (8)
gc -1.36 (1) -2.62** (1) 0.32*** (1) 0.13 (8)
Malta a -0.52 (1) -2.19* (3) 0.32*** (1) 0.24 (3)
z -1.57 (1) -2.83*** (1) 0.17** (1) 0.27 (8)
zrd -1.35 (1) 0.52 (1) 0.15** (8) 0.40* (8)
gc -1.15 (3) -3.12*** (1) 0.14* (1) 0.10 (3)
Israel a -0.98 (4) -4.03*** (1) 0.14** (8) 0.25 (8)
z -1.82 (1) -2.15 (1) 0.14* (1) 0.10 (1)
zrd -0.83 (2) 0.56 (1) 0.16** (8) 0.45* (8)
gc -1.91 (1) -2.52* (1) 0.18** (0) 0.13 (1)
Korea a -1.05 (2) -0.06 (6) 0.15** (8) 0.36* (8)
z -1.00 (1) -2.01 (2) 0.13* (8) 0.26 (8)
zrd -0.66 (2) 0.15 (2) 0.15** (8) 0.46* (8)
gc -1.50 (2) -1.94 (1) 0.22*** (1) 0.26 (1)
Singapore a -2.32 (1) -3.39*** (1) 0.14* (8) 0.17 (8)
z -1.49 (1) -1.19 (4) 0.29*** (1) 0.14 (4)
zrd -0.54 (1) -0.12 (1) 0.15** (8) 0.45* (8)
gc -1.68 (3) -1.79 (1) 0.16** (3) 0.22 (1)
Thailand a -1.53 (1) -2.71*** (1) 0.13* (8) 0.18 (8)
z -1.42 (1) -2.12 (1) 0.15** (1) 0.18 (1)
zrd -0.72 (2) -0.27 (1) 0.22*** (2) 0.67** (2)
gc -1.42 (1) -2.29* (1) 0.28*** (1) 0.26 (1)
Table 5.1: Unit Root Tests CUCs countries. All variables are index numbers (1981=100)
expressed in logarithms. The lag lengths (in parentheses) are chosen using the Schwert 1989
method: lagmax =
[
12
{
T
100
} 1
4
]
. The null hypothesis in the ADF (KPSS) test is unit root
(stationary). The test in levels include a trend and a constant. The test in first differences
include a constant (no trend). *, **, and ***, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively. Results are obtained using Stata’s dfgls and kpss.
1/ Notice that the test for “rd” in the first row stands for the unweighted version of foreign R&D
obtained through Equation (5.2). This variable is the same for all countries off the frontier.
Critical V. for the KPSS tests with a trend are 10%: 0.12, 5%: 0.15, and 1%: 0.22.
Critical V. for the KPSS tests without a trend are 10%: 0.35, 5%: 0.46, and 1%: 0.74.
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of the system for each country. In all the reported cases we are able to check
that there are no autocorrelation problems.66
Table 5.2 reports the results of the trace test for the 5 variables system
xt = (at, zrdt, zt, gct, rdt)
′
. For most countries we cannot reject that there are
between two and three cointegrating equations (the exceptions are Cyprus and
Malaysia with up to two cointegration vectors each). Therefore, we do settle
for specifying r=3—except for Cyprus and Malaysia, for which we consider r=2
instead. Our choice is generally supported by the MES statistics; the SBIC and
HQIC criteria suggest 4 cointegrating equations in all cases, but that alternative
is not supported by the stability analysis. in all cases, the analysis of the VEC
systems below is based on stable processes.
Country H0 : r = 0 H0 : r = 1 H0 : r = 2 H0 : r = 3 H0 : r = 4
China(2) 222.99 95.15 53.33 23.51*5 8.03
Cyprus(2) 212.87 72.99 41.49*5 21.64 7.74
Egypt(2) 195.17 93.95 49.50 25.22*5 9.67
Hong Kong(1) 237.22 90.42 50.48 19.29*5 6.25
Indonesia(1) 276.36 116.94 61.31 20.12*5 4.66
Malaysia(2) 173.74 66.19*1 36.82*5 22.23 10.47
Malta(2) 189.31 72.93 43.05*1 23.37*5 9.63
Israel(2) 189.92 80.50 49.51 24.04*5 7.06
Korea(2) 191.18 85.05 48.15*1 24.89*5 9.58
Singapore(3) 183.35 98.55 51.87 24.21*5 9.71
Thailand(1) 248.67 109.98 60.88 23.56*5 5.89
5% C. Value 87.31 62.99 42.44 25.32 12.25
1% C. Value 96.58 70.05 48.45 30.45 16.26
Table 5.2: Cointegration tests CUCs countries. The table reports the results of the
λtrace tests for the null hypotheses that there are r=0,...,r=4 cointegration vectors
among the five variables in the system xt = (at, zrdt, zt, gct, rdt)
′. The test includes
a restricted trend in all cases. Lag lengths (in parentheses) chosen according to the
conventional information criteria, including up to three lags. *1 and *5 denotes sig-
nificance at the 1% and 5% respectively. Critical values are reported at the bottom of
the table.
Finding the proper order of the variables is important for estimation pur-
poses of the parameters in the VEC model. The hierarchical ordering of the
variables in the system xt = (at, zrdt, zt, gct, rdt)
′
is based on the causal struc-
ture suggested by our theoretical model. This ordering is uniquely determined
and implies that productivity, “a”, is the most endogenous variable; in turn,
the interaction term, “zrd”, is endogenous to (local) innovation, “z”, and R&D
investments in countries at the frontier, “rd”; (local) innovation is endogenous
to government coordination, “gc” and “rd”; and “gc” and “rd” are weakly ex-
ogenous.
The estimation of the coefficients of interest, namely the short-run adjust-
66We need to keep in mind that our sample size, namely 30 observations per country, is not
large enough to provide safe statistics on model adequacy. In general, we exclude countries
with unstable processes, autocorrelation and overall nonnormality problems, but keep in the
sample a few of cases where the normality of the residuals is rejected for specific series (Hong
Kong, Malaysia), which of course still may affect the corresponding tests of significance.
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ment coefficients (α) and the long-run coefficients (β), requires r2 restrictions
(where r is the number of cointegrating vectors). The cointegration results
determined by imposing the Johansen normalization restrictions are shown in
Table 5.3. With r=3 for China, Egypt, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malta, Israel,
Korea, Singapore, and Thailand, the cointegration vectors are defined for the
triplets (“a”, “gc”, “rd”), (“zrd”, “gc”, “rd”) and (“z”, “gc”, “rd”). The default
normalization implies that “a” = 1 in the first cointegrating vector (first row
for each country); “zrd” = 1 in the second cointegrating vector (second row);
and “z” = 1 in the third cointegrating vector (third row). With r=2 for Cyprus
and Malaysia, the cointegration vectors are defined for the 4 variables in the
set (“a”, “z”, “gc”, “rd”) and the 4 variables in the set (“zrd”, “z”, “gc”, “rd”)
with “a” = 1 in the first cointegrating vector and “zrd” = 1, in the second.
From Table 5.3, the Johansen normalization restrictions allow us to analyze
the cointegration properties between productivity, government coordination and
foreign technology (the first cointegrating vector). They also allow us to ana-
lyze cointegration between the interaction term, government coordination and
foreign technology (the second cointegrating vector). Finally, they allow us to
analyze cointegration between (local) innovation, government coordination and
foreign technology. We cannot, however, directly infer the relationship between
productivity and the interaction term which is one of our key targets—to ac-
count for this kind of relationship we would need to rely on the analysis of
impulse response functions. As we mentioned above, rearranging the variables
to find a parameter estimate in this regard makes little sense given the unique
hierarchical order of the variables in the system. And imposing over-identifying
restriction does not solve the problem either.
As we mentioned, the correlation between productivity and the interaction
term may still be analyzed through impulse response functions. After all, if the
pairs (“a”, “rd”) and (“zrd”, “rd”) are cointegrated, it must hold that the pair
(“a”, “zrd”) is also cointegrated. The difficulty that arises for analyzing the
structural shocks in this system is that the coefficient estimates in Table 5.3
do not show reliable cointegrating vectors neither among the variables in the
triplets (“a”, “gc”, “rd”), (“zrd”, “gc”, “rd”) and (“z”, “gc”, “rd”) nor among
the 4 variables systems of Cyprus and Malaysia. The long-run effects of foreign
technology are statistically significant in most cases, but the size impacts are
too large to allow for a meaningful economic interpretation: namely, Hong Kong
(-11.64, -7.78), Indonesia (-7.73, -5.63), Thailand (-8.65, -109.76, -93.94). And
a similar difficulty arises for the analysis of the long-run impacts of government
coordination, and for the estimates of the short-run adjustment coefficients,
which are not always significant and in some cases also quite large.
Of course, the results obtained from the VEC methodology are affected by
individual idiosyncratic country effects not all of which are adequately captured
by our data (war, social riots, policy changes and so on).67 Yet, the investigation
of country specific events is not in our scope in this exploratory analysis.
To handle other difficulties that were mentioned earlier, a renormalization
67See, for instance, Juselius, Møller and Tarp 2014.
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Cointegration vector (β coeff.) SR-Adj (α coeff.)
Country at zrdt zt gct rdt ∆at ∆zrdt ∆zt ∆gct ∆rdt
China(2) 1.00 0 0 -0.06 0.82*** -0.94*** 0.33 0.37* 0.70*** -0.04***
0 1.00 0 2.43*** 6.6*** -1.34*** 0.09 0.02 0.33* 0.17***
0 0 1.00 2.90*** 8.95*** 1.22*** -0.17 -0.10 -0.38** -0.16***
Cyprus(2) 1.00 0 -0.07*** 0.11*** -1.31*** -0.48 -2.14 -3.00 -1.33* 0.06**
0 1.00 -1.57*** 0.55*** -5.38*** 0.14 0.62 0.80 0.37** 0.02***
Egypt(2) 1.00 0 0 -0.11* -0.21* -0.60*** -0.18 0.40 0.75 -0.02
0 1.00 0 0.59 -11.64*** -0.25 1.04 1.67* -0.35 0.05
0 0 1.00 0.24 -7.78*** 0.32 -1.49 -2.38* 0.52 -0.05
Hong Kong(1) 1.00 0 0 -0.62 5.29*** -0.38*** 0.92*** 0.71*** 0.09 0.21***
0 1.00 0 2.40 -18.97*** -1.14*** 2.14*** 1.80*** -1.25*** 0.62***
0 0 1.00 2.21 -16.83*** 1.09** -1.96*** -1.68*** 1.36*** -0.57***
Indonesia(2) 1.00 0 0 -3.02*** -7.73*** -0.17 0.41 0.30 0.42*** -0.02
0 1.00 0 6.58*** -5.63*** 0.38 -0.89 -0.68 -1.17*** 0.10***
0 0 1.00 7.45*** -1.01 -0.41 0.94 0.72 1.12*** -0.10***
Malaysia(2) 1.00 0 0.09 -0.86*** -1.55*** -0.14 -0.93*** -0.96*** 0.18* 0.02*
0 1.00 -1.19*** -0.55*** -2.04*** 0.27 2.15*** 2.03*** -0.32 0.16***
Malta(2) 1.00 0 0 -0.28* -0.54*** 0.18* 0.52*** 0.39* -0.19 0.13***
0 1.00 0 1.02*** -1.88*** -0.06 0.21 0.06 0.44 0.16***
0 0 1.00 0.47*** 0.07 0.61 -2.21*** -1.83* -2.45* -0.17***
Israel(2) 1.00 0 0 -0.33*** -0.81*** -1.45*** 0.60 0.93 -0.28 -0.04
0 1.00 0 9.56*** 16.51** -0.05*** 0.02 0.03 -0.04* -0.005**
0 0 1.00 0.40*** -1.33*** 0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.48*** 0.06***
Korea(3) 1.00 0 0 0.14* -0.70*** -1.22** -1.14 -1.43 -0.77 0.03
0 1.00 0 3.45** -9.94** 0.23 2.41*** 2.50*** 0.37 0.01
0 0 1.00 2.34* -5.04 -0.36 -3.09*** -3.20*** -0.54 -0.004
Singapore(2) 1.00 0 0 -0.61*** -1.91*** -1.37*** 1.57*** 1.52*** 0.57 0.01
0 1.00 0 -2.03*** -6.08*** 1.46*** -1.20* -1.17* -0.83* 0.05
0 0 1.00 -1.53*** -2.34*** -1.82*** 1.20 1.12 1.21** -0.05
Thailand(2) 1.00 0 0 -2.04*** -8.65*** -1.51*** 0.08 0.05 -1.17* 0.02
0 1.00 0 -21.73*** -109.76*** -0.24 4.36*** 4.34*** -1.39** 0.01
0 0 1.00 -18.79*** -93.94*** 0.42* -5.05*** -5.03*** 1.72** -0.01
Table 5.3: Estimated cointegration vectors with Johansen normalization restrictions (CUCs). We condition on 3
cointegrating equations among the 5 variables system—normalized by “at”, “zrdt” and “zt” respectively (Cyprus and
Malaysia with 2 vectors). A constant and a trend included (not shown) in the cointegrating vector. We report the
original estimates (1, -βxj ). *,**, and *** denote significance for P > |z| at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. The short-run
adjustment coefficients (SR-Adj) are shown in the last block of columns for each of ∆at...∆rdt: there are 3 adjustment
coefficients which correspond to the vector normalized by “at” (first row in each country); the vector normalized by “zrdt”
(second row); and the vector normalized by “zt” (third row).
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of the 5-variable system is in order. We consider a set of restrictions that is
consistent with the rationale of our hypotheses, which is informed by the theory
introduced in Section 5.2.68
So, we first test whether there is a structural cointegration relationship be-
tween productivity, the interaction term and government coordination; then
we test if the interaction term cointegrates with (local) innovation and foreign
technology—recall that the interaction term is made of (local) innovation and
the import’s share weighted average of foreign technology; and in the third
cointegrating vector we test whether (local) innovation cointegrates with gov-
ernment coordination and foreign technology—for Cyprus, Malaysia and Korea
the last vector is omitted (a stable VEC in Korea is found for r=2). In the case
of Malta a stable VEC can be obtained for r=1.
In other words, we test whether the structural cointegration relationships of
interest are supported by the data for the triplets (“a”, “zrd”, “gc”), (“zrd”,
“z”, “rd” ) and (“z”, “gc”, “rd”). The first vector is normalized by “a” and
has zero long-run restrictions on “z” and “rd”—(local) innovation and foreign
technology affect productivity through the interaction term. The second vector
is normalized by “zrd” and has zero long-run restrictions on “a” and “gc,”
and the third vector is normalized by “z” and has zero long-run restrictions on
“a” and “zrd”—by construction, the interaction term is endogenous to (local)
innovation but not the other way around.
The results are shown in Table 5.4. Regarding the first cointegration vec-
tor (the first row for each country), we find that the long-run effect of the
interaction term (“zrd”) is significant but in four cases, namely Egypt (-0.02),
Malaysia (0.07), Israel (0.002) and Korea (-0.01). In turn, the long-run effect of
government coordination is insignificant for Korea (0.06).
Regarding the second cointegration vector (the second row for each country),
we find that the long-run effect of (local) innovation is significant but in Egypt
(0.03), Indonesia (0.01) and Singapore (-0.07). In turn, the long-run effect of
foreign technology is generally significant though the size impact is still quite
large in some cases (e.g., -13.65 for Indonesia).
In the third cointegrating vector (the third row for countries other than
Cyprus, Malaysia, Malta and Korea), the long-run effect of government coor-
dination is statistically significant but for Indonesia (0.0002), Singapore (-0.03)
and Thailand (-0.02)—for Cyprus, Malaysia and Korea the effect of govern-
ment coordination in the second cointegration vector is significant and it is also
significant in the vector for Malta. In turn, the effect of foreign technology is
generally significant but for Thailand (-6.73), though we see again that the size
impact is quite large for Indonesia (16.85).
We also observe, from the sign of the estimates in the distinct cointegration
vectors, that for some countries the series in the system seem to move in opposite
directions over the long-run. That is, from the theoretical association between
productivity and other variables, it would be expected βzrd and βgc to have a
68On identification of structural relations in VEC models see Johansen 1995, Davidson 1998,
Fisher, Huh and Summers 2001.
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Cointegration vector (β coeff.) SR-Adj (α coeff.)
Country at zrdt zt gct rdt ∆at ∆zrdt ∆zt ∆gct ∆rdt
China(2) 1.00 -0.16*** 0 -0.28*** 0 -0.81*** 0.43** 0.46** 0.69*** -0.04**
0 1.00 -0.38*** 0 1.30*** -1.67 -0.33 -0.26 0.62** 0.14***
0 0 1.00 0.63*** 5.69*** 0.71*** 0.06 0.06 -0.29** -0.09***
Cyprus(2) 1.00 -0.05*** 0 0.08*** -1.06*** -0.48 -2.14 -3.00 -1.33* 0.06**
0 1.00 -1.57*** 0.55*** -5.38*** 0.12 0.52 0.66 0.31** 0.03***
Egypt(2) 1.00 -0.02 0 -0.13* 0 -0.53** -0.10 0.48 0.69 -0.04
0 1.00 0.03 0 -10.59*** -0.27 1.02 1.66* -0.34 0.05
0 0 1.00 -0.19*** -6.86*** 0.35 -1.51 -2.41* 0.54 -0.05
Hong Kong(2) 1.00 3.14*** 0 -0.46*** 0 -0.33** 0.49*** 0.48*** -0.25*** 0.06***
0 1.00 -3.74*** 0 -8.28*** -0.29** 0.46*** 0.45*** -0.22*** 0.06***
0 0 1.00 -1.66*** -3.38*** 0.19* -0.34*** -0.37*** 0.12** 0.00
Indonesia(1) 1.00 0.09*** 0 -0.84*** 0 -0.03 -0.99*** -0.90*** -0.03 -0.14***
0 1.00 0.01 0 -13.65*** -0.20 -0.25 -0.66*** -0.02 0.55***
0 0 1.00 0.00 -12.49*** 0.20 0.28 0.67*** 0.02 -0.52***
Malaysia(2) 1.00 0.07 0 -0.90*** -1.71*** -0.14 -0.93*** -0.96*** 0.18* 0.02*
0 1.00 -1.19*** -0.55*** -2.04*** 0.28 2.22*** 2.10*** -0.33 0.16***
Malta(1) 1.00 1.04*** -1.52*** 0.30*** -2.01*** -0.02 0.34*** 0.01 0.01 0.34***
Israel(3) 1.00 0.00 0 -0.04*** 0 -2.62*** 0.75 0.95 -1.30 -0.05
0 1.00 -1.85*** 0 -1.00** 0.03 0.30 0.41* -0.14 0.00
0 0 1.00 3.24*** 3.94*** 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.19** -0.01
Korea(2) 1.00 -0.01 0 0.06 -0.47*** -1.49*** -0.83 -0.93 -0.33 0.02
0 1.00 -1.28*** 0.29** -3.60*** 0.20*** 0.26* 0.20 0.22*** 0.07***
Singapore(1) 1.00 -0.06* 0 -0.51*** 0 -1.06*** 0.44 0.53 -0.03 -0.05
0 1.00 -0.07 0 -4.03*** 0.87*** -0.35 -0.58* -0.04 0.28***
0 0 1.00 -0.03 -1.94*** -1.27*** 0.64 0.83* 0.05 -0.26**
Thailand(3) 1.00 -0.11*** 0 -0.37*** 0 -2.71*** 2.26 2.39 0.46 0.06
0 1.00 0.17*** 0 -10.22* -0.80** 5.85** 5.95** -2.81** 0.10
0 0 1.00 -0.02 -6.73 1.05** -7.86** -7.98** 3.72** -0.13
Table 5.4: Estimated cointegration vectors (CUCs). We report the original estimates (1, -βxj ) computed with Johansen’s
maximum likelihood method. A constant and a trend included (not shown) in the cointegrating vector. *,**, and ***
denote significance for P > |z| at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. For each country, the first row shows the
cointegration results for the triplet (at, zrdt, gct); the second row the cointegration results for the triplet (zrdt, zt, rdt);
and the third the cointegration results for the triplet (zt, gct, rdt). The short-run adjustment coefficients (SR-Adj) are
shown in the last block of columns for each equation from ∆at...∆rdt.
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negative sign in the the triplet (“a”, “zrd”, “gc”)—note that we are normalizing
for “a” and reporting the estimates as a vector of the form (1, -βxj ). We see
the expected results for some countries in Table 5.4, namely China (1, -0.16,
-0.28), but many other coefficients in the table show opposite patterns with
productivity. Although indicative, these results should not be problematic. A
better picture of the long-run association between any two series in VEC models
depends on the systematic relationship between them and all the other variables
in the system.
On the other hand, we see that the adjustment coefficients—“α” in the equa-
tion for ∆at—are nonsignificant for productivity in Cyprus (-0.48, 0.12), Egypt
(-0.27, 0.35), Indonesia (-0.03, -0.20, 0.20), Malaysia (-0.14, 0.28), Malta (-0.02)
and Israel (0.03, 0.01). Likewise, in the equations from ∆zrdt to ∆rdt, we
see that many adjustment coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Nonsignificant coefficients may follow from the true short-run exogeneity of the
affected variables. For instance, we observe that government coordination seems
to be independent of any long-run disequilibria in Egypt and Indonesia, which
is consistent with the weak exogeneity we attribute to this variable. However,
nonsignificant parameters may reveal also correlation patterns and measurement
problems that affect specific variables. This may be the case for the nonsignifi-
cant coefficients under the equation for ∆at that we see in some countries.
In summary, a critical scrutiny of the results presented in Table 5.4 reveals
various troubles in setting up cointegration vectors that are well behaved in
all cases. Still, so far these partial results also support our hypotheses that
the variables in the system are cointegrated. In particular, we have found that
productivity is generally related with other variables in the long-run, either
directly (with “zrd” and “gc”) or indirectly (through the impact of “z” and
“rd” on “zrd”, and the impact of “gc” and “rd” on “z”). Furthermore, for
countries other than Cyprus, Indonesia, Malaysia and Malta, productivity is
significantly affected at least by some long-run disequilibria (in the sense that
at least one α 6= 0 under the equation for ∆at). Likewise, we find that (local)
innovation is generally related with “gc” and “rd” in the long-run. And with
few exceptions it seems to be significantly affected by at least some long-run
disequilibria (α 6= 0 under the equation for ∆zt).
In order to improve the subsequent analysis (e.g., the dynamic multipliers
analysis), we impose exclusion (zero) restrictions on the parameter estimates
that turn out to be statistically insignificant in the cointegration equations—
the βx coefficients in Table 5.4.
69 Using c1, c2 and c3 to denote the first, second
and third cointegration vectors respectively, those restrictions amount to test
the null hypotheses that Ho: βc1,zrd = βc2,z = 0 in Egypt; Ho: βc2,z = 0 in
69Exclusion restrictions on short-run adjustment coefficients are not tested in our analy-
sis. These restrictions are not difficult to test, but unlike the case of long-run restrictions,
the relatively larger number of restrictions to be imposed on short-run coefficients implies
a substantial cost from the computational viewpoint: extensive iterations are needed before
convergence is achieved country-by-country. Notice, moreover, that the possible existence of
near-linear dependencies among the variables in the system implies that one needs to learn
more about the feasibility of distinct types of restrictions rather than setting zero restrictions
outright.
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Indonesia; Ho: βc1,zrd = 0 in Malaysia; Ho: βc1,zrd = βc1,gc = 0 in Korea;
Ho: βc2,z = βc3,gc = 0 in Singapore; and Ho: βc3,gc = βc3,rd = 0 in Thailand.
In general, these over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected (the results of
these tests are omitted).
One remarkable feature of impulse-response functions that are drawn from
VEC models is the fact that they do not die out to zero after the initial shock.
This property that usually holds for stationary, stable VAR processes does not
necessarily hold in VEC models where the one-time initial impulse can have
permanent non-zero effects.70
In Figure 5.3 the impulse-response functions based on the constrained results
(after the exclusion restrictions) for each country are depicted. We focus here on
the point estimates of the response of productivity to a one-time orthogonalized
shock in each of the other variables.71 Total accumulated responses, which
seem more logical to analyze the long-run productivity effects of those shocks,
are discussed later in this chapter.
The response to an impulse on the interaction term (“zrd”→ “a”) is seen to
vary largely across countries. For China, Israel and Korea there is a permanent
decline of productivity; for Egypt, Indonesia, Malta and Thailand there is a
permanent positive effect; and for Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore,
a decline shortly after impact is followed by a recovery and a permanent positive
effect. Also, we observe that for Singapore and Thailand the size of the response
is relatively large, more than 0.02 units in comparison with less than 0.01 in
every other country.
The response induced by a shock on (local) innovation (“z”→ “a”) is positive
for China, Egypt, Hong Kong, Malta, Israel and Thailand (after an instanta-
neous decline in the last case); and the induced response is negative for Cyprus,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea. More specifically, in the case of Korea the ini-
tial shock leads to a transitory increase of productivity which is followed by a
permanent decline in subsequent periods. In the case of Israel there is a tran-
sitory positive effect that declines rapidly and exhibits some variation before it
converges to some positive value. And in Singapore, the decline at impact is fol-
lowed by a permanent recovery and a relatively large positive effect thereafter,
in comparison with the size of the response for any other country.
The response of productivity to an impulse on government coordination
(“gc”→ “a”) is mostly positive. Only Hong Kong and Malta show a permanent
decline after the initial shock. Israel and Thailand exhibit substantial varia-
tion before the response function stabilizes for some positive value. And the
estimated response is relatively large in the cases of Singapore, Thailand and
Indonesia.
Finally, the response to an impulse on foreign technology (“rd”→ “a”) is
70Lutkepohl 2005, Ch. 6.
71Notice that confidence intervals based on impulse-response functions after VEC models
are not available from the routine in the software-package used for this estimation (Stata). Of
course, the confidence intervals may be obtained through bootstrapping methods. But that
procedure is computationally expensive as it involves extensive replications of the underlined
VEC model country-per-country.
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Figure 5.3: Multipliers analysis: Impulse-Response Functions CUCs over a horizon of 70-years. The
orthogonalized impulse response functions measure the response of productivity to a unit standard devi-
ation shock on each of the other variables in the system. Hence,
i) “zrd” → “a” (solid line);
ii) “z” → “a” (long dashed line);
iii) “gc” → “a” (short dashed line);
iv) “rd” → “a” (dash dotted line).
A dotted 0-line is depicted in red.
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positive for China, Egypt, Indonesia, Malta, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thai-
land. And it is negative for Cyprus, Malaysia, Israel and Korea. In Singapore
the decline at impact is followed by a permanent recovery and a positive effect
thereafter, while in Korea there is an instantaneous increase in productivity
which is followed by a permanent decline thereafter, and in Israel there is mostly
a negative effect with large variation at the initial periods.
All in all, the impulse-response analysis depicted in Figure 5.3 shows no
systematic pattern in the relation between productivity and each of the other
variables in the system. Again, we note that from our theoretical considerations
it was expected a positive impact on productivity from a shock on each of the
other variables. For instance, we would have expected a high positive effect from
a shock on the interaction term as, by construction, it captures the twin benefits
of foreign technology and local innovation; and also a positive effect from a shock
on government coordination, which would follow from our discussion about the
role of government in the NIS framework.
The fact that the expected results do not show up systematically in a
country-by-country approach should, however, not be surprising. As we already
mentioned above, our ability to find the desired results is limited by a variety of
reasons, namely the small size of our sample, the unavailability of better data
to measure accurately the theoretical concepts we deal with (e.g., we rely on a
mild version of “gc”), and the omission of country idiosyncratic effects. While
these reasons prevent us from a precise estimation of the parameters of interest
and the corresponding impulse-response functions, which may seriously mislead
our conclusions on a country-per-country analysis, we would expect that, by
analyzing the entire range or distribution of the response functions across a
classification of countries, the results shall make more economic sense (in terms
of our hypotheses at the outset).
To illustrate our point we compute overall average response functions, namely
the period-by-period unweighted average response functions over all countries
with information in the CUCs classification. There are four average functions
corresponding to the response of productivity to impulses originated in each of
the other variables. These average functions are classified according to the im-
pulse variable and shown in Figure 5.4, where the country-by-country response
functions are displayed as well (these are the same shown previously in Figure
5.3).
In calculating the average impulse-response functions we need to pay atten-
tion to the unfluence of extreme values. For instance, the large responses that
we already noted in Singapore and Thailand are now much more evident when
we look at the impulses running from “zrd” to “a” in Figure 5.4. Similarly, in
the case of the impulses running from “z” to “a” we see a large positive response
(corresponding to China); and in the case of the impulses running from “gc”
to “a” there are two large positive responses (Indonesia and Thailand); finally,
in the case of the impulses running from “rd” to “a” there is a large response
(Thailand). We see that in some cases the influence of extreme positive values
is offset by responses in the opposite direction in other countries, but in many
other cases they are not. For instance, in the impulses running from “zrd” and
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“gc” to “a”.
To deal with the difficulty that the averages may be skewed by the extreme
responses found in some countries, we compute also the overall median response
functions, namely the midpoint in the distribution of the responses across coun-
tries. We compute these midpoints period-by-period. Clearly, by dividing the
range of values into two halves, the overall median response functions offer
a more accurate representation of the empirical distribution of the responses
across countries. Notice that there is a wide variance in these empirical dis-
tributions, which is a consequence of the fact that in many cases the country
specific response functions are either largely negative or largely positive rather
than clustered around the center.
In Figure 5.4 the overall average response functions are depicted using thick
solid white lines; in turn, the overall median response functions are depicted
using thick solid black lines. To gain some insight into the empirical distribution
of these functions, and the leverage exerted by the “extreme” response values
in some countries, one standard deviation intervals are established around the
median. How we do this is explained next.
First we calculate the sample standard deviation over all countries and use
it to generate an interval that is plotted as a light grey shaded area with respect
to the median; then we drop the country with the most extreme response values
on the right and also on the left of the distribution (the sample median is
unaffected by this procedure); we recalculate the standard deviation over the
remaining countries and generate a new interval that is plotted as a slightly
darker grey shaded area than before. We repeat this procedure twice, dropping
each time one more country on the right and left of the distribution and plotting
the new intervals as slightly darker grey shaded areas.
In summary, in Figure 5.4 there are four grey bands around the sample me-
dian, corresponding to the one-standard-deviation intervals that are computed
for the overall sample (the lightest grey shaded area), and for the sample af-
ter sequentially dropping the first, second and third most extreme responses on
both sides of the distribution. As a result, the innermost and darkest band lies
close to the median, though it represents also the dispersion for a lesser number
of countries (5 in the case of the CUCs).
The large dispersion and lack of systematic patterns in the impulse-response
functions are clearly problematic in the attempt to determine the suitability of
our theory. However, it is interesting to observe that in spite of the limitations
of the empirical distribution, the response functions portrayed in Figure 5.4 still
reveal some evidence in favor of our hypotheses.
We see that the average response is skewed upwards in the functions for
(zrd → a) and (gc → a). Clearly, in both these cases the overall median offers
a more suitable alternative to make sense of the distribution of the response
functions across individual countries. For the cases of the functions (z → a)
and (rd → a) the empirical distribution is more symmetric around the mean,
thus it makes little difference whether we focus on the average or the median of
the distribution.
A shock on the interaction term (zrd → a) has an instantaneous negative
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Figure 5.4: Average and median impulse-response functions for the CUCs over a horizon of 70-years.
The orthogonalized impulse response functions measure the response of productivity to a one-time unit
standard deviation shock on each of the other variables. Dashed-thin lines depict the functions obtained
for individual countries (see Figure 5.3); the thick solid white lines depict the overall average; and the
thick solid black lines depict the overall median. One standard deviation bands are plotted around the
median by taking into account the overall sample (the lightest grey shaded area) and the sample after
sequentially subtracting one, two and three countries with the most extreme responses on both sides of
the empirical distribution (the darkest inner band indicating the latter case).
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effect at impact—which is heavily influenced by China, Hong Kong, and Sin-
gapore, as can be verified by referring to Figure 5.3; but the negative effect at
impact is followed by a permanent positive effect over time. The same dynamic
pattern remains regardless of whether we look at the average or the median
of the distribution—though, as we have already noted, the average is skewed
upwards, influenced by the response function of Singapore.
In other remarkable result, we observe strong positive responses to a shock
hitting government coordination (gc → a). This result holds regardless of
whether we look at the average or the median of the distribution. But, again, the
average is evidently skewed upwards influenced by the highly positive response
functions of Thailand and Indonesia.
In the case of the response to a shock on innovation (z → a), both the
overall average and the overall median slightly overlie the zero line; and similar,
though not identical, effects are observed in the corresponding average and
median responses to a shock hitting foreign technology (rd → a). Notice that
the responses are slightly higher for the scenario (rd → a) than for the scenario
(z → a).
In summary, by focusing on either the overall average or the overall median
response functions we obtain more sensible results as to the impact of the inter-
action term, (local) innovation, government coordination and foreign technology
on productivity. Under these particular scenarios we may argue that there is
evidence in support of our hypotheses that the interaction of foreign and local
technology and government coordination have both positive impacts on produc-
tivity. In addition, we observe that the interaction term has a larger impact
than each of its individual elements.
Recall, from the discussion in Section 5.2, that we would expect that the
interaction term and government coordination have larger productivity impacts
in countries that have been successful in catching up and those that are already
at the frontier, namely the CUCs and the FRCs, than in countries that remain
in stagnation or those lagging over time, namely the STCs and th LGCs. The
procedure just discussed, by which a reasonable interpretation of the impulse-
response functions relies on the patterns of the distribution rather than on the
outcomes for individual countries, is replicated below to investigate whether, as
we posited earlier, the CUCs and FRCs countries outperform the STCs and the
LGCs.
Summary over country classifications
We focus on the analysis of so-called mean group estimates of the long-run
and short-run coefficients in the VEC models for each country classification.72
Our methodology to estimating the mean group estimates follows and, we do
think, improves the standard practice, namely, we first determine the cointe-
grating rank and run the cointegration analysis for each individual country;
72The unit root properties of the variables for each country show that they may be considered
I(1) along the same lines of the analysis for the CUCs classification shown in Table 5.1.
Detailed results from our calculations are available from the author.
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then, we calculate the unweighted average of the individual estimates over the
countries in each classification; finally, we calculate the standard deviation over
the coefficient estimates.73
Formally, the mean group estimate of the coefficients βj,c,xi for the variable
“xi” of the cointegration vector “c” in country “j” is
β¯c,xi = N
−1
N∑
j=1
βj,c,xi
and its standard deviation is
s.d.β¯c,xi
=
((
N(N − 1))−1 N∑
j=1
(
βj,c,xi − β¯c,xi
)2)1/2
We restrict the computation of the mean group estimates to the country
systems that show the same cointegrating rank. For most countries we cannot
reject r=3, therefore, we report the computed results for the triplets (“a”, “zrd”,
“gc”), (“zrd”, “z”, “rd” ) and (“z”, “gc”, “rd”) with the same normalization
restrictions discussed earlier.
From the upper block in Table 5.5 we see that the average coefficients are
reasonably high in most cases for both long and short run effects. The larger
average estimates are found for the long-run effect of “rd” in the CUCs (-6.64,
-3.11) and STCs (-3.05); and for the long-run effect of “gc” in STCs (5.24).
It is clear, on the other side, that there are wide differences in the estimates
across and within the various country classifications: the standard deviations,
reported in the parentheses below the coefficients, indicate that the estimates
differ largely on a country-by-country basis.74
As we pointed out earlier, though the dynamics in a VEC process depends
on the systematic relationship between all variables, the sign of the long-run
coefficients is still of interest. We have argued why we expect a positive long-
run association among all variables in the system. Yet, we see that this is the
actual case in just a few of cases, namely the series in the vector (“a”, “zrd”,
“gc”) for the FRCs and the CUCs (the first row in each classification), and
73As we have pointed out before, conventional mean group estimators (Pesaran and Smith
1995, Blackburne and Frank 2007.) are not adequate for our estimation purposes. Available
(panel data) procedures do not allow to test for more than one cointegration equation among
the series in the system; in addition, those procedures do not allow to impose identifying
restrictions, which clearly is a limitation as we have found evidence of more than one coin-
tegrating relationship in the 5 variables system. Another problem is the lack of consistency
between individual-by-individual and panel estimates, namely, using standard procedures,
conflicting findings may be found between the aggregate test for more than two countries (say
evidence of no cointegration) and the test for individual countries (evidence of cointegration).
74Note that the standard deviation of the averaged coefficient estimates indicates the dis-
persion of the country-by-country coefficients around the mean group estimate. One can also
calculate these quantities taking into account parameter heterogeneity using the so-called
random-coefficients-regression, RCR (Swamy 1970, Pesaran and Smith 1995); though attrac-
tive, this alternative is computationally demanding and it is not available in conventional
statistical packages.
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Cointegration vector (β coeff.) SR-Adj (α coeff.)
Country at zrdt zt gct rdt ∆at ∆zrdt ∆zt ∆gct ∆rdt
FRCs(22) 1.00 -0.18 0 -0.23 0 -0.58 0.63 0.56 0.22 0.10
(0.52) (1.14) (0.71) (1.34) (1.36) (1.33) (0.20)
0 1.00 0.28 0 -1.31 0.22 0.76 0.49 -0.26 0.37
(2.10) (6.80) (0.42) (0.96) (1.07) (1.03) (0.46)
0 0 1.00 0.05 -1.59 -0.62 -0.79 -0.46 -0.52 -0.45
(1.27) (5.29) (2.15) (1.43) (1.25) (5.29) (1.14)
CUCs(7) 1.00 -0.41 0 -0.38 0 -1.16 0.47 0.63 0.03 -0.03
(1.12) (0.25) (1.00) (0.91) (0.90) (0.64) (0.06)
0 1.00 -0.83 0 -6.64 -0.33 0.96 1.00 -0.42 0.17
(1.35) (5.10) (0.72) (2.05) (2.15) (1.02) (0.18)
0 0 1.00 0.28 -3.11 0.18 -1.25 -1.32 0.57 -0.15
(1.37) (5.90) (0.68) (2.77) (2.89) (1.31) (0.17)
STCs(10) 1.00 0.31 0 -1.54 0 -0.44 -0.01 -0.13 -0.05 0.11
(0.68) (5.48) (0.37) (0.87) (0.82) (0.34) (0.15)
0 1.00 0.43 0 -3.05 -0.01 -0.36 -0.44 -0.08 0.16
(2.29) (3.68) (0.16) (1.04) (1.05) (0.49) (0.15)
0 0 1.00 5.24 -0.53 -0.27 -0.11 0.20 0.19 -0.42
(17.22) (3.49) (0.74) (1.51) (0.89) (0.54) (1.20)
LGCs(14) 1.00 -0.19 0 0.67 0 -0.26 0.37 0.44 0.31 0.02
(1.74) (2.87) (0.27) (1.09) (1.10) (0.47) (0.19)
0 1.00 0.36 0 -1.63 -0.36 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.22
(0.98) (5.39) (0.63) (1.44) (1.56) (1.20) (0.32)
0 0 1.00 -0.28 0.08 0.55 -0.63 -0.64 -0.53 -0.14
(2.00) (5.67) (1.23) (1.28) (1.41) (1.61) (0.30)
FRCs(22) 20(-) 16(-) 14(-) 9(+) 13(+) 8(+) 13(+)
18(+) 22(-) 12(+) 13(+) 10(+) 9(-) 16(+)
20(+) 22(-) 11(-) 11(-) 12(-) 10(-) 15(-)
CUCs(7) 5(-) 7(-) 6(-) 3(-) 3(-) 2(+) 3(-)
4(-) 7(-) 3(-) 2(+) 6(+) 3(-) 4(+)
4(+) 5(-) 4(+) 2(-) 5(-) 4(+) 3(-)
STCs(10) 8(+) 9(-) 7(-) 5(-) 5(-) 4(-) 7(+)
6(+) 10(-) 5(-) 7(-) 6(-) 4(-) 10(+)
9(+) 10(-) 6(-) 6(-) 5(+) 5(+) 10(-)
LGCs(14) 13(-) 14(+) 4(-) 9(+) 8(+) 6(+) 11(+)
11(+) 13(-) 6(-) 8(+) 9(+) 6(+) 9(+)
12(+) 13(+) 7(+) 4(-) 10(-) 5(-) 12(-)
Table 5.5: Mean group estimated cointegration vectors. For each country classification, the first row is the vector for the triplet
, gct); the second for the triplet (zrdt, zt, rdt); and the third for the triplet (zt, gct, rdt). The upper block reports the
average (1, -βxj ); quantities in parentheses below the coefficient are standard deviations. A constant and a trend included (not
shown) in the cointegrating vector. The lower block reports the number of countries with significant coefficients; in parentheses is
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the series in the vector (“zrd”, “z”, “rd”) for the CUCs—the negative sign of
the β-coefficients suggests that the series in the corresponding vectors tend to
move in the same direction with the normalized variable over the long-run, as
expected.
This positive long-run relation does not hold anymore in other cointegration
vectors. We see that the average effects of βrdt are adequately signed in most
cases, but those of βgct are rather ambiguous. For instance, it bears a negative
sign in the first cointegration vector and a positive sign in the third cointegration
vector for each of the FRCs, CUCs and STCs, respectively. While in the first
case it is consistent with our theory, suggesting a positive long-run association
between productivity and government coordination, in the second case it leads
to the conclusion that innovation and government coordination move in opposite
directions which, in light of our discussion, makes no economic sense. Likewise,
the (positive) signs of βzt in the second cointegrating vector for FRCs, STCs and
LGCs suggest that over the long-run the interaction term and innovation move
in opposite directions, which conflicts with the definition of, and the theoretical
association between these variables.
Another obvious concern is about the significance of the individual esti-
mates that make up the average. Obviously, the mean group estimates are
based on coefficients differing from country to country. Unless one is prepared
to make stronger assumptions, this implies that the disturbances, and therefore
the variance-covariance matrices in the regressions across individual countries
are heterogeneous. Ignoring this heterogeneity generates inconsistent estimates
of the coefficient means and their corresponding standard errors.75 Of course,
heteroscedastic disturbances across individuals implies that the mean group es-
timates under the Johansen cointegration approach need to be corrected. But
the procedure would take us into burdensome issues of matrix algebra that are
beyond the scope of this research.76
The immediate implication of the problem above is that even though all the
coefficients of the individual cointegration vectors are statistically significant,
the mean group estimates appear statistically insignificant. In other words,
based on the statistics reported in the upper block of Table 5.5 we may be
forced to conclude that there are no cointegrating vectors in the aggregate even
though the country-by-country regressions show valid cointegrating vectors in
all cases. Therefore, instead of relying on the statistical significance of the mean
group estimates, we provide a checklist to help the verification of the significance
of the individual coefficients across all regressions.
Thus, the lower block of Table 5.5 reports the number of countries that
show statistically significant coefficients; additionally, it reports in parentheses
75Pesaran and Smith 1995, Swamy 1970.
76Adequate solutions are not available from standard panel cointegration packages either.
Under conventional panel data regression models the solution has been discussed by Swamy
1970; and in the context of panel data cointegration by Pesaran and Smith 1995. Yet, to
the best of our knowledge, the panel data cointegration packages on offer are based on the
strong assumption of constant variances, zero covariances and the absence of any serial or
auto correlation of the disturbances which leads to produce inconsistent estimates.
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the direction of the average effect. For instance, we observe that from the 22
countries in the FRCs classification, 20 report significant parameters for the
average effect of βzrdt ; 16 report significant coefficients for the average effect of
βgct ; and 18 report a significant effect for the average trend term. A similar
analysis follows for the coefficients in other cointegrating vectors and country
classifications.
Based on this information, we can conjecture, not surprisingly, that the esti-
mates in the distinct cointegration vectors turn out to be statistically significant,
albeit not systematically nor for all countries. To give a glimpse into this feature
of our results, note from Table 5.4 that for Hong Kong βzrdt is significant and
the trend-coefficient is nonsignificant in the first cointegration vector, whilst for
Israel the results for the same coefficients are the other way about. This, how-
ever, is not necessarily a problem for evaluating the ‘creditworthiness’ of the
mean group estimates. Back to the information reported in the lower block of
Table 5.5, notice that the most meaningful cointegration vectors, in terms of
their sign and statistical significance, still arise in the first cointegration vector
for the FRCs and the CUCs, and the second cointegration vector for the CUCs.
The same reasoning applies in assessing the impact of the short-run ad-
justment coefficients. We see that only 14 out of 22 FRCs report significant
coefficients in the first cointegrating vector (with an average negative impact);
and the numbers are 12 and 11 for the second and third vectors, respectively.
As we discussed earlier, nonsignificant coefficients may reveal evidence of true
short-run exogeneity, but they may also be an indication of near-linear depen-
dencies and/or measurement errors.
For instance, though the results are not shown in the table, we have found
that for 12 out of the 22 FRCs government coordination seems to be fully unre-
lated with long-run disequilibria (i.e., the α-coefficients are insignificant in the
equation for ∆gct), which is consistent with our expectations of gct being weakly
exogenous. However, 6 countries show that productivity is fully unrelated with
long-run disequilibria; and 7 countries show that that is the case for innovation
which, at least partly, conflicts with our expectations that these variables are
endogenous in the system; though, of course, we know that they still may be
affected by β-coefficients and other than the α-coefficients in the short-run.
All in all, it is worth noting that despite having the same kind of estimation
problems that were discussed earlier, the mean group estimates in Table 5.5
support our hypotheses according to which the most meaningful cointegration
relationships do hold for the triplets (“a”, “zrd”, “gc”) and (“zrd”, “z”, “rd”)
for the FRCs and the CUCs, and not necessarily for the STCs and the LGCs.
Before turning to more general conclusions, next we present a comparison of
the average impulse-response functions over each country classification. To this
end, we rely on restricted estimates (imposing exclusion restrictions on non
significant long-run coefficients in the regressions country-by-country) and focus
on the overall median response functions, which seems reasonable to deal with
the difficulties posed by extreme positive or negative values.
Before proceeding, notice that one of the implications of the wide variance
in the empirical distribution of the impulse-response functions is that we cannot
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point to the statistical significance of the differences in the comparison of the
median values across the distinct country classifications. Hence, our comparison
applies only to the magnitude and direction of these differences.
In Figure 5.5. We use again solid lines to depict the values obtained pre-
viously for the CUCs (except for the scaling these are the same as in Figure
5.4). The response functions for other country classifications are portrayed as
follows: we use dotted lines for the FRCs, long-dashed lines for the STCs and
dash-dotted lines for the LGCs.
From Figure 5.5, we observe that the median response functions are generally
quite small. Yet, the responses computed for the CUCs are typically higher
than for other classifications. The notable exception is the high positive median
response to a shock hitting innovation (z → a) in the LGCs countries which, in
line with our definition of innovation in Section 5.3, may be plausible as many
LGCs countries may have adopted strategies that gradually changed labor from
routine to cognitive non-routine working occupations.
The lower level of the LGCs’ responses to shocks hitting other variables may
explain why these countries have been mostly lagging over time. For instance,
the negative pattern in the response to shocks hitting the interaction term sug-
gests a limitation of the LGCs to combine (local) innovation capacities with
existing technology trajectories. Such an argument is consistent with the com-
paratively negligible value of the median response function in these countries to
shocks hitting foreign technology (rd → a).
Although seemingly puzzling, the mostly negative—but virtually zero—
responses obtained for the FRCs are not (completely) implausible. First, we
observe that the median response of the FRCs to shocks hitting the interaction
term is positive, which provides supporting evidence for our hypothesis in this
regard. The result that the FRCs’ function lies here below the CUCs’ is also
consistent with the expectation that, by combining (local) innovation capacities
and foreign technology, the CUCs would have drawn higher benefits than other
countries in the catching up process. In turn, the slightly negative patterns
observed for the response of the FRCs to shocks hitting other variables may be
taken as an indication that many (narrowly more than half of) countries at the
frontier technology can gradually derive less and less benefits of their already
high levels of technology, innovation capacity and government coordination. In
fact, it is possible that for FRCs countries a shock hitting foreign technology
represents more of a strategic risk than an opportunity (e.g., more intense mar-
ket competition). Finally, the median values corresponding to the responses
obtained for the STCs seem also reasonable. The negative pattern observed in
the case of impulses hitting the interaction term suggests that these countries
have mostly failed to combine (local) innovation capacities with the diffusion of
foreign technology. And this would have been the case even if STCs countries
could achieve benefits at first impact from shocks hitting foreign technology, as
we can infer from the response pattern in the scenario (rd → a).
The negative response to a shock hitting innovation (z → a), and the fact
that a shock hitting government coordination (gc → a) has only a mild posi-
tive effect at impact may altogether explain, at least partially, why the STCs
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Figure 5.5: Overall median impulse-response functions for FRCs, CUCs, STCs and LGCs (over a
horizon of 70-years). The orthogonalized impulse response functions measure the response of productivity
to a unit standard deviation one-time shock on each of the other variables. The median of the distribution
is computed period-by-period. In each case, the solid lines represent the CUCs, the dotted lines the FRCs,
the long-dashed lines the STCs and the dashed-dotted lines the LGCs.
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Figure 5.6: Long-run multipliers: overall median response values of the long-run productivity effects
(over a horizon of 70-years). The response functions measure the accumulated orthogonalized impulse-
response of productivity to a unit standard deviation shock on each of the other variables. The median
of the distribution is computed period-by-period. In each case, the solid lines represent the CUCs, the
dotted lines the FRCs, the long-dashed lines the STCs and the dashed-dotted lines the LGCs.
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countries have been less successful in catching up. In line with our definition
of innovation, STCs, like other countries in our analysis, are characterized by
an increasing transition from routine to cognitive non-routine working occupa-
tions. But though well-educated workers are expected to contribute more to
productivity growth, a necessary condition in this context is that the workers’
qualifications correspond to the needs of the economy. A problem faced by many
both backward and frontier countries is the mismatch between workers’ prepa-
ration and the needs of the economy.77 Hence, it may be that even with some
changes in the right direction (e.g., government coordination) this mismatch is
a major problem featured by STCs.
The so-called long-run multiplier effects or accumulated impulse-response
functions for the system are shown in Figure 5.6.78 Again, we concentrate on
the median of the distribution of the responses of productivity to one standard
deviation shocks on each other variable, but these responses are now accumu-
lated over a period of 70 years.
From Figure 5.6, we observe that the accumulated effects are consistent with
the patterns depicted earlier (see Figure 5.5), namely the responses of the CUCs
are generally larger than in any other country classification; the exception to
this general pattern is still related to the high response values to the impulse
running from innovation in LGCs countries.
Also, we observe that the impact of the impulse hitting the interaction term
(zrd → a) is higher than the impacts of impulses hitting individually either
innovation (z → a) or foreign technology (r → a); and this result is particularly
strong in the cases of the CUCs and FRCs classifications. Once again, this
supports our view that for these two groups the interaction term has a larger
impact than each of its individual elements.
Other results that were discussed earlier become visible in Figure 5.6 as well.
For instance, the (accumulated) response of the FRCs to a shock hitting gov-
ernment coordination (gc → a) is slightly negative and then tapers off to zero
suggesting that over the long-run the FRCs countries apparently derive less and
less benefits of their already high levels of government coordination. In turn,
the negative trend in the response of the FRCs to a shock on foreign technology
reinforces our interpretation that for these countries a shock on foreign technol-
ogy may represent mostly a stronger competition risk by technological advances
from other advanced economies.
In the case of the LGCs countries, we see high response values to the impact
running from innovation (z → a), but the response to the impact running from
foreign technology (rd → a) is practically negligible. Together, these effects
explain the slightly negative response in LGCs countries to shocks hitting the
interaction term (zrd → a). Moreover, in light of the negative response to
impulses on government coordination (gc → a), these results lead us to infer
that the main limitation of the LGCs countries to catching up has been the lack
77Cedefop 2012, Inter-American Development Bank 2012.
78The long-run effects or accumulated impulse-response functions are obtained by summing
up the effects over the period of analysis (here 70 years) of a shock in one variable (Lutkepohl
2005).
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of a coherent innovation system.
A similar conclusion holds, though for different reasons and to somewhat
larger extent, for the STCs countries. In this case we observe slight (accumu-
lated) positive responses to shocks hitting government coordination and foreign
technology (at impact); but large negative responses to innovation and the in-
teraction term. This lead us to conclude that unlike the CUCs and the FRCs,
and mostly in line with the results of the LGCs, the main problem of the STCs
countries to catching up is that they lack a coherent innovation system.
In summary, it seems fair to reckon that in spite of data and technical lim-
itations that we have duly acknowledged, we have found empirical evidence to
support our propositions at the outset, namely that there is a structural posi-
tive long-run relationship between the interaction term and productivity; and a
structural positive long-run relationship between government coordination and
productivity. In addition, it is worth pointing that the results that we have
found seem to confirm our expectation that these structural associations are
more likely to emerge in the case of the CUCs and FRCs than in the case of the
STCs and LGCs countries.
These findings seem also to support the idea found in numerous studies that
government discrete interventions in order to coordinate the whole system of
innovation has been widespread in many frontier countries and countries that
have been catching up with them—noticeably, by combining local (innovation)
and foreign technology.79 Of course, one would not expect to observe a high
degree of intervention in all cases, nor would a meaningful long-run relationship
necessarily show up systematically in every country.
Consider, for instance, that most of the literature just referenced has concen-
trated on the experiences of a number of South East Asian countries with strong
interventionist governments, namely China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore;
or they have pointed on what is seen as considerable government involvement in
promoting innovation in, namely, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and other Nordic
countries. While the computed results of the long-run impacts in our analysis
are strongly confirmatory of those views, there are many other cases where the
expected association does not show up, namely Hong Kong, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway. Also, we do not observe, as would be expected, a strong role
for government coordination in the innovation and productivity achievements
of many frontier countries: the USA, and the UK, are key examples where such
interventions have been documented,80 yet they failed to show up in the data.
Likewise, we do not observe that in all cases the interaction term has a more
substantial impact than any of its individual components. For some catching up
countries that does seem to be the case, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand, but for many others it does not. For instance, for China, Hong
Kong and Israel, innovation alone appears to be much more important than
79Kim 1980, 1993, Freeman 1987, Nelson 1993, Page 1994, Wade 1996, 2009, Hall and
Soskice 2003, Rodrik 2005, Mohnen et al., 2006, Breznitz 2007, Lin et al., 2011, Lee 2013.
See Acemoglu et al., 2012, Stiglitz 2014 for a debate. See also Prashad 2013 for a provoking
discussion.
80Cohen 2010, Mazzucato 2013.
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foreign technology—alone or combined with innovation. Similarly, for some
frontier countries, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, the UK, the interaction term has the most influence; but
for the USA, Japan, and Italy, it is innovation.
However, as we have discussed, the fact that the expected structural coin-
tegration relationships fail to show up systematically does not invalidate the
statistical support for the hypotheses that we set out to test. While consid-
erable attention is needed to improve the quality of the data before we can
resort to valid generalizations, our focus on the entire distribution rather than
on individual country-by-country cases provides useful empirical evidence that
supports the relevance of our theory. In other words, our approach provides a
valuable indication that the main propositions in regard with the NIS frame-
work that we put forward in our theoretical discussion, hold for a number of
countries that include both those already at the frontier and those that have
been catching up.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In order to investigate the relationship between technology diffusion, innovation
and the ability of countries to catch-up; and also to assess econometrically the
contrasting claims between the mainstream and the evolutionary and NIS the-
ories in this regard, we set our research to determine whether over the long-run
the economic performance of countries, measured by the rate of growth of pro-
ductivity, hinges mostly on foreign technology, as the mainstream holds, or on
the interaction between (local) innovation and foreign technology, as evolution-
ary economists hold. Further, we also set our research to assess whether the
structural relationship between these variables (productivity, foreign technology
and innovation) is influenced positively, as expected, by the government through
the enforcement of the NIS system.
We have found two main results that support our theoretical reasoning and
the predictions of the hypotheses raised at the outset. The first is the evidence
of a structural long-run association between productivity and the interaction of
(local) innovation with foreign technology, which we have found is more feasible
in the case of successful cases of catching-up.
This result confirms the hypothesis that the interaction between (local) in-
novation and foreign technology should have a larger long-run growth impact
than when each of these components is taken in isolation. More noticeable, it
is consistent with our theoretical discussion and implies that, instead of “auto-
matic”, the growth effects of foreign technology are realized only when they are
combined with the learning and assimilation aspects that feature prominently
in the evolutionary view of innovation. In the context of our measurement of this
complex concept, using the share of workers devoted to cognitive non-routine
activities as a proxy for innovation, this means that the growth effects of tech-
nology inflows are realized only when there is a substantial amount of workers
able to convey the information, commercial opportunities, new directions and
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combinations, and areas of improvement related to the new technology.
Our result is therefore in stark contrast with earlier evidence that produc-
tivity in countries off the frontier hinges overall on foreign technology;81 and,
in more general terms, our result contradicts the mainstream tenet that it is
primarily the ability to adopt/imitate the technology of the most advanced
countries which appears to increase the potential of less developed countries to
catch-up.82
The second important result is the evidence of a positive long-run relation-
ship between government coordination and (local) innovation, which again we
have found is more likely to show up in the case of successful cases of catching
up. In the context of our research, using a synthetic indicator to capture a
variety of market and non market contextual conditions, this result confirms
our hypothesis that there is an structural association between the ability of
the government to coordinate the innovation system and the long-run growth
performance of the economy.
This means that, if governments want to enhance the process of economic
growth, conventional market institutions (property rights), stabilization policies
(fiscal and monetary), and price incentives (taxes, subsidies) would be more
probably insufficient to provide the right environment and boost innovation ac-
tivities. Therefore, governments should pursue innovation strategies and policies
that place more emphasis on the organization of the whole innovation system,
including all market and non market mechanisms that influence the structure
and functioning of business innovation activities.
The policy relevance of the evidence we have been able to glean seems obvi-
ous. As we have seen, taken together the impact of government coordination and
the impact of the interaction of (local) innovation with foreign technology on
productivity, these are mostly associated with countries that stand as successful
cases of catching-up, and also with countries that are already at the frontier.
This implies that there are substantial areas of improvement in this regard for
countries that remain stagnant and those that have kept lagging behind. Of
course, choosing the appropriate strategies and policy instruments in order to
boost innovation, increase growth and achieve higher levels of income shall de-
pend on a detail analysis of the economic and other contextual conditions that
are specific to each country.
We have already noted in our methodological discussion why considerable
attention is needed to improve the quality of the data before we can resort
to valid generalizations. However, it is worth emphasizing that our empirical
approach and our results provide suggestive evidence to support our theory
according to which innovation, broadly defined, is the true engine of long-run
growth and the whole process hinges critically and positively on the ability of
the government to lead the national system of innovation.
81Coe and Helpman 1995, Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister 1995, Keller 2002, 2004.
82Romer 1993, Spence 2011.
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Appendix 5A: Local innovation
The basic statistics with regard the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO) is provided by the International labor Organization (ILO).
The aim of this classification is to organize jobs into a defined set of groups
according to the tasks and duties undertaken by workers. There are four versions
of the classification: ISCO-58 (released 1958), ISCO-68 (1968), ISCO-88 (1988),
and ISCO-08 (2008). Classification changes are addressed in correspondence
tables that are released with each subsequent version.
The following table shows the standard classification of working activities
under the ISCO methodology. The last column shows the classification of work-
ing categories in this chapter. Non-routine activities are considered to be the
source of innovation. We construct our database with information from var-
ISCO Working activities Category
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers Non-routine
2 Professionals Non-routine
3 Technicians and associate professionals Non-routine
4 Clerks Routine
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers Routine
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers Routine
7 Craft and related trade workers Routine
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers Routine
9 Elementary occupations Routine
Table 5A.1: Classification of ISCO working activities. The first two columns show
the classification of working activities according to the International Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations. The last columns shows the classification in this thesis.
Source: International Labor Organization, Author.
ious sources. In particular, the ILO database provides the required data for
many countries. This has been supplemented with further sources, namely,
the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Asian Productivity Organization
databases (APO), and several country specific databases.83
Our database is constructed by taking the share of each working category
with respect to the total. We obtain a consolidated data set by filling in the
missing data with linear interpolation provided there are not more that 5 blanks
in between non-missing data points. We also projected some values provided
the extrapolation involves less than 4 points. The list of countries, first/last
years with observations, and total data points (excluding interpolated values),
are shown below for each of the FRCs, CUCs, STCs, and LGCs classifications.
83http://laborsta.ilo.org/ Total and economically active population and employment by oc-
cupation; http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb Eco/dyb eco.htm Ta-
ble 5 - Employed population by occupation (ISCO), age and sex: 1995 - 2014;
http://interwp.cepal.org/anuario estadistico/anuario 2014/en/index.asp Structure of the ur-
ban employed population by occupational group In accordance with the Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO, 1988) of ILO. http://www.apo-
tokyo.org/wedo/measurement APO Productivity Database 2014 Version 2 (xlsx) [Updated
31 January 2015]
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country First
Obs.
Last
Obs.
Total Obs.
FRCs Countries
1 France 1962 2008 47
2 Belgium 1961 2008 48
3 Germany 1961 2008 48
4 Greece 1961 2008 48
5 Switzerland 1961 2008 48
6 United Kingdom 1961 2008 48
7 Denmark 1960 2008 49
8 Netherlands 1960 2008 49
9 Norway 1960 2008 49
10 Sweden 1960 2008 49
11 United States 1960 2008 49
12 Australia 1961 2011 51
13 Finland 1960 2010 51
14 Ireland 1961 2011 51
15 Luxembourg 1960 2010 51
16 Portugal 1960 2011 52
17 Spain 1960 2011 52
18 Turkey 1960 2011 52
19 Austria 1951 2008 58
20 Italy 1951 2008 58
21 New Zealand 1951 2008 58
22 Iceland 1950 2008 59
23 Canada 1951 2011 61
24 Japan 1950 2010 61
CUCs Countries
1 China 1982 2010 29
2 Antigua and Barbuda 1970 2001 32
3 Maldives 1977 2008 32
4 St.Vincent & Grenadines 1960 1991 32
5 Tunisia 1966 1997 32
6 Malaysia 1975 2008 34
7 Indonesia 1976 2010 35
8 Hong Kong 1976 2011 36
9 Egypt 1971 2007 37
10 Singapore 1974 2010 37
11 Grenada 1960 1998 39
12 Israel 1970 2008 39
13 Thailand 1971 2010 40
14 Dominica 1960 2001 42
15 Romania 1966 2008 43
16 Botswana 1964 2008 45
17 Cyprus 1960 2011 52
18 Macao 1960 2011 52
19 Malta 1957 2008 52
20 Korea, Republic of 1955 2007 53
Table 5A.2: Local Innovation Data Availability. We show the
first and last year with data. The last column shows the number
of years with non-missing values. Source: Author based on UNIDO-
INDSTAT4 - 2014 edition.
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country First
Obs.
Last
Obs.
Total Obs.
STCs Countries
1 Lesotho 1976 2006 31
2 Pakistan 1972 2008 37
3 Syria 1970 2007 38
4 Poland 1970 2008 39
5 Panama 1974 2013 40
6 Brazil 1970 2010 41
7 Chile 1970 2011 42
8 Fiji 1956 2007 44
9 St. Lucia 1960 2004 45
10 Belize 1960 2005 46
11 Bulgaria 1965 2011 47
12 Cambodia 1962 2008 47
13 Morocco 1960 2008 49
14 Trinidad & Tobago 1960 2008 49
15 Mauritius 1962 2011 50
16 Costa Rica 1963 2013 51
17 India 1961 2011 51
18 Hungary 1960 2011 52
19 Sri Lanka 1953 2008 56
20 Dominican Republic 1950 2013 64
LGCs Countries
1 Cote d‘Ivoire 1978 2008 11
2 Namibia 1981 2006 11
3 Burundi 1979 2006 12
4 Uganda 1981 2007 12
5 Central African Republic 1975 2007 14
6 Jordan 1961 2006 19
7 Rwanda 1978 2006 19
8 Iraq 1977 2007 21
9 Zimbabwe 1982 2006 21
10 Liberia 1962 2006 23
11 Ethiopia 1981 2006 26
12 Bolivia 1976 2011 36
13 Malawi 1977 2013 37
14 Lebanon 1970 2007 38
15 Philippines 1971 2008 38
16 Suriname 1964 2007 41
17 Sierra Leone 1963 2007 42
18 Zambia 1969 2010 42
19 Bangladesh 1961 2006 45
20 Honduras 1961 2006 45
21 Argentina 1960 2006 47
22 Nigeria 1963 2009 47
23 Mexico 1960 2008 49
24 South Africa 1960 2008 49
25 Ghana 1960 2010 51
26 Nepal 1961 2011 51
27 Uruguay 1963 2013 51
28 Ecuador 1962 2013 52
29 Jamaica 1960 2011 52
30 Paraguay 1962 2013 52
31 El Salvador 1961 2013 53
32 Peru 1961 2013 53
33 Iran 1956 2011 56
34 Guatemala 1950 2006 57
35 Colombia 1951 2008 58
Table 5A.3: Local Innovation Data Availability. We show the
first and last year with data. The last column shows the number
of years with non-missing values. Source: Author based on UNIDO-
INDSTAT4 - 2014 edition.
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Appendix 5B: Government Coordination
To construct our index, we use measures of labor productivity through all man-
ufacturing sectors according to the ISIC-Rev3 (Excluding recycling activities).
The following table presents a glimpse on how so-called Low and Medium Tech
sectors/activities (LMT), and High-tech sectors/activities (HT) are distributed
across industries.
Industry name (ISIC-Rev3) Classification High-Tech activities
15 Food and beverages LMT
16 Tobacco products LMT
17 Textiles LMT
18 Wearing apparel, fur LMT
19 Leather, leather products and footwear LMT
20 Wood products (excluding furniture) LMT
21 Paper and paper products LMT
22 Printing and publishing LMT
23 Coke, ref. petroleum prod. nuclear fuel LMT
24 Chemicals and chemical products HT Pharma/cals, Biotech, nanotech
25 Rubber and plastics products LMT
26 Non-metallic mineral products LMT
27 Basic metals LMT
28 Fabricated metal products LMT
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. HT
30 Office, accounting and computing mach. HT
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus HT nanoelectronics
32 Radio, television and communication eq. HT ICT
33 Medical, precision and optical inst. HT nanomedicine
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers HT
35 Other transport equipment HT Aircraft & spacecraft
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. LMT
Table 5B.1: Technology classifications for the manufacturing sector. Classification
based on the OECD standards. HT stands for High-Tech sectors and activities. LMT
stands for Low and Medium Technology activities.
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization dataset (UNIDO-
INDSTAT4 ISIC-Rev3), provides the basic statistics for our calculations. These
are figures of value added and number of employees which allow us to calculate
the productivity per worker for each industrial sector in each country with in-
formation. Value added figures are adjusted using the bilateral PPP convertion
ratios of each country with the USA that are calculated in the PWT V.8.084
The INDSTAT4 database presents availability and accuracy problems that
affect the reliability of productivity figures across sectors and countries, namely
missing data and/or sudden and extreme changes in the reported value added
and number of employees that form the basis of the calculation.
Our approach to address these difficulties in systematic.85 First, we smooth
each sector series by calculating 5 years centered moving averages using non-
84We use the variable “pl gdpo” which gives the price level of each country’s current GDP
(output-side) relative to the price of the same variable in the USA, with base year 2005=1
(See Feenstra et al., 2015)
85The large number of countries and economic sectors in the database prevents us from a
specific analysis of the series for individual countries.
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missing values; second, we fill in the missing values using linear interpolation
between non-missing data points. We also projected some values provided the
extrapolation involves less than 4 years. Unfortunately, our approach affects
the statistical properties of the data. In particular it may lead to underestimate
some statistics (standard errors) and overestimate others (p-values). Whilst we
warn the reader upon the accuracy/reliability of our dataset, and the need for
further research in this regard, we do think that our productivity calculations
are still useful to study the long-run dynamics we deal with in our regression
approach. We actually think that this information is good enough for deter-
mining the overall direction of productivity in each sector and country under
analysis.
The list of countries, first/last years with observations, and total data points
(excluding interpolated values), are shown below for each of the FRCs, CUCs,
STCs, and LGCs classifications.
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country First
Obs.
Last
Obs.
Total Obs. Sectors
FRCs Countries
1 New Zealand 1963 2010 37 18
2 Germany 1963 2010 41 18
3 Greece 1963 2007 41 18
4 Australia 1963 2011 42 22
5 United Kingdom 1963 2010 43 18
6 Italy 1967 2010 44 18
7 United States 1963 2008 44 18
8 Belgium 1963 2010 45 18
9 Denmark 1963 2010 45 18
10 Portugal 1963 2010 46 17
11 France 1963 2010 47 18
12 Netherlands 1963 2010 47 18
13 Turkey 1963 2009 47 18
14 Japan 1963 2010 48 17
15 Finland 1963 2010 48 18
16 Norway 1963 2010 48 18
17 Spain 1963 2010 48 18
18 Sweden 1963 2010 48 18
19 Austria 1963 2010 48 21
20 Ireland 1963 2010 48 22
21 Canada 1963 2011 49 18
CUCs Countries
1 Thailand 1968 2006 22 18
2 Botswana 1981 2011 25 2
3 Taiwan 1973 2006 26 18
4 China 1980 2007 28 18
5 Tunisia 1963 2007 30 18
6 Macao 1978 2011 34 16
7 Hong Kong 1973 2011 39 17
8 Egypt 1964 2010 40 18
9 Indonesia 1970 2011 41 17
10 Malaysia 1968 2010 42 18
11 Malta 1963 2009 45 16
12 Israel 1963 2010 47 16
13 Korea, Republic of 1963 2010 48 18
14 Cyprus 1963 2011 49 17
15 Singapore 1963 2011 49 18
STCs Countries
1 Morocco 1976 2011 31 18
2 Pakistan 1963 2006 32 18
3 Sri Lanka 1966 2010 34 18
4 Fiji 1968 2011 36 14
5 Syria 1963 2005 37 9
6 Hungary 1970 2010 39 18
7 Poland 1970 2011 41 18
8 Mauritius 1968 2011 44 17
9 Chile 1963 2008 46 18
10 India 1963 2010 48 18
LGCs Countries
1 Iraq 1970 2011 19 18
2 Burundi 1971 2010 21 7
3 Madagascar 1967 2006 26 12
4 Bangladesh 1967 2006 29 18
5 Ecuador 1963 2008 46 18
6 Jordan 1963 2011 46 18
7 Iran 1963 2010 47 18
8 Colombia 1963 2011 49 18
Table 5B.2: Government Coordination Data Availability. We show the first and last
year with data. “Total Obs.” shows the number of years with non-missing data. The
last column shows the number of sectors. Source UNIDO-INDSTAT4 - 2014 edition.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion.
6.1 Contributions.
This thesis has built upon the premise that the contesting views upon the eco-
nomics of technology diffusion and innovation that are underlined by the main-
stream growth economics, on one side, and the evolutionary and NIS frame-
works, on the other, makes it difficult to think seriously upon what are the
true determinants of growth and catching-up in backward countries. That is
because having equally feasible yet incompatible conceptual frameworks makes
it hard to clearly distinguish the substantive factors that really matter, or to
reconcile the theory with the stylized facts of reality. And the uncertainty, in
turn, makes harder the design an implementation of sound economic policies in
order to influence long-run objectives.
Therefore, our main endeavor throughout was to provide a bridge between
these theoretical approaches. We engaged in the development of an alternative
analytical framework better able to account for the empirical evidence and to
explain in a more consistent fashion both the technology aspects that matter
the most with a focus on the long-run and the proper role of government in this
regard.
To reach this core objective, we revisited in Chapter 2 the observed major
trends in economic growth and catching-up patterns across-countries since the
mid-twentieth century. Based on these empirical observations, we proposed a
classification of countries between those that are already at the frontier of in-
come and technology (FRCs); those that might be considered successful cases
of catching-up (CUCs); those that have evidently remained stagnant over long
periods of time (STCs); and, finally, those that might be referred to as lag-
gard in the sense that they have kept falling further and further behind over
time (LGCs). We proposed also a simple mathematical formula to show that
only the CUCs exhibit feasible time frames to close the income gap with the
frontier (between 9 and 54 years). By contrast, countries in the STCs classifica-
tion are between 38-191 years short of the frontier; and countries in the LGCs
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classification between 227-302 years.1
Then, we provided, in Chapter 3, an assessment of the key aspects that raise
much of the controversy and disagreement between the mainstream and the
evolutionary and NIS theories. In line with our objectives, our assessment was
focused on such aspects as learning and assimilation, and the Schumpeterian
notions of entrepreneurship that feature prominently in the evolutionary view of
innovation; we stressed the distinction and interaction between the concepts of
innovation and the diffusion/adoption of foreign technology; and, finally, we dis-
cussed the underlying differences between the mainstream and NIS approaches
about the proper role of government intervention in order to boost the (local) in-
novation system. An important aspect of our assessment is the proposition that
ideological considerations play an important role to understand the methodolog-
ical approach in each of the above mentioned theories, specifically in terms of
their ability to capture the stylized facts of reality and in terms of their policy
implications.
Based on an extensive body or research within the field, in Chapter 3 we
also associated the NIS framework with three core aspects of government action
to boost innovation: i) leadership, which refers to the production of innovations
by the government itself; ii) sponsorship, which refers to the public funding of
innovations initiated by the private sector; and iii) coordination, which places
stress on the role of government to ease the spread of innovations produced in
different parts of the economy (universities, industries, government labs). We
argued extensively why and how these aspects of the NIS system suggest a more
active and complex role for the government in order to influence the production
of innovation and promote long-run growth. Noteworthy, we stressed also why
these arguments warrant an institutional/policy framework that falls beyond
mere market failures fixing interventions.
In Chapter 4, we formulated a mathematical model that brings together the
core ideas of each of the aforementioned theories. We have argued that, on tech-
nical grounds, it is perfectly feasible to develop analytically tractable models to
investigate, in the mainstream tradition, the long-run effects of government in-
tervention along the insights of the evolutionary and the NIS theories. Hence,
our model sought to put together the conventional intertemporal optimization
approach—proper of mainstream economics—the evolutionary perspective of
innovation and the long-run impacts of the interaction between foreign technol-
ogy and local innovation underlined by the distinct aspects of concern in the
NIS framework, with a focus on the financial sponsorship mechanism that has
become widespread in this approach. Further, the proposed model was set to
provide an accurate description of the observed dynamics between the classifi-
cation of countries drawn in Chapter 2. In our view, the proposed mathematical
model mimics well the stylized facts and is able to show why and how a focus
on the whole innovation system led by the government is warranted in the re-
search of substantive questions about economic growth in the long-run, and the
1These results are based on the median of the distribution for each country classification.
See Section 2.4.
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catching-up prospects of backward countries.
Consistent with the core research question at the outset—whether catching-
up hinges on the ability of backward countries to enforce the adoption of foreign
technology or, instead, on their ability to set an institutional environment that
promotes (local) innovation—in Chapter 5, we endeavored to provide an econo-
metric test of our theoretical model. We ran cointegration tests country-by-
country in order to assess whether a number of structural long-run relationships
of interest are supported by the data, namely, i) a structural long-run relation-
ship between foreign technology and productivity; ii) a structural long-run re-
lationship between the interaction of foreign technology with (local) innovation
and productivity; and iii) a structural long-run relationship between (govern-
ment) coordination and productivity. Noteworthy, data limitations prevented
us from a complete assessment of the economic relevance of the NIS framework
in the long-run (i.e., including leadership and sponsorship issues). The fact that
most aspects related to this framework are still poorly understood and mea-
sured, and more so in countries off the frontier, has led us to place them as a
subject for future research.
The key indicators used to capture the long-run relationships of interest
were constructed based on earlier insights in the literature. We followed the
practice of using R&D expenditures in frontier countries as a proxy for foreign
technology, which spreads to countries falling behind through the imports chan-
nel. In turn, to measure innovation and coordination, we relied on two pieces
of earlier research in the context of technology change and innovation: first, the
distinction in numerous studies of labor market segmentation between workers
devoted to cognitive non-routine tasks, and workers devoted to routine tasks;
second, the distinction drawn in many innovation studies between high-tech and
low-tech economic activities.
Our basic argument goes that high-tech sectors (nanotechnology, biotech-
nology, ICT, machines and equipment) determine technology trajectories that
certainly are important to understand the contributions of foreign technology to
the economic achievements of backward countries. Those trajectories, however,
are similar for all countries, and along them lots of the innovations that in the
end affect the path of long-run growth and catching-up take place. This ba-
sic argument is supported by empirical evidence that suggest that, even in the
most advanced countries, innovation and long-term growth are to a large extent
related to low-tech activities (e.g., food production, metal products, paper and
printing); that is, these are innovations that arise in the context of operative
processes—rather than a result of R&D activities—and are mostly initiated by
the staff responsible for the ongoing functions.
We have argued largely throughout our discussion of innovation in this thesis
that the above distinctions within working categories and technology activities
fit well the notion of innovation documented in evolutionary economics. And on
the basis of those arguments, we have associated a country’s innovation capacity
with the share of workers in cognitive non-routine activities.
In turn, as a proxy for government coordination we set an index based on
the simple average of four components: labor productivity (across high and low
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tech activities), financial development, human capital and governance. While we
have widely recognized that our approach to this subject accounts just for a mild
version of the aspects of government coordination that are emphasized in the NIS
framework, it is true that the indicators in our approach provide quite a simple
and straightforward manner to capture issues of government coordination that
are of little debate. That is, the proposed coordination index relates industry-
specific productivity achievements with the availability of financial resources,
human capital and overall government policy practices, which are all aspects
about which mainstream, evolutionary and NIS economists hardly disagree.2
We have argued that a reasonable interpretation of the findings in our econo-
metric approach relies on the patterns of the distribution of the impulse-response
functions that follow from the cointegration analysis, rather than on the out-
comes obtained for individual countries.
By focusing on the median-statistics of the overall distribution of these im-
pacts, the econometric results provide suggestive evidence in support of the
propositions advanced earlier in Chapter 5. That is, they suggest that the in-
teraction of (local) innovation and foreign technology is a major engine of growth
and catching-up. In particular, for the group of countries at the frontier (FRCs),
and for the group of countries that have been successfully catching-up with them
(CUCs), we found that the impact of the interaction term is higher than the
impact of any of its individual components, namely the individual impact of
either (local) innovation or foreign technology. By contrast, countries that we
classified as stagnant (STCs) or laggard (LGCs) show a lower response to this
interaction even if any of the impacts on (local) innovation (for the LGCs) or
foreign technology (for the STCs) spurs a positive productivity response. In
addition, we found that the impact of government coordination is particularly
large in the group of catching-up countries.
While we have widely acknowledged that due to data limitations and other
technical difficulties found in our statistical approach we cannot generalize these
relationships, we also find it fair to reckon that the econometric evidence sup-
ports the validity of our theory. Our findings provide a clear indication that,
unlike the STCs and the LGCs, the catching-up patterns of the CUCs countries
are characterized by their ability to efficiently combine the benefits of technol-
ogy diffusion with the benefits of (local) innovation along a process featured
by the increase of cognitive non-routine occupational categories, and also by
substantial government coordination. In light of our discussion of the main-
stream, evolutionary and NIS theories, these econometric results are in strong
contrast with the mainstream emphasis that the potential of backward coun-
tries to catch-up hinges on their ability to adopt the technology of the most
2We have discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2, that a strong version of government coordi-
nation would need to meet most of the disagreement on the coordination role of government
between mainstream and evolutionary economics: discretionary interventions to favor spe-
cific sectors through government procurement, directed and subsidized credit facilities, and
the explicit coordination of economic targets between the government and private sector, for
instance through deliberation councils (see also Page 1994, Wade 1996, 2009). Unfortunately,
systematic indicators about these aspects are not available.
174
advanced countries. Instead, they provide evidence in support of the evolution-
ary emphasis on learning and assimilation. Additionally, the results favor the
NIS view that catching-up depends largely on the ability of countries to enforce
the (local) innovation system.
All in all, our attempt in this thesis has been to provide a new rationale
to study many features associated with the field of international development.
The main theme in our discussion is that much progress can be done in these
areas, namely the study of economic growth, economic development and catch-
ing up issues, by linking the insights of the evolutionary theory and the NIS
framework—which are much richer and policy oriented—and the mainstream
methodological and analytical framework—which is more adequate to study
the technical and mathematical issues that are of importance when the focus is
on the economy as a planning problem over the long-run.
Of course, we do not pretend—and indeed we were not aimed to do so
from the beginning—to offer a definitive answer to the problems of growth and
catching-up discussed throughout. Not only because the limitations mentioned
above still prevent us from providing more definitive answers, but because the
issues of technology diffusion, innovation and government intervention that are
at the heart of our discussion are inevitably highly controversial. Again, further
theoretical research, better quality data and convincing empirical support would
be necessary before we can provide a suitable generalization of the theoretical
framework that we have proposed in this regard.
6.2 Limitations.
The weaknesses in our approach are both theoretical and empirical. At the
theoretical level, the main limitation is the treatment of the government as ex-
ogenous to the economic system. That is, in spite of the fact that its role in
fostering innovation, long-run growth and catching-up is explicitly modelled, in
the theoretical model of Chapter 3 we have highly simplified the public sector
and the problems created by fiscal and monetary affairs. Clearly, a better as-
sessment of the ability of government to coordinate, fund and lead the overall
system of innovation would need to take care of these affairs—and thus the
conduct of fiscal and monetary policies.
Another limitation regards to the implicit assumption in our approach of
a virtuous interaction between political and economic interests. Certainly, the
NIS framework relies mostly on examples drawn from country specific cases, but
the whole approach is highly normative, namely heavily shaped by the view that
policymakers are benevolent and do their best to boost innovation and long-run
growth.
In practice, however, the choice and implementation of adequate economic
policies are frequently shown to be hampered by conflicting interests that reflect
the preferences of competing groups in society. In Chapter 4, we mentioned
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some strands of the literature that seeks to explain the failure, observed in
some countries, to profit from technology diffusion due to political elites that
explicitly block the adoption of new technologies. However, the mathematical
model that we proposed in the same chapter do not account for such political
constraints in the implementation/workings of the NIS system. In that sense,
the proposed model still has to overcome the political naiveness implicit in the
modelling approach.
On the empirical side, the key limitations of our approach have been related
to aspects of data availability and data quality. Indeed, the main reason why
we focused on a mild, instead of a strong, version on issues of government co-
ordination; and also the reason why we did not pursue an assessment of other
aspects of the NIS framework, namely leadership and sponsorship, was due to
data availability. As we largely discussed in Chapter 5, the empirical assessment
of these three roles of government involves aspects that are poorly or not sys-
tematically measured anywhere, and less so in backward countries. While the
refinement of our dataset in this regard is an important limitation to address
in order to improve the reliability of our empirical results, certainly it is not an
issue easy to solve in the near future.
Besides data availability, there are various reasons why the economic and
statistical significance of the econometric results we found need to be taken with
caution. For one thing, the data on our variables of interest (foreign technology,
local innovation, government coordination) are not directly observable, thus we
had relied here on “synthetic” indicators, which—as is usually the case—raise
many issues.
In our view, some of the chosen indicators are better, or more convincing,
than others. For instance, the use of cognitive and non-routine working cate-
gories seems to us a plaussible manner to capture the innovation capacity of a
country’s workforce, and more so than the use of indicators of education that has
been customary in other studies in this context. As we have discussed above, our
index focuses on what the workers’ capabilities are used for in practice rather
than the potential capabilities of the people still in the education system. Yet,
other indicators in our approach, say the index of government coordination,
might raise much controversy upon the adequacy of our variable definitions and
the way the concepts are actually captured by the data. These limitations come
in addition to the classical problem of measurement errors, which in turn affects
the consistent estimation of the parameters of interest.
Another problem related with the dataset in our empirical approach is data
quality. Even in cases where there is a fair deal of information for especific
indicators in our study, we have found problems related with the accuracy,
coherence (over time), and international comparability of the reported data.
For instance, methodological changes over time or across countries are many
times evident but not explicitly reported/explained at the country level, which
is an issue that may seriously have hampered our ability to find systematic
support for our predictions in the econometric approach.
Yet, while we have to acknowledge that our database is in need of further
expansion and quality betterment. In our approach above, whenever posible
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we have corrected the conflicting data to make it consistent across countries
and over time. The adjustments to the original dataset have been done in a
systematic way and we have reported the changes in the methodological notes
accompannying statistical tables. But, certainty, quality adjustment is a contin-
uos process, and thus further reviews and eventual improvements are possible
in our future research.
In closing this section, it is worth mentioning that the data limitations just
mentioned are not exclusive to our investigation in this thesis. The extended
practice of constructing synthetic indicators aimed to compare technology ca-
pabilities across countries is faced with similar limitations.3 And other authors
in this context have come to the same conclusion as we did: to rely on workable
simplifications that allow focus on comparable standards for a large number of
countries and over long periods of time.
6.3 Future Research.
Of course, we do not render any of the theoretical and empirical limitations in
the previous sections as reasons to think that our approach is ill founded or off
the mark, but rather as issues to be addressed in future research.
For instance, the theoretical model that we have developed in Chapter 3 may
be extended into a number of areas, namely to consider a coherent foundation
with respect to the role of public policy, taking account of fiscal and mone-
tary affairs; or it may be provided with rigorous microeconomic foundations in
relation with the production of sectoral innovations.
Also from the theoretical standpoint, our model may be extended to study
the role of politics in influencing the role of government within the NIS system;
and thus the influence of the political process in the policymaking and institu-
tions that affect the funding and spread of innovations conducted by universities,
government labs, the private sector, and so on.
Likewise, aside of the issues related to the refinement and extension of the
dataset on innovation that we have initiated here, further research in the empiri-
cal front may be conducted to deal with adequate modifications of some standard
software packages for analyzing time series in the context of panel data—like
it is the case in our empirical investigation above. For instance, a research
focus here may be on the problems that we have identified of lack of robust-
ness and consistency between the estimation results drawn from standard panel
data cointegration procedures and the results drawn from a country-by-country
cointegration approach that is based on standard times-series procedures.
To sum up, we do think of the present thesis as bringing in new ideas for the
academic research of economic growth and development. Those ideas however,
will need to be perfected through further research. Looking ahead, the task is
3Archibugi et al., 2009
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to develop better models to explore feasible circumstances for efficient coordi-
nation, sponsorship, and leadership of a country’s national innovation system.
As Blanchard once pointed out:
...the good news for policymakers is that there is indeed a core
of usable macroeconomics; the good news for macroeconomic re-
searchers is that there is a lot of work still to be done.4
4Blanchard, 1997
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PROPOSITIONS
accompanying the thesis
“Endogenous Growth with National Innovation Systems: The
Ultimate Route to Catching Up in the World Economy.”
Juan Ricardo Perilla Jime´nez
1. The popularity of new products is a decreasing function of the time they
have been in the marketplace. By its very nature, the success of innovation
is inevitably temporary and very short-lived. New products that survive
competition would work wonders for the first generation, but they do it
less well for the second generation, and still less for the third (This thesis).
2. The crux of innovation is that, at length, the pressures of market selection
and competition and, hence, consumers’ craze for the “new” compel pro-
ducers to permanently seek for newer market strategies and novel products
(This thesis).
3. The process of economic growth is overall a reflection of the dynamics of
innovation. The discovery/invention of major technologies helps to resolve
the productivity problem, beyond that the problem that remains is what
to produce, e.g., how to take advantage of the commercial opportunities
opened up by the newest technology breakthroughs (This thesis).
4. It is certainly the case that controversy rather than consensus is the un-
derlying feature that ultimately leads to the creation of new and valuable
knowledge (This thesis).
5. Truth matters less than the talent with which some economists mistake.
6. Physicians bury their mistakes, lawyers put them in jail, economists pub-
lish them (MEC).
7. Those who do not understand that two explanations that oppose each
other can be perfectly possible and defensible should not be an economist.
8. The relative merits of rules versus discretion in economic policy making is
more complicated than is commonly understood. The great risk theoreti-
cal economists run is the possibility of searching for permanent solutions
to transitory problems.
9. Nothing too regretful as reading, simply because they write about inter-
esting things, the talent-less writer.
10. Admiring something that is not amusing is halfway between admiring
just what is amusing and being amused just but what is admirable. Yet,
admiring just what is admirable denotes suspicious taste.
11. Nothing too complicated as pretending understanding.
202
VALORISATION ADDENDUM
This thesis explores on ideas that connect the innovation capabilities of coun-
tries with their chances to expand income, economic growth and prosperity op-
portunities for all. On these grounds, the research that has been conducted
here turns out to be relevant for society at large, even if only potentially and
indirectly, and most probably in the distant future.
On reflection, it is fair to say that looking for immediate recognition and
implementation of the fruits of academic research is complicated. Quite the
contrary, particularly when it comes to the kind of fundamental research that
is conducted in the field of economics, it may take a considerable length of time
and transformation before new ideas are accepted and implemented in a way
so that they have practical impact, and—no wonder—lots of new ideas never
make it to this final stage.
Even when the results of scientific research withstand the test of time, which
happens when and if they are recognized of some value, their usefulness to the
profession, the economy and the society are constantly verified against the facts
of reality. New theories and models are always a subject of controversy in
every field of science. New ideas can and often are modified in part, or fully
reformulated until nothing remains from the original, or they can be rejected
after a while of popularity. But, to be sure, by no means being a subject of
controversy is a minor success. After all, many of the more modest findings
never make it to the controversial territory at all. It is certainly the case that
controversy rather than consensus is the underlying feature that ultimately leads
to the creation of new and valuable knowledge.
In brief, whether the ultimate ambition of this research to improve social
prosperity is going to be reached or not, will depend on whether these ideas
are found worth of controversy and dialogue by the scientific community, and
whether they will be able to influence political decision at some point in the dis-
tant future. Therefore, this research is firstly intended for researchers, academics
and policymakers who are interested in innovation policy, economic growth and
development economics.
Since the questions related to the relationship between technology diffusion,
the production of innovation, innovation policy, economic growth and develop-
ment economics, have been explored in the literature from different theoretical
perspectives. And those perspectives involve different justifications for the role
of government in setting up the right conditions to promote an environment for
innovation which, in turn, is expected to determine the ability of less developed
countries to catch up, in this thesis we have proposed an organizing framework
to understand how the innovation system operates in the first place.
One key lesson obtained from this framework is the need to rectify the theo-
retical structure from which logical policy recommendations are derived regard-
ing the promotion of innovation as the fundamental engine of economic growth.
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Specifically, we explain why it is needed to introduce within such a framework
the explicit role of government alongside other features of the innovation sys-
tem that we have identified and discussed within this thesis. Innovation has
some of those special characteristics that K. Arrow attributed to health ser-
vices, where private interest is not well defined, which let him to famously
declare that even though (free) enterprise is desirable as much as possible, it
would have to be supplemented with as much intervention as necessary. By its
very nature, innovation does not fit in the conventional economics’ rationale
of perfectly foresighted maximizing individuals mainly—but not only—because
innovation involves lots of uncertainty. This special characteristic implies that
markets let alone would much probably produce too little innovation.
Actually, we provide a strong claim that the policy relevance of academic
research on this front, namely the relationship between the promotion of inno-
vation and long-run economic growth and catching up, is better informed by
the evolutionary and NIS approaches to the study of development in backwards
economies, and that these approaches contrast with the mainstream theory of
economic growth, the distance from frontier and advantages of backwardness
approaches. The point that conventional economics has failed to convincingly
incorporate the economics of innovation is widely recognized by other academic
economists. For instance, Edmund Phelps, a leading economist, has pointed out
that, despite their sophistication in other respects, what is wrong with conven-
tional approaches to explain economic growth is that those approaches make
no room for the possibilities created by indigenous innovation, which is in open
contrast with the fact of reality that everywhere people are constantly imagining
new products and using their creativity to build them.
The novelty of our approach is not the introduction of the evolutionary the-
ory. This theoretical perspective has been around since the very foundations of
economics as a social science. Marshall, one of the founders of what we know as
the neoclassical approach, and also various other classical economists are known
to have declared in not few occasions that the advance of economics is closely re-
lated to the evolution of biological systems where both the inner and outer forms
of the system are constantly changing. The famous Marshallian quote according
to which “The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in
economic dynamics” is often presented to point out that economic phenomena
can be seen as a natural process. It has “cooperation”, “competition”, “selec-
tion”, “survival of the fittest” and other many features that are also commonly
found to be descriptive characteristics and processes in the field of biology.
In this thesis, we concentrate less in the analogy between biological and
economic systems. But, we often use the metaphor to emphasize, even though at
times implicitly, that the process of innovation is closely related to the biological
process. For example, we discuss how the pressures of market selection and
competition—which is triggered by consumers’ craze for the “new”—compel
producers to permanently seek for newer market strategies and novel products.
By its very nature, innovation is a process that involves permanent change as
producers know that any product innovation that survive competition may do
wonders for the first generation, but they do it less well for the second generation,
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and still less for the third.
While real life examples of innovation are easily associated with high techno-
logical devices produced somewhere by sophisticated means and highly trained
scientists working in centers of excellence of the advanced world economies, the
truth is that innovation, as an engine of economic activity, is found everywhere.
Kinder eggs, the popular chocolate candy that is found practically all around
the world would be much less popular would not children come to realize there is
a good chance of a ceaseless offer of new collectible miniature toys packed inside
them. And, likewise, the baker around the corner knows—even if they probably
aren’t conscious of possessing such a knowledge—that rather than producing
the whole stock of bakery early in the morning, a successful business depends
on the smell of baking bread instead, hence, on having a permanent offer of
freshly baked products all through the day.
Extending this line of reasoning to the economy wide level and to the con-
text of international economics we reach the conclusion that, however important,
technology diffusion and its adoption by backward countries would be ineffec-
tive without domestic assimilation, a process by which the new technology is
found to have practical and profitable commercial applications. Technology ac-
quisition matters, but the wonder of technology progress lies less in technology
consumption per se and more in being able to put technology to productive use.
The diffusion of major technologies certainly helps to resolve the produc-
tivity problem, e.g, they help to resolve the problem of ‘how to produce’. But
beyond the ability to produce more of the same products, or producing them
at a lower unitary cost, the problem that remains is ‘what to produce’. This in-
volves thinking of new product varieties able to lure new and existing costumers
and, more in general, thinking of novel strategies to take advantage of the com-
mercial opportunities opened up by the newest technology breakthroughs, both
in domestic and international markets. Thus, we claim in this thesis that a
broad view of innovation inclusive of both low-tech and high-tech innovations is
needed if we are going to gain better understanding of the process of economic
growth and catching up of backward countries.
The innovation systems approach is also well established in the research into
the impact of innovation on economic growth and catching up issues. In this
thesis we have narrowed the numerous and some times overlapping features at-
tributed in the specialized literature to this framework, to just three mechanisms
that we consider essential and encompassing among the many desirable charac-
teristics of a good innovation system. We call them leadership, sponsorship and
coordination mechanisms.
We have shown that leadership, which relates to public innovation and col-
laboration with the private sector; coordination, which summarizes a wide range
of strategies designed by the government to encourage the spread of innovation
throughout the different sectors of economic activity and the different parts of
the innovation system; and sponsorship, which copes with a broad range of pub-
lic programs to financially support private innovation initiatives, are the three
major defining attributes of the innovation system approach as it has been ac-
tually implemented in practical policy making in the most successful catching
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up economies worldwide.
The main theme in our discussion of this framework is that knowledge of the
three components of the NIS approach can be useful in formulating innovation
promoting strategies. Based on this rationale, policymakers can realize that
the formulation of innovation policy goes far beyond friendly regulations to
foreign technology and mere financing facilities that are currently stressed in
some branches of the literature, and which have become commonplace in the
policy practice and growth strategies of less successful economies.
However, we have stressed also that much progress can be done in analyzing
the actual economic growth and development impact of innovation by linking
the insights of the evolutionary theory and the NIS framework—which are con-
ceptually richer and more policy oriented—with the mainstream methodological
and analytical framework—which is firmly established an approach to study the
technical and mathematical issues that are of importance when the focus is on
the economy as a planning problem over the long-run.
It is hard to know whether the ideas developed here will influence actual
decision making or not at some point of time, so that they can reach the stage
of social impact. A most immediate step toward this ‘major goal’ is to boost
controversy and, hopefully, to make it through the contest for the “survival of
the fittest”.
To this end, parts of the research that led to the present thesis have been
submitted for publication in specialized outlets: the World Bank Economic Re-
view, The Journal of Economic Growth, the Journal of Evolutionary Economics
and the Journal of International Trade and Economic Development among oth-
ers. We have obtained encouraging peer review feedback suggesting that by no
means our research approach is off the mark. And also, we have managed to
publish some of the submissions and others are close to being published: Perilla
2015, 2019a, 2019b. Also, we have taken part in conferences and seminars where
the ideas developed in this thesis have being presented to academic communities.
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This thesis is endeavored to address the question whether and how 
catching up by backward countries depends more on technology 
diffusion or on indigenous innovation. We claim that the apparently obvious 
answer to this question involves a range of frequently controversial issues 
regarding the very definition of innovation and the role of government 
within the innovation system.
One of the key lessons the avid reader may derive from the discussion of 
the theory and empirical evidence throughout the different chapters of the 
book, is the need to rectify the theoretical structure from which relevant 
policy recommendations may be obtained regarding the promotion of 
innovation as a fundamental engine of economic growth. We hold that 
such recommendations are better informed by the evolutionary and 
innovation systems approaches than by the more extended reliance on 
the advantage of backwardness approach.
Summing up, we argue that a broad view of innovation, inclusive of both 
low-tech and high-tech innovations, is needed if we are going to gain a 
better understanding of the determinants of growth and catching up in 
backward countries. And among the many desirable characteristics of 
a good innovation system, we hold that there are three encompassing 
mechanisms that feature prominently in successful catching up 
economies regarding the role of government: leadership, sponsorship 
and coordination. Thus we conclude that, despite their importance, to be 
effective, innovation policy needs to go beyond the conventional focus 
on financial facilities and friendly regulations to foreign technology.
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